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The concept of biodiversity offsets has been around since the 1970s, but it is only in the 
last decade that a substantial interest has been shown by international bodies and 
governments in what benefits offsets can provide and how such biodiversity offsets 
should be implemented.  South Africa has also shown interest in the tool, although as a 
recent entry into the biodiversity offset arena, there is currently a dearth of literature 
around South Africa’s regulatory and enabling legislation for biodiversity offsets and 
whether such legislation is adequate to ensure effective control and utilisation of 
biodiversity offsets. 
 
Through the review of international guidelines, South African and foreign statutes and 
policy documents, and a case study, this dissertation explores whether South Africa’s 
legislation currently provides an adequate framework for the implementation of 
biodiversity offsets, through the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, and 
how this framework might be improved.  
 
This review shows that it is possible, within the constraints of administrative law, to 
utilise the EIA process to manage and implement biodiversity offsets. The review also 
highlights that there are several aspects which are not provided for in the legislation, 
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CHAPTER 1                                                                                
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
A growing world population and greater demand for resources has resulted in 
significant habitat loss1 and increasing pressure on biodiversity.2, 3 A corresponding 
increasing understanding of the real impact of this degradation and loss of biodiversity 
in terms of the world economy and the health and well-being of people, in particular 
those most reliant on the direct use of resources,4 has, however, highlighted that limits 
must be put in place to ensure the protection of biodiversity whilst still allowing for 
resource utilisation and development, namely, the implementation of sustainable use 
and development. 
 
Sustainable development as a concept was first brought to the fore in the 1987 report by 
the World Commission on Environmental and Development termed ‘Our Common 
Future’, which is also referred to as the Brundtland report. 5  This sustainable 
development concept has subsequently become widely accepted 6  and appears in 
international instruments,7 has been invoked in international courts and tribunals,8 and 
                                                 
1 Gillespie, A,  A Missing Piece of the Conservation Puzzle: Biodiversity Offsets, prepared for New 
Zealand’s Department of Conservation, 29 March 2012, available at http://www.doc.govt.nz/ 
Documents/conservation/missing-piece-of-the-conservation-puzzle.pdf  (accessed September 2013), 3. 
2 Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity defines biodiversity as ‘the variability among living 
organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species, 
and of ecosystems.’ Convention on Biological Diversity, available at http://www.cbd.int/ 
convention/text/ (accessed September 2013), 3. 
3 Gillespie, op cit note 1, at 3-4; Nellemann, C & Corcoran, E (eds), Dead Planet, Living Planet – 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Restoration for Sustainable Development. A Rapid Response Assessment, 
United Nations Environment Programme, available at http://www.grida.no/publications/rr/dead-planet/ 
(accessed October 2013),6; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems And Human Well-Being: 
Synthesis, available at http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf 
(accessed September 2013), 2; Kiesecker, JM et al, ‘A Framework for Implementing Biodiversity 
Offsets: Selecting Sites and Determining Scale’ (2009) 59 (1) Bioscience, 77–84, 77. 
4 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report concluded that ‘any progress achieved in addressing the 
Millennium Development Goals of poverty and hunger eradication, improved health, and 
environmental sustainability is unlikely to be sustained if most of the environmental services on which 
humanity relies continue to be degraded’ - Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, op cit note 3, at 2.  
5 This report defined sustainable developments as ‘development which meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. United Nations 
‘Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future’ 1987 
General Assembly Annex to document A/42/427 - Development and International Cooperation: 
Environment, available at http://conspect.nl/pdf/Our_Common_Future-Brundtland_Report_1987.pdf 
(accessed March 2014), at para 27. 
6 Sands, P & Peel, J Principles of International Environmental Law 3rd (2012), at 206. 
7 Examples include; (i) the Rio declaration which sets out 27 principles as determined at the 1987 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, with Principle 2 and 3 specifically related to 
sustainable development; - United Nations, ‘Rio Declaration of Environment and Development’ Report 
of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,  Rio de Janerio, Brazil,  
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has provided a conceptual framework for the development of both international9 and 
national environmental laws. 
 
Sands puts forward that, internationally, sustainable development is recognised as 
commonly being composed of four elements, namely (i) the need to preserve resources 
for current and future generations (principle of intergenerational equity); (ii) 
exploitation of natural resources in a sustainable manner (principle of sustainable use); 
(iii) equitable use of natural resources (principle of intrageneration equity); and (iv) 
environmental considerations are integrated into economic and other plans, projects and 
programmes (principle of integration).10 
 
One tool which is increasingly being put to the forefront as a mechanism to effect 
sustainable development is biodiversity offsets. 11  The concept of biodiversity offsets 
has been around since the 1970s12 but it is only in the last decade that there has been a 
significant interest shown by international bodies and governments in what benefits 
offsets can provide and how such biodiversity offsets should be implemented.13  In 
                                                                                                                                               
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (1992), available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multi 
lingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163 (accessed July 2014); (ii) Agenda 21, which has 
the concept of sustainability as a thread throughout the document, but in particular looks at sustainable 
consumption (Chapter 4), sustainable human settlement development (Chapter 7), and the integration of 
environment and development (Chapter 8), - United Nations, Agenda 21 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development,  Rio de Janerio, Brazil, available at 
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf (accessed September 2014); 
and (iii) the Convention on Biological Diversity, whereby the website for the CBD states that the 
convention ‘was inspired by the world community's growing commitment to sustainable development, 
and that the convention represents a dramatic step forward in the conservation of biological diversity, 
the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use 
of genetic resources’, available at http://www.cbd.int/history/default.shtml (accessed July 2014). 
8  An example being the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Project - Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, 1. C. J. Reports 1997, at Para [140] available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf (accessed July 2014). 
9 International Law Association ‘New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to 
Sustainable Development, 2 April 2002’ International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics (2002) 2: 211–216, available at http://cisdl.org/tribunals/pdf/NewDelhiDeclaration.pdf 
(accessed July 2014). 
10 Sands, op cit note 6, at 107. 
11 ten Kate, K et al, Biodiversity offsets: Views, experience, and the business case., Gland & Cambridge: 
IUCN & Insight Investment (2004), 78; Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), 
Biodiversity Offset Design Handbook-Updated Washington DC: BBOP (2012), available at 
http://bbop.forest-trends.org/ (accessed September 2013),1; McKenney BA & Kiesecker JM, ‘Policy 
Development for Biodiversity Offsets: A Review of Offset Frameworks’ (2010) 45 Environmental 
Management 165–176, 165; Gillespie op cit note 1 at 33. 
12  The 1970s’ German and US legislation are the oldest examples of legislative biodiversity offset 
mechanisms - see Section 2.1 for more details in this regard. 
13 The Biodiversity Consultancy, Government Policies on Biodiversity Offsets, available at 
http://www.thebiodiversityconsultancy.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Government-policies-on-
biodiversity-offsets1.pdf (accessed July 2013), 3; ICMM & IUCN, Independent Report on Biodiversity 
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general, biodiversity offsets are used as a tool in circumstances where a project or 
programme will result in the loss of, or negative impact upon, biodiversity, and 
provides government and developers an option of going ahead with the project whilst 
ensuring biodiversity protection through an alternative mechanism. 
 
The 2004 IUCN Report Biodiversity Offsets: Views, Experience and the Business Case, 
which provided the first international overview and assessment of biodiversity offsets, 
defined biodiversity offsets as:14 
 
Conservation actions intended to compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm to 
biodiversity caused by development projects, so as to ensure no net loss of biodiversity. 
Before developers contemplate offsets, they should have first sought to avoid and 
minimise harm to biodiversity. 
 
Subsequently, the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), which is an 
international collaboration between companies, financial institutions, government 
agencies and civil society organizations, established in November 2004 with the aim of 
formalising and guiding the utilisation and implementation of biodiversity offsets, 15 has 
provided a similar but more detailed definition: 16  
 
A measurable conservation outcome resulting from actions designed to compensate 
for significant residual adverse biodiversity impacts arising from development plans or 
projects after appropriate prevention and mitigation measures have been taken. The 
goal of biodiversity offsets is to achieve no net loss and preferably a net gain of 
biodiversity on the ground with respect to species composition, habitat structure, 
ecosystem function and people’s use and cultural values associated with biodiversity. 
 
There is currently no universally accepted definition of ‘biodiversity offsets’,17 as this is 
a relatively new field which is still under development.  BBOP, through their many 
citations in the literature of this definition, and the various standards and guidelines for 
                                                                                                                                               
Offsets, prepared by The Biodiversity Consultancy (2012), available at www.icmm.com/biodiversity-
offsets (accessed July 2013), 12.  
14 ten Kate, op cit note 11, at 13. 
15 Forest Trend website, Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme Overview, http://www.forest-
trends.org/ program.php?id=117 (accessed September 2013). 
16 BBOP (Handbook), op cit note 11, at 1. 
17 Gillespie, op cit note 1, at 9. 
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biodiversity offsets published by BBOP, does however appear to have gained 
international acceptance. 
 
South Africa is a relatively recent entry into the biodiversity offset arena. The first 
official reference to biodiversity offsets was in South Africa’s 2005 National 
Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, which states that a national policy framework is 
required to guide the implementation of biodiversity offsets in South Africa.18 The first 
government guidelines on how to implement biodiversity offsets in South Africa were, 
however, drafted at provincial level, with the draft guidelines in 2007 by the Western 
Cape Province, 19  followed by the KwaZulu-Natal Province 20  in 2010 and Gauteng 
Province in 2012.21 The National Department of Environmental Affairs is currently 
(2013/2014) drafting a policy and guidelines which are intended to form the national 
framework for utilisation of biodiversity offsets in South Africa.22  
 
The need for this national framework on biodiversity offsets has largely resulted from 
(i) pressure from developers for standardisation and for clear guidelines on how the 
process will work in South Africa; (ii) the need for South Africa to clearly set out 
procedural and legislative processes to ensure that any conflicts with or divergences 
from international biodiversity offset norms can be identified for multinational 
companies working in South Africa, which will bring their own corporate requirements 
that have been based on international norms and standards; and (iii) the fact that 
biodiversity offsets, although recognised as a potentially important tool to unlock 
development, are also recognised as not being appropriate in all situations, such as 
where irreplaceable biodiversity would be adversely impacted or where adequate 
compensation cannot be provided.23  Further, there have been concerns raised around 
                                                 
18 The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan report was developed to fulfill South Africa’s 
international obligations in terms of Article 6 of the Convention on Biological Diversity. The National 
Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans are the principal instruments for implementing the CBD at the 
national level, and South Africa’s current plan clearly sets out that a framework on offsets is to be put 
in place – Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), South Africa’s National 
Biodiversity Strategy Action Plan (NBSAP) (2005), Outcome 1.3, Activity 1.3.10, 33 & 36. 
19 Western Cape Department of Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Provincial Guideline 
on Biodiversity Offsets (draft), Provincial Government of the Western Cape, Department of 
Environmental Affairs & Development Planning, Cape Town (2007). 
20  Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, Norms and Standards for Biodiversity Offsets (draft), Ezemvelo KZN 
Wildlife, Pietermaritzburg (2010). 
21 Gauteng Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, Detailed Guideline on biodiversity Offsets 
for Gauteng Province (unpublished draft), (December 2012). 
22 Information provided at Biodiversity Offset Workshop with SANBI, DEA and provincial environment 




the effectiveness of biodiversity offsets, and whether many of the biodiversity offsets in 
place are inadequate and have resulted in biodiversity loss.24 
 
1.2 RESEARCH TOPIC, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY  
Although draft provincial guidelines have been prepared and implemented in at least the 
Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal Provinces, and there is a drive to set out clear 
national guidelines for South Africa’s implementation of biodiversity offsets, there is 
currently a relative dearth of literature, and hence understanding, on South Africa’s 
regulatory and enabling legislation for biodiversity offsets and whether such legislation 
is adequate to ensure effective control and utilisation of biodiversity offsets.  
 
This dissertation explores whether South Africa’s legislation currently provides an 
adequate framework for the implementation of biodiversity offsets, and how this 
framework might be improved.  In this regard, although the dissertation will provide an 
overview of the general legislative and policy landscape for offsets in South Africa, its 
analysis will focus on the use of offsets in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
process. This decision to focus on the EIA process was based on the fact that, currently, 
the EIA process is the tool being utilised to implement the majority of the biodiversity 
offsets in South Africa. 
 
The review will utilise international guidelines, national and provincial statutes and 
policy documents (both South African and foreign), and a case study of an 
environmental authorisation and appeal thereof, as well as secondary sources in the 
form of books, journal articles and web based resources. 
 
The case study to be utilised is the 2012 Fairbreeze environmental authorisation,25 
which required that a biodiversity offset be put in place to mitigate residual impacts of 
the proposed mining operation, and the associated appeal decisions.26 
                                                 
24 Maron M et al, ‘Faustian bargains? Restoration realities in the context of biodiversity offset policies’ 
(2012) 155 Biological Conservation 144; ten Kate, op cit 11, at 78. 
25 KZN Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs, Environmental Authorisation for the 
Construction of the Fairbreeze Mine and Related Activities, issued on 12 July 2012. 
26 KZN Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs ‘Appeal decision relating to the 
environmental authorisation issued on 12 July 2012 for the construction of the Fairbreeze Mine and 
related activities for the appellant  Twinstreams Blue People Advocacy Group, 11 June 2013, 21; KZN 
Department of  Agriculture and Environmental Affairs ‘Appeal decision relating to the environmental 
authorisation issued on 12 July 2012 for the construction of the Fairbreeze Mine and related activities 
for the appellant Wildlands Conservation Trust’, 11 June 2013, 10; KZN Department of  Agriculture 
and Environmental Affairs ‘Appeal decision relating to the environmental authorisation issued on 12 
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1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation provides an overview of the international guidance on 
biodiversity offsets and the manner in which offsets are addressed in the laws and 
policies of other countries. Thereafter, Chapter 3 sets outs South Africa’s approach to 
offsets, based on current provincial guidelines and the draft national guideline and 
policy, and considers whether this concurs with or differs from the international 
guidance, as largely set out by BBOP.  
 
The review of whether South Africa’s legislative framework (in particular, the 
country’s laws pertaining to environmental impact assessments) can be broadly utilised 
to enable and regulate the utilisation of biodiversity offsets is set out in Chapter 4, with 
Chapters 5 reviewing (through the use of a case study) how biodiversity offsets are 
being implemented, and whether this implementation highlights any gaps or 
weaknesses in South Africa’s laws. Recommendations and conclusions, including how 
any gaps or weaknesses identified in the South African law might be improved, are set 
out in Chapter 6. 
  
                                                                                                                                               
July 2012 for the construction of the Fairbreeze Mine and related activities for the appellant  WESSA, 
11 June 2013,10; KZN Department of  Agriculture and Environmental Affairs ‘Appeal decision relating 
to the environmental authorisation issued on 12 July 2012 for the construction of the Fairbreeze Mine 
and related activities for the appellant  Mtunzini Conservancy, 11 June 2013, 21.  
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CHAPTER 2                                                                           
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE GUIDANCE ON 
BIODIVERSITY OFFSETS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO 
CONSERVATION 
To set the context for an examination of biodiversity offsets in South Africa, the 
manner in which biodiversity offsets are addressed in other countries, and the 
recognition which offsets have received at the international level, are briefly discussed 
below. This chapter further provides an explanation of relevant terminology in respect 
of biodiversity offsets, and a brief discussion on the criteria that are being set (by 
international bodies and, to some extent, foreign countries) to guide what would be an 
acceptable standard for a biodiversity offset.  
 
2.1 BIODIVERSITY OFFSET LEGISLATION IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES  
There has been an increasing move towards the utilisation of biodiversity offset 
mechanisms, with the 2011 Ecosystem Marketplace report 27  finding 45 existing 
compensatory mitigation programs and the development of another 27 programmes 
underway. Many of these are on a voluntary basis, although there are an increasing 
number of national processes requiring the use of offset mechanisms. The 2012 Draft 
Global Monitoring Report on the Strategy for Resource Mobilization under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity found that over two thirds of countries have legal 
requirements, through environmental impact assessment statutes, policies and 
procedures, for compensation for environmental damages, and that nearly a quarter of 
them have already implemented or tested various forms of biodiversity offset 
mechanisms. 28  Examples of countries that have legislation supporting biodiversity 
offset mechanisms are set out in the table below. 
  
                                                 
27 Madsen, B et al, State of Biodiversity Markets Report: Offset and Compensation Programs Worldwide. 
(2011), available at http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/ doc_2848.pdf (accessed September 
2013), v. 
28 Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘State Of Financing For Biodiversity: Draft Global Monitoring 
Report 2012 On The Strategy For Resource Mobilization Under The Convention’ UNEP/CBD/ 
COP/11/INF16, for COP11, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/ cop/cop-11/information/cop-
11-inf-16-en.pdf (accessed October 2013), 29. 
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Australia The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Act No 91 of 
1999)29 provides a legal framework to protect and manage nationally and internationally 
important flora, fauna, ecological communities and heritage places. The Act requires 
approvals for controlled actions and makes provision for compensation measures as part 
of the conditions of approvals.30  
 
The various states also have legislation facilitating offset mechanisms, including: New 
South Wales through its Native Vegetation Act 2003 (Act No 103 of 2003);31 Victoria 
through its Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Act No 45 of 1987, as amended 
2004) 32  and associated 2002 Native Vegetation Management Framework (‘Native 
Vegetation Management – A Framework For Action 2002’);33 and Western Australia 
through its Environmental Protection Act 1986 (Act No. 087 of 1986)34 which requires 
approvals for clearing of vegetation and makes provision for compensation measures. 
New South Wales also has Part 7A of its Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 
(Act No. 101 of 1995 (as amended 2006))35 which provides for the development and 
regulation of conservation banks. 
 
Brazil Brazil has two mechanisms of relevance to offsets: (i) The Forest Code (Law 4771/1965 
as amended) requires that landowners must maintain a fixed minimum percentage of 
natural vegetative cover on their property, but allows those wanting to developed the 
entire property to compensate through purchasing other land; and (ii) The Protected 
Areas Law (Law no. 9985/2000) requires that development impacts, determined through 
environmental licensing and which cannot be avoided, must be compensated through 
contribution to the Protected Area Network, either through money or land.36 
 
Canada  The Canadian Fisheries Act (RCS 1985, c. F-14)37 prohibits the destruction of fish 
habitat and requires that where impacts cannot be avoided or mitigated, they must be 
compensated through habitat recreation or restoration.38 
                                                 
29 Available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/legis/cth/consol_act/epabca1999588/ notes. 
html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=Environment%20Protection%20and%20Biodiversity%20Conserva
tion%20Act%201999%20(Act%20No%2091%20of%201999) (accessed March 2014). 
30 Section 134 as well as 136 to 140A of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999; see also the Environmental Offsets Policy which sets out when and how biodiversity offsets are 
to be undertaken in terms of the Act - Commonwealth of Australia Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 Environmental Offsets Policy (October 2012), available at 
http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/ publications/pubs/offsets-policy.pdf (accessed August 2013), 5 
& 12. 
31 Available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/nva2003194/ (accessed March 2014). 
32 Available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/paea1987254/ (accessed March 2014). 
33 Available at https://www.google.co.za/url?q=http://www.pyrenees.vic.gov.au/files/bf448a16-d6ea-49 
59-a098-9e4e010b80f4/VictoriasNativeVegetationManagementAFrameworkForAction.pdf&sa= 
U&ei=JY8lU-2mNdSshQeA_4H4Aw&ved=0CCMQFjAB&usg=AFQjCNFMpuAWMGwmzfo7 
yh6d36gf5Va06w (accessed March 2014). 
34 Available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/epa1986295/ (accessed March 2014). 
35 Available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/tsca1995323/ (accessed March 2014). 
36 Darbi, M et al, International approaches to compensation for impacts on biological diversity, final 
report (2009), available at http://www.slu.se/Documents/externwebben/ltj-fak-dok/Lands 
kapsarkitektur,%20planering%20och%20f%C3%B6rvaltning/Personal/CV/Jesper%20Persson/Projekt/ 
Litteraturtips/Darbi_International%20approaches%20to%20Compensation.pdf (accessed September 
2013) 58-59; ten Kate, op cit note 11, at 30.  
37 Available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/f-14/FullText.html (accessed March 2014). 
38 Section 35(2) of the Canadian Fisheries Act and the Habitat Policy which sets out the hierarchy of 
compensation - Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), Policy for the Management of 
Fish Habitat (1986), available at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/Library/23654.pdf (accessed October 
2013), 21; Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Practitioners Guide to Habitat Compensation For DFO 
Habitat Management Staff Version 1.1, available at http://www.dsao.net/Resources/DFO%20fact% 
20sheets/ Compensation_Guide_e.pdf (accessed October 2013), 2; ten Kate, op cit note 11, at 22.  
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China China has a national regulatory program that requires developers impacting lands zoned 
for forestry to avoid, minimize, and then if there are still impacts to pay into a Forest 
Vegetation Restoration Fee Program.39 
 
Columbia National legislation Decreto 1753 of 1994 requires environmental licensing for 
developments where impacts must be compensated through reforestation or payment to 
a reforestation fund.40 
 
Europe Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive (Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992)41 
requires that any impact on the Natura 2000 network42 is avoided or where it cannot be 
avoided compensatory mechanisms put in place to ensure the continued coherence of the 
network.43 
 
Germany The German Federal Nature Conservation Act of 1976 (as updated in 2002) provides the 
framework for the Eingriffsregelung (Impact Mitigation Regulation), which aims to 
preserve the existing ecological situation by ensuring impairment of nature and 
landscape is either avoided or compensated.44 
 
Mexico The General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Protection of the Environment Act of 
1988 regulates Environmental Impact Assessments and, in conjunction with the 
Biodiversity Code, makes provision for compensation measures either through 
restoration or the Biodiversity Restoration and Preservation Fund. 45 
 
Switzerland The Federal Law for the Protection of Nature and Landscape, 1966 in Switzerland 






The US has two main mechanisms to facilitate offsets: (i) Section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act (Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq. (2002))47  regulates 
permits for development activities affecting wetlands, and allows for compensation 
through restoration, creation or enhancement of wetlands elsewhere; 48  and (ii) the 
                                                 
39Madsen, B et al, State of Biodiversity Markets Report: Offset and Compensation Programs Worldwide 
(2010), available at http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_2388.pdf (accessed September 
2013), 44; Species banking.com website ‘Forest vegetation restoration fee (China)’ 
http://www.speciesbanking.com/program/forest_vegetation_restoration_fee (accessed March 2014). 
40 Madsen, 2010, op cit note 39, at 31. 
41 Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1992L0043:200701 
01:EN:PDF (accessed March 2014). 
42 The Natura 2000 network is the European Union’s network of conservation areas which includes 
nature reserves and privately owned land, and which was established under Article 3 of the Habitats 
Directive. 
43 See McGillivray, D, ‘Compensating Biodiversity Loss: The EU Commission’s Approach to 
Compensation under Article 6 of the Habitats Directive’ (2012) 24(3) Journal of Environmental Law, 
417-450, 431-432; and European Commission, ‘Managing Natura 2000 Sites: The provisions of Article 
6 of the ‘Habitats’ Directive 92/43/EEC’ (2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/ 
natura2000/ management/docs/art6/provision_of_art6_en.pdf (accessed October 2013), 44. 
44 Darbi, op cit note 36, at 25; Rundcrantz, K & Skärbäck, E ‘Environmental compensation in planning: 
A review of five different countries with major emphasis on the German System’ (2003) 13 European 
Environment, 204-226, 208. 
45 Darbi, op cit note 36, at 113-121. 
46 ten Kate, op cit note 11, at 31. 
47 Available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2002-title33/pdf/USCODE-2002-title33-chap26. 
pdf (accessed March 2014). 
48 Matthews, JW & Endress, AG, 'Performance criteria, compliance success, and vegetation development 
in compensatory mitigation wetlands', (2008) 41 Environmental Management 130 – 141, 130; ten Kate, 
op cit note 11, at 22. 
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Endangered Species Act (Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C § 1531 et seq.)49 
makes provision for compensation mechanisms for developments that unavoidably 
impact on listed species.50 
 
These two statutes also enable the establishment and use of wetland banking and 
conservation banking respectively. 
 
 
2.2 RECOGNITION OF, AND GUIDANCE ON, BIODIVERSITY OFFSETS 
IN INTERNATIONAL FORA  
The 1970s’ German and US legislation are the oldest examples of legislative 
biodiversity offset mechanisms, with other countries progressively putting legislation in 
place from the 1980s onwards. Since 2004, with the launching of BBOP, discussion on 
biodiversity offsets has also been taken into the international arena. This expansion into 
the international arena has been aided by the tabling of the BBOP approach at the 2006 
Convention on Biological Diversity’s (CBD) eighth Conference of the Parties 
(COP8), 51  and the resolution of CBD COP9 that biodiversity offsets should be 
considered as a means to attain the objectives of the CBD.52 Parties to the CBD have 
further agreed at COP10 in 2010, through the ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–
2020 and the Aichi Targets’, 53  to significant actions to halt, and in a number of 
instances, reverse the loss of biodiversity by the year 2020.54 This opened the door to 
discussions on various mechanisms, including biodiversity offsets, to achieve these 
targets. This expansion of offsets discussions in the international arena was further 
                                                 
49Available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2002-title16/pdf/USCODE-2002-title16-chap35. 
pdf (accessed March 2014). 
50 Section 10(a) of the Endangered Species Act, 1973; ten Kate, op cit note 11,at 25.  
51 Decision VIII/17 stated that contributions from business and industry towards the implementation of 
the Convention and its 2010 target could be facilitated by further work under the Convention to develop 
guidance for potential biodiversity offsets in line with the objectives of the Convention. – ‘Convention 
on Biological Diversity, ‘2006 Report of the Eighth Meeting Of the Parties to the Convention On 
Biological Diversity’, UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31, Decision VIII/17, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/ 
meetings/cop/cop-08/official/cop-08-31-en.pdf (accessed October 2013), 259. 
52 Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Decisions Adopted by the Conference Of the Parties to the 
Convention On Biological Diversity at its Ninth Meeting’, UNEP/CBD/COP/9/29, Decision IX/11 
‘Review of the implementations of Articles 20 & 21’, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-09/full/cop-09-dec-en.pdf (accessed October 2013), 45. 
53  Convention on Biological Diversity ‘Decisions Adopted by the Conference Of the Parties to the 
Convention On Biological Diversity at its Tenth Meeting’, UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27, Decision X/2 'The 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets', available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/ decisions/cop-10/full/cop-10-dec-en.pdf (accessed October 2013), 111. 
54 The Aichi targets include, inter alia: (i) halving and where possible halting the rate of loss of natural 
habitats, (ii) securing and improving the conservation status of threatened species, (iii) ecosystem 
resilience stocks to be enhanced through conservation and restoration of at least 15% of degraded 
ecosystems, (iv) at least 17% of terrestrial and inland water and 10% of coastal and marine areas to be 
conserved through a systems of protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures, 
(v) ecosystems that provide essential services are to be restored and safeguarded - Convention on 
Biological Diversity, ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the Aichi Targets’, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/strategic-plan/2011-2020/Aichi-Targets-EN.pdf (accessed October 2013). 
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aided by a 2008 resolution of the Conference of the Parties to the Ramsar Convention 
on Wetlands of International Importance,55 which encouraged decision-makers to adopt 
policies and guidelines related to biodiversity offsets,56 and a resolution adopted at the 
2012 World Conservation Congress, for the development of an IUCN policy on 
biodiversity offsets. 57  Further impetus was also provided by the inclusion of 
biodiversity offsets in various requirements of the international financial sector, such as 
those of the International Finance Corporation 58  and the Equator Principles 
Association.59  
 
2.3 BIODIVERSITY OFFSET  TERMINOLOGY  
Notwithstanding the recognition of biodiversity offsets in the international arena and 
the guidelines and standards published by BBOP, there is, as yet, no standardised 
concept of a biodiversity offset. Currently, a number of different terms are used in the 
various foreign policies and statutes, which have a similar function to the biodiversity 
offset of attempting to reconcile economic and social development and biodiversity. 
These terms include ‘biobanking’, ‘mitigation banks’, ‘conservation banking’, ‘habitat 
credit trading’, ‘set-asides’, ‘compensation mitigation’, and ‘compensation’.60  
 
                                                 
55 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, commonly referred to as the ‘Ramsar 
Convention’, available at www.ramsar.org.  
56 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolutions of the 10th Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties’, 
Resolution X.12 ‘Principles for partnerships between the Ramsar Convention and the business sector’, 
available at http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key_res_x_12_e.pdf (accessed October 2013), 2. 
57 IUCN, ‘Resolutions and Recommendations’, WCC-2012-Res-110-EN ‘Biodiversity offsets and related 
compensatory approaches’ (2012), available at www.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/WCC-5th-005.pdf 
(accessed October 2013), 161. 
58  The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is a global development institution which focuses 
exclusively on investment within the private sector of developing countries. The IFC has eight 
Performance Standards which define clients' responsibilities for managing their environmental and 
social risks. Performance Standard 6 (PS6), which was implemented on 1 January 2012, talks to the 
requirement for the mitigation hierarchy being followed and for offsetting residual biodiversity impacts.  
- International Financial Corporation, ‘World Bank Group IFC Performance Standards on 
Environmental and Social Sustainability 1 January 2012’, available at 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c8f524004a73daeca09afdf998895a12/IFC_Performance_Standar
ds.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (accessed October 2013), 2,6,40,42; ICMM & IUCN, op cit note 13, at 13. 
59 The Equator Principles (EPs) are a risk management framework, adopted by financial institutions for 
determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in projects, the Principles are 
primarily intended to provide a minimum standard for due diligence to support responsible risk 
decision-making. The Equator Principles Association members, which include 78 financial institutions 
covering 35 countries, adopted the IFC Performance Standards for implementation on 1 January 2012, 
which includes PS6 and the offsetting of residual impacts - Equator Principles website 
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-ep/about-ep (accessed October 2013).  
60 Gillespie, op cit note 1, at 9; Bull, JW et al, ‘Biodiversity Offsets in Theory and Practice’ (2013) 47(3), 
Fauna & Flora International, Oryx, 369-380, 370; Burgin, S, ‘BioBanking: an environmental 
scientist’s view of the role of biodiversity banking offsets in conservation’ (2008)17 Biodiversity and 
Conservation, 807–816, 807. 
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Set asides are in general not considered as biodiversity offsets, as they are considered 
to fall within the ‘avoidance’ section of the mitigation hierarchy,61 with such land being 
incorporated into the development and managed as open space areas, corridors,  buffers, 
conservation areas, etc.62  The Brazil Forest Code, which requires forest to be set aside 
as a ‘Legal Reserve’ on private land, is an interesting mix as the onus to ‘set aside’ 
forest on the land (i.e. avoidance mitigation) can also be satisfied through the 
purchasing of another land parcel as a form of biodiversity offset. 63  
 
BioBanking, mitigation banking, wetland banking, habitat banking, conservation 
banking, and habitat credit trading are all terms for a similar mechanism. Broadly, 
an ecosystem (such as in the case of the US wetland mitigation banking) or habitat for a 
species (such as in the case of US conservation banking),64 or a vegetation biome (such 
as in the case of the Australian biobanking),65 is conserved or restored or created. The 
ecosystem or habitat’s ecological and ecosystem functioning is then converted into a set 
number of biodiversity credits that can be purchased by developers needing to offset a 
development which has comparable residual ecological impacts. 66  The long term 
management and liability of the offset, through the purchasing of the credit, is legally 
passed by the developer to a third party, the ‘bank’.67 Banking, in general, facilitates 
offsetting for more than one project and thus is differentiated from a ‘once of offset’ 
                                                 
61 The mitigation hierarchy requires that impacts are first avoided, and if they can’t be avoided are then 
minimised, and where they can’t be minimised the impact is then remediated, and where they can’t be 
remediated are offset; see Section 2.4(a) for more discussion on the mitigation hierarchy. 
62  ten Kate, op cit note 11, at 10; UNEP, EIA Training Manual, 2 ed (2002), available at 
http://www.unep.ch/etb/publications/ EIAman/SecETopic7.pdf (accessed October 2013), 323. 
63 Darbi, op cit note 36, at 58-59; Doswald, N et al, Biodiversity offsets: voluntary and compliance 
regimes. A review of existing schemes, initiatives and guidance for financial institutions (2012), 
available at http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/Biodiversity_Offsets-Voluntary_and_Com 
pliance_ Regimes.pdf (accessed October 2013), 8. 
64 The USA’s wetland mitigation banking and conservation banking models are amongst the earliest 
examples of such banking, having commenced in the 1980s (Mead, DL ‘History and Theory: The 
Origin and Evolution of Conservation Banking’ in Carroll, N, Fox, J, Bayon, R (eds), Conservation & 
Biodiversity Banking (2008), 9-31, 12) and been facilitated through the Clean Water Act and the 
Endangered Species Act. The USA banks in general belong to private land owners/companies where 
the development and management of banks is considered a profitable business (Madsen 2010, op cit 
note 39, at 7). 
65 The New South Wales State (Australia) banking system is termed ‘biobanking’ and enabled through 
Part 7A of the Threatened Species Conservation Act of 1995 and the Threatened Species Conservation 
(Biodiversity Banking) Regulations of 2008. This scheme commenced in 2008 and biobanking can 
occur for all ecosystems and species listed in the Threatened Species Conservation Act of 1995 
(Department of Environment & Climate Change, New South Wales, Biobanking: Biodiversity Banking 
and Offset Scheme- Scheme Overview (2007), available at www.legislation.nsw.gov.au (accessed 
September 2013), 5). 
66 Doswald, op cit note 63, at 7; Bull, op cit note 60, at 2. 
67 Madsen 2010, op cit note 39, at 7; White, W ‘The Advantages and Opportunities’ in Carroll, N, Fox, J, 
Bayon, R (eds), Conservation & Biodiversity Banking (2008), 33-41, 36. 
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which is secured via the conservation or restoration or creation of ecosystems or 
habitats for a specific project or development. 
 
The terms ‘compensation’ and ‘mitigation’ are defined differently in different 
countries. In the US, ‘mitigation’ or ‘compensation mitigation’ is the term used for 
biodiversity offsets (these being intended to compensate for unavoidable environmental 
damage). In other countries as well as the Europe Union, the term ‘mitigation’, however 
refers to the on-site actions to minimise harm (avoid, reduce and rehabilitate) and 
‘compensation’ is the term utilised for biodiversity offsets.68 
 
International initiatives (such as BBOP and the offsets requirements of financial 
institutions)69 tend to follow the same approach as the EU with regards to the definition 
of mitigation, namely using this term for the, avoid, minimise and remediate section of 
the mitigation hierarchy. They however have ceased to utilise the term ‘compensation’, 
as the term has several meanings, including financial payment for damage associated 
with legal liability, whilst the intention of the biodiversity offset is for concrete on the 
ground conservation gains.70 
 
Biodiversity offsets are broadly recognised as occurring through two main approaches, 
namely: (i) The creation, restoration or rehabilitation of habitat or ecosystems71 and (ii) 
the prevention of loss of biodiversity/averting of risk. 72  These approaches are not 
mutually exclusive and can be used in combination. 73  Further approaches, such as 
                                                 
68 Gillespie, op cit note 1, at 9; ten Kate, op cit note 11, at 9. 
69 See notes 58 and 59. 
70 ten Kate, op cit note 11, at 9; Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), Glossary, 2nd ed 
(2012), available at http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/ doc_3100.pdf (accessed October 
2013), 10. 
71  ‘Creation’ is the development of a new ecosystem, such as a wetland, where it did not exist. 
‘Restoration’ is the return of an ecosystem/habitat to its original natural state, and ‘rehabilitation’ is to 
restore or improve some aspects or an ecosystem but not necessarily to fully restore all components. 
However, the term restoration is also often used to refer to actions which are better defined as 
rehabilitation (Roni, P et al, Habitat rehabilitation for inland fisheries. Global review of effectiveness 
and guidance for rehabilitation of freshwater ecosystems (2005) FAO Fisheries Technical Paper. No. 
484, available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/a0039e/a0039e00.pdf (accessed October 2013); 
Nellemann, op cit note 3, at 15).  
72 Such as averting risk of imminent or projected loss of biodiversity by securing areas for protection and 
effective management; or averting risk of imminent or projected loss of biodiversity by tackling the 
underlying causes of biodiversity loss in an area through working with communities to support 
sustainable livelihoods. 
73 ICMM & IUCN, op cit note 13, at 8; Commonwealth of Australia, op cit note 30, at 8; BBOP 
(Handbook), op cit note 11, at 8; Maron, op cit note 24, at 142; Norton, DA, 'Biodiversity Offsets: Two 
New Zealand Case Studies and an Assessment Framework', (2009) 43 Environmental Management, 
698- 706, 698; Canadian DFO, op cit note 38, at 9. 
14 
 
monetary compensation, are also used as a mechanism in some foreign legislation. For 
example, Brazil requires financial contributions from developers towards the country’s 
Protected Area Network, but this use is limited and does not fall within the scope of the 
biodiversity offset definition.74 Other types of compensation, such as capacity building, 
education and research are not generally considered to be biodiversity offsets, although 
both BBOP and Australia indicate that such measures may form a limited portion of an 
offset, where such would give rise to measurable conservation outcomes.75 
 
Further to these two main approaches, are two generally recognised categories of 
biodiversity offsets, namely ‘in kind’ or ‘like for like’ offsets and ‘out of kind’ or 
‘trading up’ offsets. Whereby ‘in kind’ is where an offset provides the equivalent 
habitat type, species composition, ecological functionality, etc., of that which will be 
lost. An ‘out of kind’ offset does not compensate directly but provides alternative 
habitat which is desirable due to a high conservation status76 or its national importance. 
This is referred to as ‘trading up’, and is considered in circumstances where ‘like for 
like’ is not feasible.77 
 
The difficulty in operating within an arena that has different terminology, or different 
definitions for the same terminology, has been noted78 and the commencement of the 
international standardisation of terminology is one of the outcomes of the BBOP 
association.79 
 
In this dissertation, the definitions for ‘mitigation’80 and ‘biodiversity offsets’81 will be 
those used by BBOP, unless otherwise specified. 
                                                 
74 Madsen 2010, op cit note 39, at 30. 
75 BBOP (Handbook), op cit note 11, at 8; Commonwealth of Australia, op cit note 30, at 8 & 29. 
76 Conservation status is the categorisation of species/vegetation based on how likely they are to become 
extinct in the future. Categories include inter alia: Critically Endangered, which has an extreme high 
risk of extinction in the wild, Endangered, which has a very high risk of extinction in the wild, 
Vulnerable, which has a high risk of extinction in the wild, and Near Threatened, which does not 
currently qualify as threatened but may in the near future – IUCN, IUCN Red List Categories and 
Criteria: Version 3.1., 2nd ed, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK: IUCN (2012), available at 
http://jr.iucnredlist.org/documents/redlist_ cats_crit_en.pdf (accessed March 2014), 15. 
77 BBOP (handbook), op cit note 11, at 4; Bull, op cit note 60, at 372; McKenney, op cit note 11, at 169; 
Fisheries & Oceans Canada, op cit note 38, at 3. 
78 Ten Kate, op cit note 11, at 80. 
79 BBOP (Glossary), op cit note 70, at 10. 
80 BBOP (Glossary), op cit note 70, at 28 defines mitigation as ‘measures which aim to reduce impacts to 
the point where they have no adverse effects’ determined through the mitigation hierarchy. 
81 As explained above, BBOP has defined biodiversity offset as: ‘A measurable conservation outcome 
resulting from actions designed to compensate for significant residual adverse biodiversity impacts 
arising from development plans or projects after appropriate prevention and mitigation measures have 
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2.4 WHAT MAKES A FUNCTIONAL BIODIVERSITY OFFSET? 
Internationally, as led by BBOP82 but also reflected in many of the foreign national 
legislation requiring compensation mechanisms,83 the following have been determined 
as being the minimum requirements for a biodiversity offset to be considered functional 
and of benefit to biodiversity.84 
 
2.4.1 Mitigation Hierarchy 
The strict implementation of the mitigation hierarchy to determine whether a 
biodiversity offset is necessary is central to the BBOP approach,85 and is in general the 
approach taken by the various countries’ legislation (as listed above), including the US, 
where the hierarchical approach was first established.86 The mitigation hierarchy is a 
sequential assessment framework where impacts are first avoided, and if they cannot be 
avoided are then minimised, and where they cannot be minimised the impact is then 
remediated. The last step of the mitigation hierarchy is that if, after following all the 
above steps, there is still a residual impact, consideration could be given to whether 
such an impact could be offset.87  
 
2.4.2 No Net Loss 
Central to biodiversity offsets,88 and also a requirement of many of the above listed 
compensation mechanisms, is that at a minimum ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity is 
                                                                                                                                               
been taken’, and has explained that ‘[t]he goal of biodiversity offsets is to achieve no net loss and 
preferably a net gain of biodiversity on the ground with respect to species composition, habitat 
structure, ecosystem function and people’s use and cultural values associated with biodiversity’. 
82 BBOP’s principles for biodiversity offsets, BBOP (Handbook), op cit note 11, at 10. 
83 Such as the US wetland and conservation compensation mitigation, Candian fisheries compensation 
requirements, Australia federal and state offset requirements, EU compensation requirements for 
impacts on Natura 2000 network, and Germany’s Eingriffsregelung compensation requirements. 
84 McKenney 2010, op cit note 11, at 168. 
85 BBOP (Handbook), op cit note 11, at 10.  
86 McKenney, op cit note 11, at 167; Dolswald, op cit note 63, at 6; US Environmental Protection Agency 
and US Department of the Army (USEPA & Army), ‘Memorandum of Agreement Between the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of 
Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines. February 8, 1990.’ (1990), 
available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/mitigate.cfm (accessed October 2013), 
Sect II.A; Commonwealth of Australia, op cit note 30, at 7; European Commission, ‘Guidance 
document on Article 6(4) of the 'Habitats Directive' 92/43/EEC: Clarification of the Concepts of: 
Alternative Solutions, Imperative Reasons of Overriding Public Interest, Compensatory Measures, 
Overall Coherence, Opinion of the Commission’ (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/art6/guidance_art6_4_en.pdf (accessed October 
2013), 4. 
87 ICMM & IUCN, op cit note 13, at 10; McKenney 2010, op cit note 11, at 167. BBOP (Handbook), op 
cit note 11, at 7. 
88 This requirement is contained within BBOP’s definition of biodiversity offset. 
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achieved. 89  That is, the biodiversity offset must ensure that after the development 
impacts have occurred there has been a neutral effect on biodiversity90 or, preferably, a 
net gain of biodiversity.91 
 
2.4.3 Limits to what can be offset 
Related to the no net loss and the mitigation hierarchy concepts is the acknowledgment 
that there are limits to what can be offset through a biodiversity offset process. The 
threshold for this limit depends on a number of factors, such as the sensitivity and value 
of ecosystems and ecosystem services, or the irreplaceability/rarity of species or habitat. 
There may also be instances in which the offsets proposed do not adequately 
compensate for the calculated impacts, or cannot be offset in a socially acceptable 
manner.92  The exact definition for this limit is, however, very complex and is generally 
dealt with in terms of broad guidelines, such as those provided by BBOP,93 for case by 
case decision-making.  
 
2.4.4 Additionality 
The concept of additionally is considered a fundamental principle of biodiversity 
offsets, whereby a biodiversity offset must always deliver biodiversity benefits through 
conservation actions over and above those already planned by other parties or required 
by legislation.94 
 
                                                 
89 Canadian DFO, op cit note 38, at 7; Commonwealth of Australia, op cit note 30, at 6; European 
Commission 2007, op cit note 43, at 13; USEPA & Army, op cit note 86, at SectII.B. 
90 BBOP defines this as ‘no net reduction overall in the type, amount and condition (or quality) of 
biodiversity over space and time’ - Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP, Resource 
Paper: No Net Loss and Loss‐Gain Calculations in Biodiversity Offsets (2012), available at 
http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3103.pdf (accessed October 2013), 2. 
91 ten Kate, op cit note 11, at 11 & 13; Maron, op cit note 24, at 142; Darbi, op cit note 36, at 168; 
Madsen 2010, op cit note 39, at 38-39; Bull, op cit note 60, at 371. 
92 Gillespie, op cit note 1, at 28; ICMM & IUCN, op cit note 13, at 18; European Commission 2007, op 
cit note 86, at 13; Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), Resource Paper: Limits to 
What Can Be Offset. (2012), available at http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3128.pdf 
(accessed October 2013), 2. 
93 BBOP (limits to offsetting), op cit note 92, at 12-16. 
94 BBOP (handbook), op cit note 11, at 29; Commonwealth of Australia, op cit note 30, at 22; European 
Commission 2000, op cit note 43, at 45; McKenney, op cit note 11, at 169 &170; ICMM & IUCN, op 




An offset must always, at a minimum, provide an equivalence of gains to that of project 
impacts.95 This required equivalency is based on: type and quality, location of offset 
and time scale of deliverance of offset.96  
 
In terms of type and quality, the offset should preferable be an ‘in kind’ type providing 
the equivalent of what will be lost, although ‘trading up’ can be considered in 
circumstances where ‘like for like’ is not feasible.97 
 
The location of an offset has a high impact on equivalency, and often a decision must 
be undertaken between locating within the immediate area, which allows for local no 
net loss of ecosystem functionality and ecosystem services, and locating within the 
landscape or catchment which allows for incorporation of broader conservation and 
connectivity priorities.98 
 
The timeframe for the delivery of the completed offset again has a high impact, as the 
offset needs to be gained within a timescale that would ensure ‘no net loss’ of 
biodiversity or social concerns.99 This is not always easy as restoration of biodiversity 
and even ecosystem services can take many years to achieve, and this could create a 
time lag between the project commencing and the actual no net loss being achieved. 
This time lag seems, however, to be an accepted fact,100 with only the EU requiring that 
the offset is functional prior to impacts being effected.101  BBOP does also note that 
time lag impacts are not acceptable where such could result in irreversible biodiversity 
loss.102 
 
                                                 
95 Commonwealth of Australia, op cit note 30, at 17; European Commission 2000, op cit note 43, at 45; 
US Department of Defense, US Environmental Protection Agency, US Department of Agriculture, US 
Department of the Interior, and US Department of Commerce, ‘Federal Guidance for the Establishment, 
Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks. 60 Fed. Reg. 58605-58614. November 28, 1995’ (1995), 
available at www.fws.gov/habitatconservation/Corps%20banking%20guide.pdf (accessed October 
2013), SecII.D.5. 
96 ICMM & IUCN, op cit note 13, at 20; Commonwealth of Australia, op cit note 30, at 16-17. 
97 BBOP (handbook), op cit note 11, at 4; Bull, op cit note 60, at 372; McKenney, op cit note 11, at 169; 
Fisheries & Oceans Canada, op cit note 38, at 3. 
98 ten Kate, op cit note 11, at 62-63; ICMM & IUCN, op cit note 13, at 20; BBOP (handbook), op cit note 
11, at 30 & 77. 
99 ICMM & IUCN, op cit note 13, at 29. 
100 Commonwealth of Australia, op cit note 30, at 23; US Department of the Defense, op cit note 95, at 
II.D.6; BBOP (handbook), op cit note 11, at 88. McKenney, op cit note 11, at 169. 
101 European Commission 2000, op cit note 43, at 45. 
102 BBOP (no net loss), op cit note 90, at 16. 
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2.4.6 Metrics  
The determination of equivalency and associated desired no net loss requires some 
measure of ecological and ecosystem functionality that will be lost and a related 
measure of how much needs to be offset to ensure no net less. These are referred to as 
‘metrics’ and there are numerous different metrics that are available to calculate losses 
and gains and the required offsets. Such calculations often require multiple metrics to 
cover all aspects, such as habitat for threatened species, vegetation types or ecosystems, 
movement corridors and connectivity, location of and timeframes for delivery of 
offsets, and uncertainty of success of the offset. 103 
 
2.4.7 Duration, management, monitoring and compliance  
A central principle for the implementation of biodiversity offsets is the requirement that 
an offset must be in place for the duration of the impacts resulting from the project/ 
development, which in many cases, such as urban development, would be in 
perpetuity.104  To facilitate this, it is in general, required that the biodiversity offset sites 
be secured through appropriate legal mechanisms such as protected area legislation or, 
in the US and Australia, easements and conservation covenants which register land use 
restrictions against the title deeds. 105  The financial costs of the management and 
monitoring of the biodiversity offset must be secured through an appropriate 
mechanism, such as a trust fund.106 
 
The literature emphasises that an offset must be legally enforceable to ensure 
compliance and the delivery and maintenance of the biodiversity offset.107 
 
                                                 
103 Maron, op cit note 24, at 142; BBOP (no net loss), op cit note 90, at 9; Doswald, op cit note 63, at 14; 
Quetier, F & Lavorel, S, ‘Assessing ecological equivalence in biodiversity offset schemes: key issues 
and solutions’ (2011) 144 Biological Conservation 2991–2999, 2993-2994. 
104 BBOP (handbook), op cit note 11, at 10; McKenney, op cit note 11, at 172; European Commission 
(2007), op cit note 86, at 19; Commonwealth of Australia, op cit note 30, at 18-19; US Dept of Defense, 
op cit note 95, at E.2; US Department of the Interior (US DOI), ‘Guidance for the establishment, use 
and operation of Conservation Banks’ (2003), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-
library/pdf/ Conservation_ Banking_Guidance.pdf (accessed October 2013), B.1. 
105 ICMM & IUCN, op cit note 13, at 30; Commonwealth of Australia, op cit note 30, at 18; US Dept of 
Defense, op cit note 95, at E2; McKenney, op cit note 11, at 172. 
106 ten Kate, op cit note 11, at 66; European Commission (2007), op cit note 86, at 19; US DOI, op cit 
note 104, at D.4; ICMM & IUCN; op cit note 13, at 30; McKenney, op cit note 11, at 172; US Dept of 
Defense, op cit note 95, at E2-E3. 
107 McKenney, op cit note 11, at 172; Bull, op cit note 60, at 374.  
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2.4.8 Transparency  
One of the BBOP principles108 is that the design and implementation of biodiversity 
offsets must be adequately communicated to the public, and many countries’ national 
legislation also requires public input into the process. 109 
 
2.5 EFFECTIVENESS OF BIODIVERSITY OFFSETS  
Despite the above requirements, the BBOP guidance for the design and implementation 
of biodiversity offsets (which is receiving increasing international support), and the 
rapid increase in the implementation of biodiversity offsets under voluntary 
mechanisms and national legislation, the literature still reflects a number of concerns 
with regards to the effectiveness of offsets. The first concern centres on the ability to 
first accurately determine the full biodiversity loss and then to replace that biodiversity 
loss. 
 
Biodiversity is a complex entity to measure as it includes hierarchical levels of 
organization from genes to ecosystems, with elements at each level varying in time and 
space, and diverse interactions within and between these levels.110 Any measure of 
biodiversity is thus a proxy for this complex entity, with no single metric capturing the 
full extent of biodiversity.111 An example of this complexity, is given by Burgin, who 
notes that the long term survival of a species requires knowledge and measuring of 
habitat requirements, metapopulation consideration, 112  dispersal, effects of 
fragmentation, ecosystem functioning, population/ecosystem viability and genetic 
diversity.113  
 
Restoration of habitats or ecosystems is an uncertain science, and although some types 
of wetlands can be restored to functionality relatively easily, the restoration of full 
biodiversity functionality is not as straight forward.114 Other ecosystems are even more 
                                                 
108 BBOP (handbook), op cit note 11, at 10; 
109 European Commission (2000), op cit note 43, at 38; US Dept of Defense, op cit note 95, at C.5; US 
DOI, op cit note 104, at C.7; Canadian DFO, op cit note 38, at 17. 
110 Walker, S et al 'Why bartering biodiversity fails', (2009) 2 Conservation Letters 149 -157, 150. 
111 Bull, op cit note 60, at 371. 
112 A metapopulation is a network of local populations linked by dispersal. The term is used to describe 
systems in which local populations periodically go extinct with recolonisation occurring by migration 
from other local populations - Margule, CR & Pressey, RL, ‘Systematic conservation planning’ (2000) 
405 Nature 243 -253, 247. 
113 Burgin, op cit note 60, at 811. 
114 Maron, op cit note 24, at 143; Gardner, R C, ‘Rehabilitating nature: a comparative review of legal 
mechanisms that encourage wetland restoration efforts’ (2003) 52 Catholic University Law Review 
(2003) 573 -620, 576. 
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difficult to restore completely, and such restoration can take 100 years or longer,115 
examples being peat wetland (which is generated on geological time) or a mature 
forest.116 For many species this delay in restoration, even on a temporary basis, may 
permanently damage populations.117 Replacement of biodiversity loss to full ‘no net 
loss’ is thus often uncertain, with the actual reckoning only taking place after the 
project’s impacts have already been realised. 
 
Further to the replacement of biodiversity loss is the concern that there is insufficient 
monitoring and compliance enforcement, with many of the offsets currently in place 
showing incomplete or total lack of compliance and ability to deliver the required 
offset.118  
 
These concerns are not unwarranted and, as noted in the BBOP overview document:119 
  
the scientific community continue to explore related issues in natural and social 
science, such as limits to what can be offset, tests for ecological equivalence, 
currencies and metrics for measuring loss and gain, and approaches for ensuring that 
local communities and indigenous peoples benefit from projects. 
 
Further, the best practice for biodiversity offsets is currently evolving and requires 
continued input from all stakeholders.120 
 
Biodiversity offsets are thus acknowledged as being in their infancy, with many of the 
identified problems and kinks in the process and the actual long term viability of 
offsets, requiring further monitoring and scientific research. Despite these flaws, the 
need for balancing development and biodiversity is an immediate and pressing problem 
and it appears that biodiversity offsets as one of the tools to promote sustainable 
                                                 
115 Burgin, op cit note 60, at 811-812; Maron, op cit note 24, at 142; Bekessy, SA et al, ‘The biodiversity 
bank cannot be a lending bank’ (2010) 3 Conservation Letters 151–158, 152. 
116 Quetier, op cit note 103, at 1991. 
117 Walker, op cit note 110, at 152; Maron, op cit note 24, at 145. 
118 Gibbons, P, and Lindenmayer, D B, ‘Offsets for land clearing: No net loss or the tail wagging the 
dog?’ (2007) 8 Ecological Management & Restoration 26–31,28; Bull, op cit note 60, at 369; Walker, 
op cit note 110, at 152; Matthews, op cit note 48, at 136; Quetier, op cit note 103, at 2991. 
119 Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), To No Net Loss and Beyond: An Overview of 
the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (2013) Washington DC: Business and Biodiversity 
Offsets Programme, available at www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3319.pdf (accessed 
October 2013), 10. 
120 Ibid, 12. 
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development is attracting the attention of governments, the financial community and 
companies.121 
 
The question thus appears to be whether biodiversity offset design and supporting 
scientific assessments will catch up with the stated full theoretical benefits and start 
producing the on the ground conservation gains that would contribute to sustainability. 
  




CHAPTER 3                                                                                            
SOUTH AFRICA’S POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR BIODIVERSITY 
OFFSETS  
Biodiversity offsets in South Africa are neither mandatory nor specifically provided for 
in South African law, but several sectors are investigating the utilisation of biodiversity 
offsets, including the environment, forestry, water, mining and municipal planning 
sectors. Currently there is no accepted over-arching framework in South Africa to 
coordinate these approaches, although, as discussed below, each of the sectors has 
considered the international guidance and principles for functional biodiversity offsets, 
as set out by BBOP and found in the offsets regulations of many foreign countries.   
 
The approach taken by each of these sectors is briefly set out below and the differences 
and similarities between the various South African approaches and the international and 
comparative guidance outlined above (referred to hereunder as the international 
approach) are examined. This chapter concludes, by making suggestions about the 
legislative controls and tools which are required to implement biodiversity offsets in 
South Africa. 
 
3.1 ENVIRONMENT SECTOR 
The environment sector within South Africa is managed concurrently by the national 
and provincial122 Departments of Environment and covers a wide spectrum of issues,123 
such as air pollution, waste management, coastal and marine management, biodiversity 
and conservation, as well as land use planning and management through environmental 
authorisations. The utilisation of biodiversity offsets within this sector is, however, 
currently only being investigated and utilised within the environmental authorisation 
process.124 
                                                 
122 Schedule 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
123 Here the concept of environment is limited to the administrative separation of environmental functions 
as provided for by NEMA and the specific environmental legislation provided for by this Act. There are 
other elements of environment that do not fall into this administrative separation including water, 
heritage, marine resources, etc. 
124 The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) sets out the framework for 
environmental authorisations, which requires that the potential consequences for/ or impacts on the 
environment of listed or specified activities must be considered, investigated, assessed and reported on 
to the competent authority (S24(1)) and that such identified activities may not commence without 
authorisation from the competent authority (S24F). The associated Environmental Impact Assessment 
Regulations, 2010, set out the process and the lists of activities that require environmental authorisation 
- Government Notice R543(process), GN R544 (listing notice 1), GN R545 (listing notice 2), and GN 
R546 (listing notice 3) in Government Gazette No. 33306 of 18 June 2010. 
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As noted in Chapter 1, three provincial guidelines have thus far been drafted (by the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Development Planning within the Western 
Cape Province in 2007, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife125 within the KwaZulu-Natal Province 
in 2010, and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development within the Gauteng 
Province in 2013). 126  The National Department of Environmental Affairs has also 
charged the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI) 127  with the 
development of a national framework for the implementation of biodiversity offsets.128 
 
These draft guidelines, although developed separately by the three provinces, follow the 
same general principles and approach. The national framework129 as it currently stands 
also follows these same fundamental principles, which can be seen to closely follow 
those set out by BBOP. The approach within the environment sector includes the 
following: 
 
3.1.1 Mitigation hierarchy  
Biodiversity offsets are regarding as the last option and may only be considered once all 
other avenues of mitigation have been investigated (as provided in the mitigation 
hierarchy).130 
 
3.1.2 No net loss of biodiversity 
A biodiversity offset must ensure no net loss of biodiversity,131 although South Africa’s 
interpretation and baseline for this no net loss differs from the international approach, 
which proposes a strict no net loss of biodiversity based on restoration principles.132 
                                                 
125 Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife is the trading name for the KwaZulu-Natal Conservation Services, which is a 
public entity that falls under the MEC of Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs. 
126 The Gauteng draft has not been released to the public and is currently in the process of being finalised. 
127 The South African National Biodiversity Institute was established by Section 10 of the National 
Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 and the institute reports to the National 
Department of Environmental Affairs. 
128 Information provided at Biodiversity Offset Workshop with SANBI, DEA and Provincial environment 
and conservation departments in April 2013. 
129  The national framework is currently in the drafting phase, but the principles underpinning the 
framework have been set out at a workshop attended by government departments and presented to 
BBOP – Manuel, J Overview of the South African framework for Biodiversity Offsets, presentation to 
the BBOP Community of Practice, 22 May 2013, available at http://bbop.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/jmanuelppt.pdf (accessed December 2013). 
130 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at iii & 5; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at iii & 6; 
Gauteng, op cit note 21, at 6; Manuel, op cit note 129.  
131 This requirement is central to government’s obligation to ensure the protection of the environment for 
current and future generations and its requirement to ensure sustainable use of the environment. These 
requirements are further discussed in Section 4.1 
132 BBOP (Handbook), op cit note 11, at 80. 
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South Africa’s baseline is centred on the requirement that there is no net loss to the 
biodiversity targets and the biodiversity network.133  That is, the no net loss concept 
trades loss for protection of the biodiversity network, and thus aims to ensure that 
representative areas of ecosystems and associated species, and biodiversity 
underpinning important ecosystem services, are secured for public protection in 
perpetuity.134 This ‘lower requirement’ is stated as being justified on the basis that, (i) 
South Africa as a developing country requires land for economic expansion, and (ii) 
restoration of many of the habitats within South Africa, particularly the grasslands and 
fynbos biomes, is not economically feasible and such restoration does not achieve the 
biodiversity levels of pre-disturbance. Restoration of some biomes could also take 
decades, and in some cases centuries, to achieve the required mature habitat to support 
the biodiversity levels of pre-disturbance.135  
 
Although South Africa’s no net loss is a lower requirement than that set out in the 
international arena136 and by many foreign countries, it is an established fixed baseline 
that can be used to determine success or failure in coming years, and thus could be said 
to addresses a flaw, the lack of a defined baseline, which has been identified in several 
reviews of the offset process. 137   This approach does however rely heavily on the 
accurate calculation of biodiversity targets, covering all species, habitats, ecosystems 
and ecosystem services, to ensure that full functionality of biodiversity in South Africa 
is retained. A large onus is thus placed on the spatial planning undertaken by the 
provinces to compile plans which identify biodiversity areas that provide for all levels 
of biodiversity and all levels of ecosystems.138 Particularly when such plans can only be 
                                                 
133 This biodiversity network is determined through systematic conservation planning. Systematic 
conservation planning is an internationally recognised means to identify the areas required to ensure the 
conservation and management of biodiversity. Such areas are determined through the setting of targets, 
indicating how much of each feature is required in order to conserve a representative sample of 
biodiversity pattern (ecosystems, habitats, species and genes) and associated ecological processes, and 
are areas that maintain ecological and evolutionary processes that allow biodiversity to persist in the 
long term- DEAT, ‘Guideline regarding the determination of bioregions and the preparation of and 
publication of bioregional plans’, published in Government Notice No 291 in Government Gazette No. 
32006 of 16 March 2009, 25. 
134 Brownlie, S and Botha, M, ‘Biodiversity offsets: adding to the conservation estate, or ‘no net loss’?’ 
(2009) 27 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 230. 
135 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at 9; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 27; Gauteng op 
cit note 21 at 32-33; Manuel, op cit note 129. 
136 By BBOP and a number of financial institutions such as those associated with the International 
Finance Corporation and the Equator Principles Association. 
137 Refer to Section 2.5 for further discussion in this regard. 
138 An ecosystem can be defined as a very small unit such as a drop of water, or aggregated to a wetland, 
or a wetland complex or ever larger as the entire planet. DEAT, Bioregional Plans, op cit note 133, at 9-
10. Ecosystems can thus be subdivided into smaller ecosystems or aggregated into larger ecosystems, 
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compiled based on best available science, which, although continuously improved, 
cannot be said to be all encompassing.139  
 
3.1.3 Thresholds for offsetting 
Thresholds or limits for offsetting are based on the potential significance of the residual 
impacts, with a medium to high significance being considered for offsets, a low 
significance not requiring an offset and a very high significance being a fatal flaw and 
not offsetable. The guidelines indicate that significance was utilised in setting the 
threshold limits as the evaluation of significance of impacts and the potential for 
mitigation was already a central requirement of the National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA) and its EIA Regulations.140  It is likely that the utilisation of 
significance levels was also guided by the international approach, as the use of 
significance of impacts to evaluate potential for offsets, and the potential that very high 
significance is non-offsetable, is also a feature of the international guidelines.141  
 
Guidance is given on what circumstances would create these three significance 
levels. 142  This guidance is based, in line with the international approach, on the 
individual assessment of vulnerability and irreplaceability143 of ecosystems, species and 
ecosystem services. 144  In addition to the individual assessments, the South African 
environmental sector’s approach145 also requires the categorisation of the three levels, 
                                                                                                                                               
and the thus question arises at what level must ecosystem integrity be maintained to fulfil the 
sustainability requirement. 
139 Driver, M, Cowling, RM & Maze, K, ‘Planning for Living Landscapes; Perspectives and Lessons 
from South Africa’ Center for Applied Science at Conservation International Cape Town (2003), 
available at http://www.cepf.net/documents/living.landscapes.pdf (accessed September 2013), 43. 
140 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at 9; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20 at 27, Gauteng, op 
cit note 21, at 37; Manuel, op cit note 129;  
S24(4)(a)(iv) of NEMA requires that all applications for environmental authorisation must investigate 
the proposed activities’ impacts on the environment and assess the significance of these impacts. In the 
EIA Regulations, 2010, this assessment requirement is linked to the determination of residual impacts, 
through the requirement that the significance of the impact is assessed as well as the extent to which the 
impact may be reversed or mitigated (R22 & R31). 
141 BBOP (limits to offsetting), op cit note 92, at 3 & 12. 
142 Low, Medium to high, and Very high. 
143 Where ‘Vulnerability’ is the likelihood or imminence of biodiversity loss due to impacts such as 
ongoing cumulative impacts, fragmentation, degradation and or habitat loss, over harvesting etc; and 
‘Irreplaceability’ is the uniqueness of the biodiversity and whether there are other options for 
conserving that biodiversity. - Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife op cit note 20 at 32. 
144 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at 27-28 & 74-81; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 
32 & 106-115; Gauteng, op cit note 21, at 38-39; Manuel, op cit note 129. 
145 This approach is explicitly set out in the draft national framework, and in the Gauteng draft guideline 
(Gauteng, op cit note 21,at 41 & 44-47, which was developed at the same time as the national 
framework was being drafted.  The Western Cape (Western Cape, op cit note19, at 27) and KZN draft 
guidelines (Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 32) also refer to spatial planning as a means to 
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based on spatial planning146 information and biodiversity maps,147 which are available 
at a national and provincial level and, in some cases, at a finer scale.148  
 
3.1.4 Additionality  
In line with the international approach, biodiversity offsets are required to achieve gains 
above and beyond measures that are already required by law or would have occurred 
had the offset not taken place. The types of actions that would constitute an offset are 
the prevention of loss of biodiversity through securing areas and/or averting risk. 
Unlike the international approach, the creation and restoration of habitat or ecosystems 
is, in general, not considered as a viable offset action, except with regards to certain 
wetland types. Rehabilitation of habitat or ecosystems is further considered to be a 
management action and would not constitute a stand-alone offset, but would only be 
considered if combined with securing areas and averting risk. 149  Monetary 
compensation, where the cost of securing and managing a site was paid to a third party 
(banking or a conservation fund), is set out as an option, however it is noted that at this 
time no mechanisms are in place to facilitate the banking option. It has further been 
noted that payment into a fund managed by conservation authorities has risks in terms 
of capacity constraints of the said authorities to manage the various funds and banks.150  
The main type of offset recognised is therefore the securing of area with associated 
actions to avert risk.  
 
3.1.5 Metrics 
In order to meet the requirement of no net loss of biodiversity beyond the scientific 
targets established for a particular biodiversity feature or ecosystem, the guidelines, as 
                                                                                                                                               
determine significance levels although less guidance is provided on how this could be used to determine 
whether a biodiversity offsets could be considered.  
146 Spatial planning is undertaken by systematic conservation assessments. See op cit note 133 for an 
explanation of systematic conservation assessments. 
147  GIS based maps which delineate areas of priority biodiversity, termed critical biodiversity areas 
(features/area required to achieve conservation targets) and ecosystem support areas (features/area 
required to maintain the critical biodiversity areas). These maps are a visual representation of the area 
required to conserve and maintain biodiversity and are based on required biodiversity targets and 
irreplaceability and vulnerability concepts. The methodology for determining these delineations and 
maps has been standardised through workshops with SANBI and the provinces, and the intention is for 
such maps to be compiled for all of the provinces. 
148 The inclusion of systematic planning information and maps is aimed at ensuring that cumulative 
impacts do not compromise biodiversity persistence and representivity (i.e. viability of biodiversity) – 
Manuel, op cit note 129. 
149 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at 9; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 27-28; Manuel, 
op cit note 129. 
150 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at 58; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 90; Gauteng, 
op cit note 21, at 82; Manuel, op cit note 129. 
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with the international approach, require that a metric151 must be utilised to determine 
the loss and gains and to calculate the type and size of the offset required.152  
 
The metrics currently set out in the provincial guidelines, and which also appear to be 
the approach that the national framework is undertaking, provide guidance on how to 
undertake the basic first calculations but still leave the modifiers as a case by case 
assessment based on relevant species and site specific scientific knowledge and 
assessments. The metrics thus do not provide for a fool proof calculation and are still 
based on available expert knowledge and the decision-making of authorities. These 
metrics are also largely based on terrestrial ecosystems and do not provide adequate 
guidance for systems such as wetlands, which can undergo rehabilitation and restoration 
and which thus also need to take into account functional equivalency in the metrics.  
 
3.1.6 Equivalency 
The proposed offset site should preferably be an ecological equivalent (like for like), 
although trading up would be considered on a case by case basis, in circumstances 
when the habitat which is to be impacted has a low threat/conservation status and the 
offset will result in the securing of valuable threatened habitat.153 The location of the 
offset site(s) must also be determined on a landscape basis, and must be located so as to 
provide comparable ecosystem services 154  (specifically to those parties adversely 
                                                 
151 The metric to calculate the loss and gains is ecosystem and area (calculated in hectares) based, 
meaning that the size of the offsets is calculated firstly utilising the size of the impacted site multiplied 
by a ratio generated by the conservation status [Critically Endangered, Endangered, Vulnerable, or 
Least Threatened] of the vegetation (ecosystem) and the existing protection level for that vegetation 
type [This first basic ratio is also referred to as a conservation outcome multiplier and is one of the 
methodologies recognised in the international guidance - BBOP( no net loss), op cit note 90, at 19.] The 
size of biodiversity offset is then adjusted to take into account other factors, such as the condition of the 
site, the presence of threatened or protected species, important ecological process areas, or important 
ecosystem services, levels of risk or uncertainty associated with the success of the biodiversity offset, 
and time lags before the biodiversity offset would be achieved [Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, 
at 53; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 78; Gauteng op cit note 21, at 86; Manuel, op cit note 
129]. 
152 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at 44; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 64; Gauteng, 
op cit note 21, at 86; Manuel, op cit note 129. 
153 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at 45-46; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 66-67; 
Gauteng op cit note 21, at 80; Manuel, op cit note 129. 
154 Ecosystems services are benefits that are derived from the natural capital of an ecosystem and which 
can be categorised as goods, services and attributes. ‘Goods’ are harvestable resources, such as water 
and food; ‘services’ are processes, such as erosion control or treatment of waste; and ‘attributes’ are 
recreational or cultural. – Turpie, J, ‘Environmental and Resource Economics’ in Fuggle & Rabies’ 
Environmental Management in South Africa, Strydom, HA & King, ND (eds) 2 ed (2009) 46. 
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affected by impacts on ‘their’ ecosystem services); and be as close to the impacted site 
as possible, preferably within the same sub-catchment.155  
 
3.1.7 Duration, management, monitoring and compliance 
Offsets are aimed to be maintained in perpetuity and are thus required to be secured and 
further managed for at least the lifetime of the impacts.156 The proposals for the national 
framework provide that the securing of an offset must be through the proclamation of 
the land as a nature reserve under the National Environmental Management: Protected 
Areas Act 57 of 2003 (NEMPA). The reason for this preference is that this secures the 
land in perpetuity, provides controls for management of the biodiversity and also 
precludes mining of the land.157 However, it has been acknowledged that not all offset 
sites will comply with the legal requirements for a nature reserve, especially wetlands, 
which in South Africa are small scattered units within the landscape.158 The provincial 
draft guidelines suggest that sites could also be secured through conservation 
servitudes, Protected Environments (NEMPA), and biodiversity agreements under S44 
of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 (NEMBA).159 
 
The draft provincial guidelines also requires that funding must be provided for any 
immediate rehabilitation programmes, the long term management of the land, the 
auditing and monitoring of the offset, and the management of the fund itself.160 The 
draft provincial guidelines further stipulate that the enforcement of an offset, and 
compliance with the required management, monitoring and auditing, must be part of the 
conditions of the environmental authorisation, as continued compliance is required to 
ensure a viable long term offset.161  
                                                 
155 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at 56; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 84; Manuel, 
op cit note 129. 
156 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at 57; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 87; Gauteng, 
op cit note 21 at 100; Manuel, op cit note 129. 
157  Minerals are owned by the state and not by the landowners, thus the setting aside of land for 
conservation use does not automatically exclude the minerals from been exploited by an entity licensed 
by the Department of Mineral Resources. The exception to this is provided in S48 of NEMPA, which 
prohibits commercial prospecting or mining activities in Special Nature Reserves, National Parks, and 
Nature Reserves [S48(1)(a)] as well as in World Heritage sites, Marine Protected Areas, Specially 
Protected Forest Areas, Forest Nature Reserves and Forest Wilderness Areas [S48(1)(c)]. Further 
S48(1)(b) prohibits commercial prospecting or mining activities in Protected Environments unless 
written permission is obtained from both the Minister and the Minister for Mineral Resources. 
158 Discussion at workshops with SANBI. 
159 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at 59; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 88; Gauteng, 
op cit note 21 at 101. 
160 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at 60; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 91; Gauteng, 
op cit note 21 at 101. 




3.1.8 Public involvement 
The involvement of the public in the offsets calculations and design is expected to occur 
through the mechanisms provided for in the EIA Regulations, 2010.162 
 
3.2 FORESTRY SECTOR 
The forestry sector is managed by the National Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (DAFF) under the National Forest Act,163 which addresses management of 
plantations 164  and the protection and conservation of natural forests and protected 
trees.165 
 
The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries has compiled a four page 
document to provide guidance on DAFF’s approach to offsets,166  which states that 
biodiversity offsets could be considered within the licensing process required for the 
destructions of trees within natural forests167 and the destruction of protected trees.168 
 
The guideline sets out that it is the preference of DAFF that offset requirements are 
integrated into the environmental authorisation process;169 however, if requirements are 
not incorporated or not incorporated satisfactorily, then offsets should be managed 
through the licensing application process.170 As with the environment sector’s approach 
to biodiversity offsets, DAFF will only consider an offset as a last resort after it has 
been proven that the land use change or development is absolutely necessary and that 
no feasible alternatives exist, and (in the case of natural forest) that the development 
fulfils the requirements for exceptional circumstances.171 
                                                 
162 Western Cape DEADP, op cit note 19, at 82-89; Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 116-123; 
Chapter 6 of the EIA Regulations, 2010. 
163 Act 84 of 1998. 
164 Plantations are defined as ‘a group of trees cultivated for exploitation of the wood, bark, leaves or 
essential oils in the trees’ under S2 of the National Forest Act. 
165 The Minister may declare trees belonging to a particular species, or a particular tree, group of trees or 
woodland as protected under S12 of the National Forest Act. 
166 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) ‘Guidance on Off-Sets: Approach of DAFF 
Regarding Off-Sets as Condition for the Licensing Of Destruction of Protected Trees and Natural 
Forests’ (2012). 
167 S7 of the National Forest Act. 
168 S15 of the National Forest Act. 
169 As managed by the environment sector through the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 
1998 (NEMA) and its EIA Regulations, 2010.  
170 DAFF, op cit note 166, at 1. 
171 S3(3)(a) of the NFA states that natural forest may only be destroyed in favour of development in 
exceptional circumstances, whereby ‘exceptional circumstances’ is defined as capital projects of 




Two pathways are allowed for offsets, namely:  
(i) The setting aside of an area for conservation. This area must be in the same 
province that the destruction occurs and should be of the same vegetation 
type.172 This land must be secured through the declaration of a protected area 
and the land either donated to the Provincial Conservation Agency or managed 
privately, with only the latter option requiring long term funding options.173   
(ii)  The placement of money within a trust fund which is to be used for 
conservation purposes, preferably within the same vegetation type.174 
 
The guideline also provides guidance on the metrics required for the calculation of the 
required offset or monetary compensation. For natural forest, the metric is a basic 
multiplier with the ratio to be determined by rare forest types, forest types declared as 
threatened or critical biodiversity areas.175  
 
3.3 WATER AND MINING SECTORS 
South Africa’s water sector is managed by the National Department of Water Affairs 
under the National Water Act, 1998.176 The mining sector is managed by the National 
Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) under the Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA),177 although other departments, such as those responsible 
for the environment178 (EIA Regulations179) and water (Water Use Licences)180 have 
authorisation requirements that also manage mining activities. 
                                                                                                                                               
possible - Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Policy Principles and Guidelines for 
Control of Development Affecting Natural Forests, available at http://www.nda.agric.za/doaDev/ 
sideMenu/ForestryWeb/webapp/Documents/PolicyGuide NaturalForestsDev.pdf (accessed December 
2013), 9. 
172 DAFF, op cit note 166, at 2. 
173 DAFF, op cit note 166, at 3. 
174 DAFF, op cit note166, at 2. 
175 Multiplier from 12 to a maximum of 30 – DAFF, op cit note 166, at 3. 
176 National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
177 Act 28 of 2002. 
178 Environmental authorisations for the mining sector have been a point of contention between the 
Environment and Mineral Departments. Initially the EIA Regulations did not require environmental 
authorisations for mining activities and the EIA Regulations, 2010, which did list mining activities 
(Activities 19 and 20 in Listing Notice 1), were and are still suspended in respect of these activities. 
The 2010 listing of mining activities was derived from extensive negotiations between the two sectors, 
which determined that the Department of Mineral Resources would be the competent authority for 
mining activities for 18 months and this would then revert back to the Department of Environment. This 
negotiated process was set out in the National Environmental Management Amendment Act 62 of 2008 
and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Amendment Act 49 of 2008. This process was, 
however, only initiated when the commenced date for the MPRDA amendment Act was published as 7 
June 2013, thus setting the date for DMR to be a competent authority, for these mining activities, as 




For the water and mining sectors, discussion on the need for an offsets guideline was 
initiated by the SANBI Grassland Programme181 as part of its interactions within the 
mining sector, and the draft guideline 182  was developed through the subsequent 
partnership of the Grassland Programme with the Department of Water Affairs. 
 
The draft Wetland Guideline developed under this partnership relates only to wetlands 
(that is, the document is specific to one type of ecosystem only), and is intended for 
applications through the MPRDA, as well as the Environmental Authorisation and 
Water Use License processes.183 Further, once this guideline is finalised, the National 
Department of Water Affairs proposes to Gazette the guideline under the National 
Water Act as a standard for the implementation of wetland offsets. 
 
A similar approach to that set out in environment sector’s draft guidelines is taken, with 
the international principles discussed above forming the framework of the draft 
Wetland Guideline,184 namely: implementation of the mitigation hierarchy;185 that there 
are limits to what can be offset;186 offsets must ensure no net loss;187 offsets should not 
consist of activities already required by law (additionality); 188  and offsets must be 
secured for as long as the impacts occur.189 Offsets should be designed on a landscape/ 
catchment basis,190  using best available information, and should provide a fair and 
balanced outcome (equitable outcome) in terms of surrounding communities and 
conservation needs.191  
 
                                                                                                                                               
179 Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, 2010, supra note 124. 
180 Water uses, as listed in S21 of the National Water Act, require a water use license under S22(b) of the 
same Act. 
181 The Grasslands Programme commenced in 2008, and is a 20-year partnership between national and 
provincial government departments, conservation agencies, non-governmental organisations, 
municipalities, and the private sector which seeks to sustain and secure the biodiversity and associated 
ecosystem services of the grasslands biome for the benefit of current and future generations. See 
http://www.sanbi.org/programmes/working-country-wide/grasslands-programme.  
182 Department of Water Affairs and South African National Biodiversity Institute (DWA & SANBI), 
Wetlands offsets: a best practice guideline for South Africa (draft) (2013). 
183 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 5.  
184 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 14.  
185 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 14. 
186 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 15 and 23. 
187 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 16. 
188 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 17. 
189 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 17. 
190 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 15. 
191 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 14. 
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Further as with the environment sector’s approach, the draft Wetland Guideline 
provides guidance on the threshold for the limits to what can be offset, with low 
residual impacts in general not requiring offsets and very high significant impacts been 
considered ‘non-offsetable’. Guidance on what is non-offsetable is provided as both a 
broad description192 and a specific list of wetland types or circumstances that would 
result in the impacts being of very high significance and thus non-offsetable.193 This list 
is similar to the environmental sector’s concept of utilising the spatial planning 
generated information to determine significance. 
 
The draft guideline sets out that the wetland offsets can be delivered through one or a 
combination of mechanisms, namely: (i) protection through implementation of legal 
mechanisms to secure the wetland; (ii) averted loss of a wetland which is under threat 
through current activities (such as farming methods) or degradation (such as  erosion 
gullies and headcuts); (iii) rehabilitation through the improvement of wetland condition, 
function and associated biodiversity; (iv) establishment through the  creation of a new 
wetland system; and (v) direct compensation for ecosystem services lost through 
monetary means or provision of lost service through engineering structures  (such as a 
water treatment plant).194 The first three mechanisms are similar to those proposed in 
the environment sector. Establishment of a new wetland is specific to this ecosystem, as 
creation of a new habitat would not be possible in most terrestrial systems. The direct 
compensation is also not provided for in the environment sector, although a similar but 
parallel concept is proposed, where resource use is replaced or subsidised to avert risk 
(over harvesting, etc.) on a habitat.195  
 
The draft Wetland Guideline, in its assessment of residual impacts and no net loss, 
looks at three aspects: the intrinsic value of the wetland (hydrological functionality, 
conservation status and species habitat), the ecosystem services provided by the 
wetland,196 and the wetland’s importance as a water resource in terms of water resource 
                                                 
192  Offsets should not be used with respect to the following: Ecosystems or habitats of high 
irreplaceability (i.e. those ecosystems/habitats which are unique or rare or are restricted in distribution 
and/ or abundance), or high vulnerability; as well as activities with highly significant impacts on 
ecosystem services and water resources - DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 15. 
193 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 23. 
194 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 17-18. 
195 Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 28. 
196 See note 154 for more information on ecosystems services. 
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management and water resource quality objectives.197 The metric used to determine the 
loss and gains is based on an ecosystem approach, 198  as is also followed by the 
environmental sector.199  
 
In terms of securing the offsets for long term outcomes, the draft guideline sets out that 
wetland offsets need to be secured through appropriate legal mechanisms, which 
include declaring the site a formally protected area or the use of a conservation 
servitude registered on the title deeds; and that the long-term management of the offset 
needs to be secured through financial provision by the developer in the form of a 
fund. 200  It is also required that monitoring of the implementation and long term 
management of the offset be undertaken, based on an agreed upon plan with milestones 
and associated indicators and final condition targets.201 
 
As with the environment sector’s draft guidelines, there is a requirement for a report 
that clearly sets out the impacts, proposed offsets with calculations, proposed 
timeframes for implementation, the monitoring and management plan.202  
 
3.4 MUNICIPAL PLANNING SECTOR 
Several municipalities, including the City of Cape Town, eThekwini Metropolitan 
Municipality and uMgungundlovu District Municipality, have investigated the 
utilisation of biodiversity offsets through municipal planning legislation.203   At this 
                                                 
197 The national water resource quality objectives are set in terms of S13 of the National Water Act 36 of 
1998 and establish the required resource quality in terms of instream flow, water quality, instream and 
riparian habitat and aquatic biota (S1 of National Water Act of 1998). The water resource management 
requirements are set by the relevant catchment agencies and the National Water Resource Strategy as 
per S5 & S6 and Chapter 7 of the National Water Act. 
198 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 15. 
199  However, the concept around the calculation method differs, with the wetland guideline using 
fractional multiplier (this includes calculations based on protection level, regional and national 
importance, value of species within wetland, condition of the wetland buffer and connectivity within 
the landscape), which reduces the extent of the required offset area based on the biodiversity 
significance of the wetland - DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 30-35. In international practice, 
multipliers are generally used to account for risk and uncertainty and are used to increase offset areas - 
BBOP (Handbook) 2012, op cit note 11, at 88. The environment sector’s methodology does not follow 
this practice of fractional multipliers, and instead uses multipliers for additional habitat requirement 
(species, ecosystem services, etc), as well as risk and uncertainty, as per the international approach. 
There is a fundamental difference in the two methodologies, which could create confusion for 
developers when requiring authorisations from both the environment and mining/water departments. 
200 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 54. 
201 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 56. 
202 DWA & SANBI, op cit note 182, at 56. 
203 In the case of eThekwini, offsets have already been incorporated into planning authorisations, for 
example the Sun Coast Casino which was required to undertake an offset to mitigate impacts on 1ha of 
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stage, no municipal guidelines have been developed, although the eThekwini 
Metropolitan Municipality is currently investigating the possibility of piloting a 
conservation bank within the municipality.204 
 
3.5 SOUTH AFRICA’S APPROACH TO BIODIVERSITY OFFSETS   
As explained hereinabove, there are several sectors investigating the utilisation of 
biodiversity offsets for their sector’s application processes.  The various approaches 
have, in general, followed the same lines, as in all cases the international discussions 
and guidelines for offsets have been utilised as the frameworks. The South African 
approach thus appears to be in line with current BBOP and international thinking. 
Although, in this regard it is noted that the BBOP guidelines are relatively new and 
have not been well tested at this time, thus, no conclusion can be drawn around the 
viability of the biodiversity offset approach.  
 
Further to this, guidelines can only lay down general principles to govern the use of 
biodiversity offsets. The determination of whether an offset should be considered and 
how it is managed and enforced comes down to the available legislative controls and 
tools, as well as the decisions made by the application authorities,205 which themselves 
can be influenced by resource and time constraints and the difficulty of balancing the 
three sustainability pillars (social, economic and environmental sustainability) in a 
developing country. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
dune vegetation during the construction of the casino, with the offset being the re-creation of vegetated 
dunes using a ratio of 12:1. 
204 Discussion at eThekwini workshop ‘Exploring the opportunity to pilot a conservation banking scheme 
in eThekwini municipality’ on 29 November 2013. 
205 Decision making by officials has a significant impact on the outcomes of a project, and it has been 
noted that in making such decisions officials often have motivations that are different from their 
statutory mandates, including personal choices, political pressure, practical problems in enforcing 
complex conditions, etc. – Walker, op cit note 110, at 153; Evans, R ‘Decision Making in the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Process’ available at http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/ 
dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/8416/R.%20Evans%20-%20Decision%20Making%20in%20the% 
20EIA%20Process_ FINAL.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed July 2014), 4. 
Further, decision-making which includes a biodiversity offset can be considered as multi-objective, 
multi-criteria decisions, which have to contend with many conflicting constraints between the various 
environmental options, and the accumulation of large amounts of project-specific information - Evans, 
ibid, at 5. The impact of officials on decision making is, however, outside the scope of this investigation 
and will not be discussed in further detail. 
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3.5.1 Legislative controls and tools 
Based on the above guidelines and frameworks, it is submitted that the legislative 
controls and tools required for implementing the biodiversity offsets in South Africa 
and specifically the environment sector, can be grouped into seven themes. Namely:  
1. Legislation framework that enables, or at a minimum does not prohibit, the 
utilisation of biodiversity offsets. 
2. Tools to facilitate a uniform approach to the investigation, design and 
implementation process. 
3. Mechanisms to initiate and provide for the investigation and design of a 
biodiversity offset. 
4. Mechanisms to enforce the implementation of the offset to the desired standard. 
5. Mechanisms to secure the legal protection of the offset for the required duration. 
6. Financial mechanisms to secure the long term management of the offset. 
7. Mechanisms providing for the involvement of surrounding communities in the 
biodiversity offset process. 
 
The above grouping has been presented to facilitate and structure the discussion in 
Chapter 4, which will critically assess whether South African law, in particular its laws 
relating to environmental authorisations, adequately provides for the mechanisms 






CHAPTER 4                                                                                         
SOUTH AFRICA’S LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR 
BIODIVERSITY OFFSETS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR 
 
Biodiversity offsets are being required, on a case by case basis, by government 
authorities in the context of various authorisation processes. 206  It is these existing 
application processes, which are currently being used to provide, the mechanisms for 
the initiation and investigation of offsets, the design of the offsets and enforceable 
conditions for monitoring and implementation. 
  
This chapter looks at whether South Africa’s current legislation pertaining to the 
Environmental Authorisation, Environmental Impact Assessment process (as 
administered by the national and provincial environmental authorities) provides an 
adequate framework for the utilisation of biodiversity offsets.  
 
The investigation of this framework is structured around the seven themes identified in 
Chapter 3 as being required for biodiversity offsets to be implemented within South 
Africa. 
 
4.1 BIODIVERSITY OFFSET COMPATIBILITY WITH SOUTH AFRICA’S 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
At this stage, no legislation is in place that directly refers to or mandates the 
implementation of biodiversity offsets. This section thus investigates whether the use of 
biodiversity offsets is consistent with basic principles underlying South African 
environmental law, and whether the current legislation enables, or at a minimum does 
not prohibit, the utilisation of biodiversity offsets. The investigation below considers 
whether the use of biodiversity offsets is consistent with the public trust doctrine, the 
NEMA principles, and the concept of IEM, and whether there are any provisions of 
NEMA which might be seen as enabling offsets. 
 
                                                 
206 Application processes such as the EIA Regulations, mining permits and licences, water use licences, 
forestry licences, town planning approvals, etc. 
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4.1.1 Constitution  
The framework for South Africa’s environmental legislation is contained within the 
environmental right207,208 of S24 of the Constitution. 209 Where sub-section (b) creates a 
constitutional imperative to protect the environment through reasonable legislative and 
other measures,210 whereby the protection of the environment through these reasonable 
legislative and other measures requires the prevention of ecological degradation, 
promotion of conservation, and the securing of ecologically sustainable development.211  
 
This requirement for sustainability is seen to be central to South Africa’s environmental 
legislation,212 with the environmental right requiring that the promotion of justifiable 
economic and social development must be pursued213 and NEMA setting out that all 
development must ensure a balancing of the three sustainability pillars, with such 
development being socially, economically and environmentally sustainable. 214 
Biodiversity offsets on the face of it could be said to uphold this requirement for 
balancing the three pillars of social, economic and environment, as they are put forward 
as a means to allow the unlocking of economic and social development, whilst still 
providing for conservation and protection of biodiversity.  
 
It could thus be argued that although the environmental right does not specifically 
provide for offsets, legislative or ‘other measures’215 taken to implement biodiversity 
                                                 
207 Kotzé LJ, ‘The Judiciary, the Environmental Right and the Quest for Sustainability in South Africa: A 
Critical Reflection’ (2007) 16(3) RECIEL, 298.  
208 This term serves to describe a fundamental human right to have a safe and protected environment and 
does not imply that the environment has a right. - Blackmore, A ‘ The relationship between the NEMA 
and the Public Trust: The importance of NEMA principles in safeguarding South Africa’s biodiversity’ 
– in prep, 2014 
209 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which reads as ‘Everyone has the right- 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and (b) to have the environment 
protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other 
measures that-  (i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) 
secure ecologically sustainable development and the use of natural resources while promoting 
justifiable economic and social development’. 
210 Kidd, M, Environmental Law 2ed (2011), 23; Environmental right, ibid. 
211 S24(b)(i) to (iii) of the Constitution, op cit note 209. 
212 Kidd, op cit note 210, at 18; Paterson, A, ‘Fuelling the Sustainable Development Debate in South 
Africa’ South African Law Journal (2006) 123(1), 62; Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v 
Director-General: Environmental Management, Department Of Agriculture, Conservation And 
Environment, Mpumalanga Province, And Others 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) at para [58-60]; MEC, 
Department Of Agriculture, Conservation And Environment And Another v HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd 
2008 (2) SA 319 (CC) at para [65]. 
213 S24(b)(iii) of the Constitution, op cit note 209. 
214 S2(3) NEMA. 
215 The meaning or interpretation of ‘other measures’ is not provided for in the Constitution, (Kidd, op 
cit note 210, at 24; du Plessis, A, ‘Adding Flames To The Fuel: Why Further Constitutional 
Adjudication Is Required For South Africa’s Constitutional Right To Catch Alight’ (2008) 15 SAJELP, 
38 
 
offsets would not be in contradiction of the constitutional requirements of the 
environmental right.  
 
 
4.1.2 State’s trusteeship of biodiversity  
In addition to the sustainability requirement is the fact that, in South Africa, the State is 
the trustee of the environment and biological diversity.216  The question thus arises 
whether this trusteeship allows for the biodiversity offset concept which, in effect, 
sanctions the significant loss of biodiversity in one area as a means to secure 
biodiversity in another area.  
 
The State’s trusteeship is based on the environmental right, which requires that the State 
must ensure that the environment is protected for present and future generations.217 This 
protection is to be attained218 through mechanisms that prevent ecological degradation, 
promote conservation and ensure that the exploitation of the environment through 
utilisation of resources and development is sustainable. Thus, protection of the 
environment is, in large part, seen as meaning the sustainable219 use thereof. This is 
further set out in NEMBA, which requires that the State must manage, conserve and 
sustain South Africa’s biodiversity.220, 221 
 
                                                                                                                                               
72) although it has been put forward that ‘other measures’ would include policies and programmes, 
(Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para [42]; Kidd, op 
cit note 210, at 24; du Plessis, op cit note 215, at 73) and could be construed to include the 
implementation of legislative measures, environmental law compliance and enforcement measures, 
mechanisms to promote environmental education, (Kidd, op cit note 210, at 24; du Plessis, op cit note 
215, at 73; Kotzé, op cit note 207, at 301)  as well as administrative measure (Kotzé, op cit note 207, at 
301; du Plessis, op cit note 215, at 7). 
216 S24 of Constitution, op cit note 209, requires that ‘the environment is protected for the present and 
future generations’;  Section 2(4)(0) of NEMA  states that ‘[t]he environment is held in public trust for 
the people, the beneficial use of environmental resources must serve the public interest and the 
environment must be protected as the people’s common heritage’; Section 3 of NEMBA states that ‘in 
fulfilling the rights contained in section 24 of the Constitution, the state …must (a) manage, conserve 
and sustain South Africa’s biodiversity and its components and genetic resources’. 
217 S24 of the Constitution, op cit note 209. 
218 S24(b)(i) to (iii) of the Constitution, op cit note 209. 
219 Sustainable development is defined in S(1) of NEMA as ‘the integration of social, economic and 
environmental factors into planning, implementation and decision-making so as to ensure that 
development serves present and future generations’. 
220 S3 of NEMBA, (own emphasis); op cit note, 216. 
221 This concept of public trust aligns with that set out by Sax, who in 1970 wrote a seminal article on the 
public trust concept, in which he noted that the public trust and the principal requirement for 
government to promote the public interest does not require the preservation of every inch of public trust 
property – Sax, J ‘The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention’, 
68 Michigan Law Review (1970) 68(3) 471 – 566, 488.  
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The level required to sustain biodiversity and ensure intergenerational equity is not 
explicitly provided for, although NEMBA does provide that sustainable use of a 
biological resource222 requires that the resource must be used in such a way and at a rate 
that ‘(a) would not lead to its long-term decline; (b) would not disrupt the ecological 
integrity of the ecosystem in which it occurs; and (c) would ensure its continued use to 
meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations of people’.223 
 
Biological resources, obviously only constitute a component of biodiversity,224 but this 
definition nevertheless provides an indication of the expected approach with regards to 
biodiversity sustainability and development, where such development must not lead to 
long term decline of biodiversity, must maintain the ecological integrity of the 
ecosystem and must ensure its continued existence for present and future generations.225  
 
South Africa’s current approach to the conservation of biodiversity and its 
incorporation into sustainable development is through systematic conservation planning 
tools. 226  This approach arises from the fundamental principle underpinning South 
Africa’s management and conservation of biodiversity, namely, the necessity to be 
strategic, focused and supportive of sustainable development, due to limited resources 
available for biodiversity management and conservation and the need for development 
                                                 
222 S1 of NEMBA defines indigenous biological resources as ‘… any resource consisting of- (i) any 
living or dead animal, plant or other organism of an indigenous, species (ii) any derivative of such 
animal, plant or other organism; or (iii) any genetic material of such animal, plant or other organism’. 
223 Definition of sustainable in S1 of NEMBA. 
224  S1 of NEMBA defines biodiversity as ‘the variability among living organisms from all sources 
including, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they 
are part and also includes diversity within species, between species, and of ecosystems’. 
225 This is further supported in:  
   (a) The NEMA principles and criteria for sustainable development – S2(4)(a)(i) of NEMA provides that 
‘[s]ustainable development requires the consideration of all relevant factors including … that the 
disturbance of ecosystems and loss of biological diversity are avoided, or, where they cannot be 
altogether avoided, are minimised and remedied’. 
(b) The 2008 National Biodiversity Framework,  which defines sustainable development as 
‘development that avoids: (i) loss and degradation of natural habitat in threatened ecosystems and 
critical biodiversity areas; (ii) further introduction or spread of invasive alien species; (iii) over-
abstraction of water beyond the limits of the ecological reserve; (iv) over-harvesting of species; and 
(v) further contributions to climate change’ - Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
(DEAT), ‘South Africa’s National Biodiversity Framework’ in Government Notice No. 813 in 
Government Gazette No. 32474 of 3 August 2009. 
226 DEAT bioregional plans, op cit note 133, at 24; DEAT, National Biodiversity Framework, op cit note 
225, at 44 and 57; Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), Department of Mineral Resources, 
Chamber of Mines, South African Mining and Biodiversity Forum and South African National 
Biodiversity Institute, Mining and Biodiversity Guideline: Mainstreaming Biodiversity into the Mining 
Sector, Pretoria (2013), 24; DEAT (NBSAP), op cit note 18, at 68; See note 133 for explanation of 
Systematic Conservation Assessments. 
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in South Africa. 227  Systematic conservation planning basically identifies areas of 
biodiversity priority, which adequately represent biodiversity features within a defined 
region and which ensure the maintenance and persistence of this identified biodiversity. 
Thus, the tool provides for areas that can be developed or modified and those areas 
which are critical for maintenance of biodiversity. This approach is provided for in the 
2008 National Biodiversity Framework, 228  through the development of provincial 
spatial plans, as well as legislated through S40 of NEMBA, which provides for the 
publishing of bioregional plans, although currently the majority of provincial and 
district plans have not been published. 
 
South Africa’s current approach to biodiversity conservation and the State’s trusteeship 
of biodiversity, thus, already accepts the concept that there can be loss of biodiversity in 
an area, and that such would not impact on the maintenance and persistence of 
biodiversity as a whole, as long as the identified biodiversity network is maintained.229 
The environmental sector’s approach to biodiversity offsets is also based on 
maintaining the required biodiversity network.230 The question, whether this trusteeship 
allows for the biodiversity offset concept, on the face of it and based on current 
practice, appears to be in the affirmative. 
 
An outstanding question, which falls outside the scope of this dissertation, is whether 
the current biodiversity practices could be said to fulfil the State’s required trusteeship 
on all occasions. This question arises as NEMBA requires that this biodiversity231 
which must be sustained, managed and protected, includes all of its components and 
genetic resources.232 Thus, in using spatial planning to provide the tools to determine 
sustainability, as noted in Chapter 3 above, a large onus is placed on the provinces, 
when undertaking spatial planning, to compile plans which accurately and fully identify 
all the levels of biodiversity that need to be conserved.  
 
                                                 
227 DEA 2013, op cit note 226, at 7.  
228 Compiled in terms of S38 & 39 of NEMBA. 
229 DEAT, National Biodiversity Framework, op cit note 225, at 37. 
230 See discussion in Chapter 3, in particular Section 3.1 and op cit note 133. 
231 S1 NEMBA op cit note 224. 
232 NEMBA, op cit note at 216. 
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4.1.3 National Environmental Management Act 
The National Environmental Act is an overarching framework statute which gives 
effect to the environmental right233 as set out in the Constitution.234 The provisions 
which could be applicable to the implementation of the biodiversity offsets 
(specifically, the principles which guide the implementation of the Act and the 
Integrated Environmental Management chapter) will be briefly looked at below. 
 
4.1.3.1 NEMA Principles 
The principles in the National Environmental Act (NEMA)235 apply to actions of all 
organs of states which may significantly affect the environment.  The principles do not 
themselves empower decision makers to exercise or perform a particular function,236 
but do form the framework against which the provisions of NEMA, and other laws 
concerned with the protection and management of the environment must be analysed 
and interpreted.237, 238 
 
Biodiversity offsets could be said to be in line with the NEMA principles as offsets may 
only be considered after the strict implementation of the mitigation hierarchy239 and 
                                                 
233 S24 of the Constitution, op cit note 209. 
234 Kidd, op cit note 210, at 35; MEC, Department Of Agriculture, Conservation And Environment And 
Another v HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd, supra note 212, at para [24]; Fuel Retailers Association of 
Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, 
Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province, and Others, supra note 212, at para [59]. 
235 S2 of NEMA. 
236  Smith Ndlovu Summers Environmental Law Specialists, ‘Memorandum of Advice: The 
implementation of financial biodiversity offsets in the context of South Africa’s environmental law and 
laws applicable to the regulation of public finances’ prepared for SANBI, 31 January 2012 
(unpublished), 8.  
237 Kidd, op cit note 210, at 39-40; Smith Ndlovu Summers, op cit note 236, at 8; MEC for Agriculture, 
Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs v Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd 2006 All SA 17 (SCA), at para [15]; 
MEC, Department Of Agriculture, Conservation And Environment And Another v HTF Developers 
(Pty) Ltd supra note 212, at para [29]. 
238 S2(1)(c) and S2(1)(e) of NEMA which state respectively that the principles ‘serve as guidelines for 
organs of state exercising any public or administrative function in terms of NEMA,  or any statutory 
provision concerning the protection of the environment’ and ‘guiding the interpretation, administration 
and implementation of NEMA and any other law concerned with the protection or management of the 
environment’. 
239 S2(4)(a) (i) of NEMA: ‘That the disturbance of ecosystems and loss of biological diversity are 
avoided, or, where they cannot be altogether avoided, are minimised and remedied’ (own emphasis). 
S2(4)(a)(ii) of NEMA: ‘That pollution and degradation of the environment are avoided, or, where 
they cannot be altogether avoided, are minimised and remedied’ (own emphasis). 
S2(4)(a)(iii) of NEMA: ‘That the disturbance of landscapes and sites that constitute the nation’s 
cultural heritage is avoided, or where it cannot be altogether avoided, is minimised and remedied’ 
(own emphasis). 
S2(4)(a)(viii) of NEMA: ‘That negative impacts on the environment and on people’s environmental 
rights be anticipated and prevented, and where they cannot be altogether prevented, are minimised 
and remedied’ (own emphasis). 
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may only be considered if such an offset will ensure no net loss of biodiversity. 240 The 
biodiversity offset approach also encapsulates the concept that environmental 
damage 241  and the consequences of an activity are the responsibility of the 
developer/polluter for the lifetime of the activity.242 Biodiversity offsets could also be 
said to be in line with the principle that environmental management be undertaken in 
terms of the best practical environmental option available,243 which is defined as being 
that which provides the most benefit or causes the least damage to the environment as a 
whole, at a cost acceptable to society, in the long term as well as in the short term.244 
 
Thus, on the face of it, the NEMA principles do not preclude the use of biodiversity 
offsets, although, as noted above, the principles do not themselves provide enabling 
provisions.  
 
4.1.3.2 Integrated Environmental Management  
S23 of NEMA sets out the general objectives of integrated environmental management 
(IEM), namely, that impacts on the environment are, in a transparent manner, to be 
identified, predicted and adequately evaluated in terms of the risk, consequences and 
options for mitigation, with a view to minimising negative impacts, maximising 
benefits, and promoting compliance with the S2 NEMA principles. Again, these 
provisions do not preclude the implementation of biodiversity offsets, as biodiversity 
offsets could be said to fulfil the requirements for IEM.245 
 
Further to this, S23 of NEMA also establishes that the objective of IEM is to employ an 
environmental management method best suited to ensuring that a particular activity is 
                                                 
240 S2(4)(a)(vi) of NEMA ‘that the development, use and exploitation of renewable resources and the 
ecosystems of which they are part do not exceed the level beyond which their integrity is jeopardised’ 
(own emphasis). 
241 2(4)(p) of NEMA: ‘The costs of remedying pollution, environmental degradation and consequent 
adverse health effects and of preventing, controlling or minimising further pollution, environmental 
damage or adverse health effects must be paid for by those responsible for harming the environment’ 
(own emphasis). 
242 2(4)(e) of NEMA: ‘Responsibility for the environmental health and safety consequences of a policy, 
programme, project, product, process, service or activity exists throughout its lifecycle’ (own 
emphasis). 
243 2(4)(b) of NEMA: ‘Environmental management must be integrated, acknowledging that all elements 
of the environment are linked and interrelated, and it must take into account the effects of decisions on 
all aspects of the environment and all people in the environment by pursuing the selection of the best 
practicable environmental option’ (own emphasis). 
244 Definition of ‘best practical environmental option’ in S1 of NEMA. 
245 Smith Ndlovu Summers were of a similar view - Smith Ndlovu Summers, op cit note 236, at 10. 
43 
 
pursued in accordance with the NEMA principles.246 These environmental management 
methods are not defined in NEMA, however, NEMA does list several environmental 
management instruments which can be utilised to implement IEM, ranging from 
strategic, to spatial and site specific instruments, including EIAs.247  
 
Although biodiversity offsets are not explicitly recognised, in light of the requirement 
that the methods referred to in S23 must facilitate the application of the NEMA 
principles of sustainability and no net loss of biodiversity, and the fact that a wide range 
of instruments are recognised as implementing IEM,248  it could be argued that, as 
above, this provision, while not currently explicitly providing for biodiversity offsets, 
does not preclude their implementation.   
 
The current provisions appear clear in their intention that such modes or instruments be 
established and managed through regulations under S24(5)(bA).249  This provision does 
allow for additional environmental management instruments to be developed and 
adopted in time, 250  which could provide for biodiversity offsets as a stand-alone 
instrument, 251  or for amendments to the existing EIA Regulations, 2010, 252  to 
incorporate biodiversity offsets. This would, however, require the publishing of 
regulations (or the amendment thereof).  
 
                                                 
246 S23(2)(f) of NEMA: ‘identify and employ the modes of environmental management best suited to 
ensuring that a particular activity is pursued in accordance with the principles of environmental 
management set out in Section 2’. 
247Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), Overview of Integrated Environmental 
Management, Integrated Environmental Management Information Series 0, Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Pretoria (2004), 8; 
 S24(5)((bA) of NEMA: ‘(i) environmental management frameworks; (ii) strategic environmental 
assessments; (iii) environmental impact assessments; (iv) environmental management programmes; (v) 
environmental risk assessments; (vi) environmental feasibility assessments; vii) norms or standards; 
(viii) spatial development tools (ix) any other relevant environmental management instrument that may 
be developed in time’. 
248 DEAT, 2004, op cit note 247 at, 8 – States that South Africa’s thinking around IEM has evolved from 
only been associated with authorisations of controlled activities to been viewed as an underlying 
philosophy and suite of tools that can be infused into decision-making by all sectors of society. 
249 24(5)((bA) of NEMA: ‘The Minister, or an MEC with the concurrence of the Minister, may make 
regulations …. laying down the procedure to be followed for the preparation, evaluation and adoption 
of prescribed environmental management instruments’. 
250 S24(5)(bA)(ix) of NEMA: ‘any other relevant environmental management instrument that may be 
developed in time’. 
251 An instrument established outside the EIA Regulations, would have the advantage of being available 
for utilisation in the environmental authorisation process but could also allow for use in policies, 
programmes and other projects that are not listed but have significant impacts that can’t be minimised 
or remediated on site or within an area. 
252 EIA Regulations, 2010 published in GN 543 in GG 33306 of 18 June 2010. 
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4.1.3.3 Environmental Authorisations  
The EIA regulatory framework established in terms of S24 of NEMA is the established 
legal instrument to implement IEM and the environmental right at the project level, and 
as such is the instrument in place to ensure no net loss of biodiversity and the 
implementation of the public trust.253 The EIA Regulations is further the mechanism 
that the environment sector is currently utilising to implement biodiversity offsets.  
 
Again, as with the provisions discussed above, S24 of NEMA does not explicitly refer 
to biodiversity offsets. The question is thus: Does S24 indirectly enable or in fact 
preclude the implementation of biodiversity offsets? 
 
S24(1) of NEMA provides that the potential consequences for or impacts on the 
environment of listed activities 254  must be considered, investigated, assessed and 
reported on to the competent authority. S24(4) provides the requirements for the report, 
namely that such must include an investigation of, inter alia: (i) the potential 
consequences for or impacts on the environment of the activity and assessment of the 
significance of those potential consequences or impacts;255 (ii) mitigation measures to 
keep adverse consequences or impacts to a minimum; 256  and (iii) formulation of 
arrangements for the monitoring and management of consequences for or impacts on 
the environment.257  
 
As observed in a memorandum of advice produced by Smith Ndlovu and Summers 
Attorneys for SANBI, 258  no express reference to the possibility of implementing 
measures to offset for adverse residual impacts is made in S24(1) or S24(4). The other 
measures in the mitigation hierarchy of avoid, minimise and remedy are, however, 
explicitly required to be taken into account. This is seen in the requirement for the 
investigation of alternatives, which could bring about avoidance and minimisation of 
negative consequences; and the investigation of mitigation measures, which would 
                                                 
253 With public trust, being the protection of the environment for current and future generations and the 
requirement that the use of the environment provides for intergeneration equity. See Section 4.1.2 and 
note 216 and 221 for further discussion around this issue. 
254 S24(2) of NEMA. 
255 S24(4)(a)(iv) and 24(4)(b)(i) of NEMA. 
256 S24(4)(b)(ii) of NEMA. 
257 24(4)(b)(v) of NEMA. 
258 Smith Ndlovu Summers, op cit note 236, at 11. 
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include means to minimise adverse consequences or impacts to a minimum acceptable 
level, as well as the possibility of remediation subsequent to the impact.259  
 
Further, the consistent requirement for what must be considered for sustainable 
development, in terms of the NEMA principles, is the need for impacts to be avoided, 
minimised or remedied.260 Again, these criteria do not explicitly include the last step of 
the mitigation hierarchy, namely biodiversity offsets.  
 
It could be argued that the omission of the final step of the mitigation hierarchy, in the 
principles and S24, demonstrates that NEMA does not currently enable the biodiversity 
offset tool. However, it could also be argued that the criteria for determining 
sustainability are not exhaustive,261 and that the terms ‘mitigate’ and ‘remedy’ are broad 
enough to allow for the implementation of biodiversity offsets. 
 
Neither NEMA nor the EIA Regulations, 2010, provides a definition of these terms. 
The 1992 IEM Guideline Series does however define mitigate as ‘the implementation of 
practical measures to reduce adverse impacts or enhance beneficial impacts of an 
action’.262 The dictionary defines the terms mitigate and remedy, respectively, as to 
make (something bad) less severe or serious, 263   and a means of counteracting or 
eliminating something undesirable.264 
 
The dictionary and the IEM guideline definitions provide a wide meaning of the two 
terms and it could be argued that biodiversity offsets, in offsetting residual impacts, are 
a means to counteract and make good on an undesirable impact, as well as a means to 
make this impact less severe, by offsetting the feature/ecosystem/function that is lost or 
impacted upon within the surrounding area. 
 
                                                 
259 Requirement of the environmental management programme which must be included in the EIA report 
- S24N(2)(f) of NEMA; as well as R22(2)(i)(v) and R31(2)(l)(v) of the EIA Regulations, 2010, which 
requires an assessment of the extent to which impacts can be reversed. 
260 S2(4)(a)(i) to (iii) and (viii) of NEMA, op cit note 239. 
261 S2(4)(a) of NEMA sets out that sustainable development requires the consideration of all relevant 
factors, including eight specific criteria which are articulated in the provision. 
262 Department of Environmental Affairs, Glossary of terms used in Integrated Environmental 
Management, Integrated Environmental Management Guideline Series No 6 (1992), 5. 





The Smith Ndlovu and Summers report suggests that the terms mitigate and remediate 
must be viewed broadly in terms of the purpose of the EIA regime265 and NEMA.266 
When interpreted against the backdrop of the polluter pays principle,267 and considering 
that offsets for residual impacts could assist decision-makers in identifying the best 
practicable environmental option and in the promotion of sustainable development, it 
could be said that the use of offsets measures is broadly in line with the purpose and 
context of the EIA regime. 268 
Following this line of argument, that mitigate and remedy must be looked at in broad 
terms, as a means to fulfil the requirement of sustainable development and to allow for 
the determination of the best environmental option, and bearing in mind the dictionary 
definitions of these terms, it could be argued that the terms remedy and mitigate thus do 
allow for the final step in the mitigation hierarch, the biodiversity offsets.  
This argument could further be supported by S24O of NEMA, which sets out the 
criteria that must be assessed by competent authorities when undertaking a decision for 
an environmental authorisation. This provision requires that the competent authority 
take into account measures that may be taken to (i) protect the environment from harm 
resulting from the activity being applied for, and (ii) prevent, control, abate, or mitigate 
any substantially detrimental environmental impacts or environmental degradation.269 It 
could be argued that these requirements do not preclude biodiversity offsets being 
considered as a means to protect the environment from harm and as a means to control 
or mitigate the residual impacts arising from the activity.270 
In summary, NEMA contains no explicit reference to biodiversity offsets. NEMA, in 
providing for IEM mechanisms to ensure the most efficient process to restore and 
safeguard the biodiversity estate from necessary landscape transformation, does, 
however, arguably include an implicit reference to biodiversity offsets. It thus could be 
                                                 
265 To identify, assess and evaluate the impacts of proposed listed activities with an ultimate view to 
identifying and authorising ‘the best practicable environmental option’ – Smith Ndlovu Summers, op 
cit note 236, at 11. 
266 To, inter alia, give effect to sustainable development by providing the framework for the EIA Regime 
- Smith Ndlovu Summers, op cit note 236, at 11. 
267 The polluter pays principle is the concept that any person involved in an activity that creates pollution,  
must be responsible for the costs involved in the prevention of that pollution as well as the costs 
involved in dealing with the consequences, to humans and the environment,  of pollution that has 
occurred- Kidd, op cit note 210 at 7-8.  
268 Smith Ndlovu Summers, op cit note 236, at 12. 
269 S24O(b)(ii)(aa) and (bb) of NEMA. 
270 This argument concurs with that put forward by the Smith Ndlovu Summers Report - Smith Ndlovu 
Summers, op cit note 236, at 13. 
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argued that NEMA does not prohibit the utilisation of biodiversity offsets, and that 
further, the IEM environmental authorisation process concept could be said to enable 
the implementation of biodiversity offsets.  
 
4.2 TOOLS TO FACILITATE AN UNIFORM APPROACH FOR THE 
INVESTIGATION, DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
BIODIVERSITY OFFSETS 
Biodiversity offsets have significant implications for the regulators, applicants and the 
general public. For biodiversity offsets to be managed and implemented in a transparent 
and uniform manner, a standardised approach and methodology needs to be in place. 
Such approach needs to provide guidance but have sufficient flexibility to be utilised 
for different activities and landscapes, and to allow for use of the most updated 
techniques and methodologies. Mechanisms in South African law which could facilitate 
this standardisation are regulations, norms and standards,271 policies and guidelines.  
 
Regulations provide for legally binding, enforceable requirements, as can norms and 
standards (although this depends on the provisions within the relevant Act), whilst 
policies and guidelines are not legally binding but must be taken into account by 
government and developers. The statutory mandates of officials in the Department of 
Environmental Affairs to adopt such mechanisms, and which mechanisms would seem 
to provide the most appropriate means for standardisation of biodiversity offsets, is 
discussed below. 
 
S23(3) of NEMA provides for the publishing of manuals and/or guidelines to ensure the 
coordination of the competent authorities’ actions and procedures related to the 
environmental authorisation process. S24(J) of NEMA further provides for the 
publication of guidelines to guide the implementation, administration and institutional 
arrangements of the EIA regulations. These two provisions could respectively provide 
for the publishing of the National Framework for Biodiversity Offsets as a means of 
                                                 
271 The norms and standards tool provides for a description of a desired state (norm) and the measurable 
means to achieve that state (standards), and are general prescriptive in the methods required to be used. 
S9(1)(a) of NEMBA does make provision for norms and standards to be issued for the achievement of 
any of the objectives of this act, including the management and conservation of South Africa’s 
biological diversity and its components. The NEMBA norms and standards, as with guidelines, are not 
legally binding requirements. On this basis, and in determining between the two, it is put forward that 
guidelines would better provide for the flexibility required in an offset tool and thus would be more 




standardisation between national and provincial approaches, as well as provide for 
guidance on specific aspects of the biodiversity offset process, for example the 
utilisation of trust funds. 
 
The use of guidelines and policies to assist government in the protection of the 
environment for current and future generations is implicitly provided for in the S24 
environmental right272 and has been discussed in case law. 273 In the Sasol Oil case, 274  
Justice Cachalia stated that:  
 
The adoption of policy guidelines by state organs to assist decision makers in the 
exercise of their discretionary powers has long been accepted as legally permissible 
and eminently sensible. 
 
He further stated that in circumstances where policy/guidelines exist: 
 
An affected party would then have to demonstrate that there is something exceptional 
in his or her case that warrants a departure from the policy. 
 
Such would thus require all parties to utilise the guideline(s), and would allow for the 
required flexibility of implementation. The framework policy and associated guidelines 
could thus provide the tool for the uniform implementation of biodiversity offsets. It is 
however noted that the above guidelines are restricted to the NEMA environmental 
authorisation process and would not provide for a uniform approach across all sectors. 
Further, although guidelines and policies must be utilised when available, they cannot 
be enforced rigidly,275 which allows for flexibility in terms of updated techniques, but 
can also result in decision-makers having to continually defend positions taken and thus 
adding an administrative burden. 
 
                                                 
272 The environmental right (see note 209) must be implemented through legislative and other measures 
(my emphasis), whereby other measures has been set out as including policies and guidelines, see note 
215. 
273 For example in BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and 
Land Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 (W) at [155 B]; MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and 
Land Affairs, Gauteng v Sasol Oil and Another (2006) supra note 237, at para [19]; Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at para [48]. 
274 MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs, Gauteng v Sasol Oil and Another, 
supra note 237, at para [19]. 
275 MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs, Gauteng v Sasol Oil and Another 
supra note 237 at para [19]. 
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As noted above, regulations are enforceable, but this also means that they cannot be 
amended quickly to take into account new knowledge. It is possible that regulations 
could be used to provide the framework for the offset, in conjunction with guidelines 
that would allow for more detailed guidance on processes. In this regard regulations 
may be issued through several provisions provided for in NEMA and NEMBA. 
 
The EIA Regulations, 2010, published under section 24(5) of NEMA could be amended 
to provide for the steps of the offset process and an associated guideline(s) could be 
published in terms of S24J to provide more detailed guidance.  
 
A potentially wider provision is S44 of NEMA, which provides that the Minister may 
make regulations to carry out the general purpose and the provisions of this Act. The 
general purpose of NEMA being to provide a framework for enacting the environmental 
right set out in the Constitution, and to inter alia provide for certainty with regards to 
decision-making that affects the environment, as well as to provide a framework for 
integrating environmental management into all development activities. Looking at the 
general purpose of NEMA and the S23 provision for integrated environmental 
management, regulations could thus be published for implementation of biodiversity 
offsets which would have a wider scope than the Environmental Authorisation process 
and could apply to any process where the decision may significantly affect the 
environment.  
 
NEMBA has a similar provision in terms of which regulations may be published 
relating to any other matter that may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of 
NEMBA. 276  It could be argued that biodiversity offsets are a tool to ensure the 
management and conservation of biological diversity, and thus that the regulation of 
this tool would facilitate the implementation of NEMBA.277  Publishing regulations 
under NEMBA could potentially set a clear distinction between biodiversity offsets and 
the EIA Regulations. That is, clearly recognising that although biodiversity offsets can 
be utilised through the EIA Regulations, these offsets are not solely tied to the EIA 
process and may also be used by other sectors such as agriculture, forestry, mining etc. 
 
                                                 
276 S97(1)(h) of NEMBA. 
277 The objectives of NEMBA is set out in S2 with S2(a)(i) specifically stating that one of the objectives 




It is put forward that a combination of regulations with policy and guidelines could 
provide a good framework to ensure a uniform approach to the investigation, design and 
implementation of biodiversity offsets through the EIA process, and that the enabling 
provisions to introduce such a framework are available in South African law.  In 
addition it is also noted that there is provision in South African law for this approach to 
be extended beyond the EIA process, providing for a uniform approach by all sectors.  
 
4.3 MECHANISMS TO INITIATE AND PROVIDE FOR THE 
INVESTIGATION AND DESIGN OF A BIODIVERSITY OFFSET 
The policies/guidelines discussed in Chapter 3 provide that biodiversity offsets are 
triggered by the determination that there is residual impact(s), of medium to high 
significance, which cannot be avoided, mitigated or remediated. Thus, tools are 
required that provide for the determination of the type of impacts and the significance 
of these impacts. Further, tools are required that would allow for the investigation into 
the viability of biodiversity offsets and how such biodiversity offsets should be 
designed and managed.  
 
NEMA provides for the identification of activities which require environmental 
authorisations,278 and currently the lists of activities have been provided for in terms of 
Listing Notices 1, 2 and 3, 279  which were published with the EIA Regulations, 2010. 
These lists identify activities that may potentially have a significant impact on the 
environment (Listing Notice 1 and 2) or activities that may potentially have a 
significant impact if occurring within identified sensitive geographic regions (Listing 
Notice 3). It is likely that many of the activities/projects that have significant impacts 
on the environment and biological diversity would thus have to follow the 
environmental authorisation process.  
 
This environmental authorisation process280 requires the submission of a report to the 
competent authority for decision-making,281 with the report being required to provide, 
amongst other aspects, detailed information on the predicted impacts and the 
significance of these impacts.282 The report would thus provide information on whether 
                                                 
278 S24(2) of NEMA. 
279 Supra note 124. 
280 As set out in the provisions of S24 of NEMA and the EIA Regulations, 2010. 
281 Basic assessment report (BAR) required in R22(1) and R23, and an Environmental Impact Assessment 
Report (EIR) required in R31(1) and R34(1) of EIA Regulations, 2010. 
282 R1 of EIA Regulations, 2010, defines significant impact as ‘an impact that by its magnitude, duration, 
intensity or probability of occurrence may have a notable effect on one or more aspects of the 
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a project has been determined to have residual impacts,283 and the significance level284 
of these remaining impacts.  
 
The EIA process as currently set out will thus be able to provide the information 
required to determine if a biodiversity offset investigation should be initiated. This 
biodiversity offset process should be formally initiated by the competent authority, as 
such has significant implications for biodiversity, and requires extensive investigations 
which have cost and time implications for the applicant.285 Residual impacts can only 
be identified once there has been a full investigation of the site, the activities, the 
impacts and the consideration of the mitigation hierarchy. The determination of whether 
a biodiversity offset is needed and/or could be considered can thus only occur towards 
the end of the process currently provided for in South Africa’s EIA legislation, 286 
namely, at the time of compilation of the basic assessment reports (BAR) or 
environmental impact assessment reports (EIR). 
 
Although it was noted above that the competent authority should formally initiate the 
offset investigation, there are currently no constraints in the EIA Regulations which 
would stop the applicant from undertaking a full biodiversity offset investigation, 
without first obtaining approval.287  The applicant could also approach the competent 
authority after the complication of the draft BAR or EIR and public participation 
                                                                                                                                               
environment’. To determine the level of significance, the report is required to include an assessment of 
alternatives and cumulative impacts, the nature of the impact, the extent and duration of the impact and 
probability of the impact occurring, the degree the impact can be reversed (remediated) or mitigated, 
and the degree to which the impact may cause irreplaceable loss of resources- R22(2)(i) and R31(2)(l) 
of EIA Regulations, 2010. 
283 Impacts that cannot be avoided, mitigated or remediated. 
284 Impacts of low significance need not be offset, and no further investigation is thus required. Impacts 
of very high significance would not be able to be adequately offset and thus offsets should not be an 
option in this case. The level where offsets may be considered as an option, is thus where impacts are of 
medium to high significance. 
285 There is however no constraints set out in the EIA regulations which would stop the applicant from 
undertaking an entire offset process without first obtaining approval from the competent authorities. 
286 EIA process for BAR: Application submitted, draft BAR is undertaken which undergoes a public 
participation process, and the final BAR is submitted to the competent authority. The report must be 
accepted before a decision can be undertaken on whether to grant or deny authorisation.  
EIA process for Scoping EIA: Application submitted, scoping undertaken and a draft scoping report 
compiled which undergoes a public participation process, the final scoping report is submitted to the 
competent authority. When the competent authority accepts the scoping report, investigations are 
undertaken as per the scoping plan and a draft EIR is compiled which undergoes public participation 
process, and the final EIR is submitted to the competent authority. The report must be accepted before a 
decision can be undertaken on whether to grant or deny authorisation. 
287 This could place pressure on the competent authority to accept that a biodiversity offset should be 
followed, as the applicant would have spent time and money to obtain the information on the offset. A 
formalised biodiversity offset process as discussed in Section 4.2, would allow for controls that would 
protect both the applicant and the competent authority. 
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process and request that approval is granted for a biodiversity offset process to be 
initiated.  
 
If initiated by the competent authority, without a request from the applicant, such can 
only occur when the final BAR or EIR is submitted. Further, the only option available 
to the competent authority, under the current EIA provisions, is to reject 288  the 
submitted BAR or EIR and request the submission of an amended report. 289  The 
competent authority, in the letter rejecting the report, must provide instructions on what 
must be undertaken to provide all the required information for a decision to be made. 
The EIA Regulations stipulate that such instructions could either be a request for 
additional information290 or the submission of a report on any specialist study.291 Either 
of these instructions would allow for the investigation and design of a biodiversity 
offset to be undertaken and the information provided to the competent authority. 
 
The decision to reject a BAR or EIR is considered as an administrative action.292 The 
question is, therefore, whether the rejection of the report, in order to request an 
investigation of biodiversity offsets, is allowed within the constraints of administrative 
law293 and the provisions of the EIA Regulations.  
 
Administrative law requires that an administrative decision be rationally related to the 
purpose for which the power was given.294 In this regard, the requirement for BARs and 
EIRs is that the content of these reports must provide the competent authority with 
sufficient information to determine whether the application for environmental 
                                                 
288 R24(1)(b) and R34(2)(b) of EIA Regulations, 2010. 
289 R24(2)(a) and (b); and R34(2)(b)(ii) of the EIA Regulations, 2010. 
290  R24(2)(a) of the EIA Regulations, 2010 states ‘the competent authority must request the EAP 
managing the application to submit such additional information as the competent authority may 
require’;  R34(2)(b)(ii) of the EIA Regulations, 2010 states that the competent authority may ‘request 
the applicant to make such amendments to the report as the competent authority may require for 
acceptance of the environmental impact assessment report’.  
291 R24(2)(b)  of the EIA Regulations, 2010  states that ‘the competent authority must request the EAP 
managing the application to submit a report on any specialist study or specialised process as the 
competent authority may require in relation to any aspect of the proposed activity’; and for the EIA 
report the submission of specialist reports is already provided for in the content of an EIA report 
(R31(2)(q)) and R34(2)(b)(ii) of the EIA Regulations, 2010. 
292 S1 of Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) defines an administrative action as 
‘any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by- (a) an organ of state, when… (ii) exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation … which adversely affects the 
rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect’. 
293 Decisions must be lawful, procedurally fair and reasonable – S33 Constitution and S3 and S6 of 
PAJA.  
294 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA; In re: Ex parte Application of President of the RSA 
2000 2 SA 674 (CC) at para 85. 
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authorisation should be granted or denied. 295  The purpose for which competent 
authorities are given the mandate to accept or reject these reports is thus to ensure that 
these reports do in fact provide sufficient information to provide the basis for an 
informed decision.  Indeed, the EIA Regulations themselves articulate reasons for which 
a report may be rejected, and these include that the report does not materially/ 
substantially comply with the required content296 and non- compliance to guidelines.297 
 
The required information which would allow the competent authority to make this 
informed decision is set out in the Regulations,298  although this is not an exhaustive list 
and does allow for other information not listed. One of these factors required in the 
report is the investigation of mitigation measures, 299  which (based on the broad 
interpretation of ‘mitigation’ discussed above) can be argued to include biodiversity 
offsets.  On this basis it could be argued that a competent authority’s rejection of a BAR 
or EIR, pending an investigation of biodiversity offsets falls within the competent 
authority’s mandate under the EIA Regulations and constitutes a reasonable 
administrative action. 
 
For investigations into a potential biodiversity offset to be triggered the environmental 
assessment practitioner would have to have identified that remaining residual impacts 
could not be otherwise resolved, and that the activity could potentially have a 
significant impact on the environment. The applicant, on review of this information, has 
the option to withdraw the application before submission of the BAR or EIA report. 
Submission of the report thus indicates desire on the part of the applicant to continue 
with the development. The request to consider a biodiversity offset as a means to 
facilitate this process thus could be argued as being reasonable and procedurally fair. 
 
It could thus be said that the EIA Regulations do allow for the investigation of 
biodiversity offsets, however it could be further argued that the current process as 
                                                 
295 R22(2) and R31(2) of the EIA Regulations, 2010, state that ‘the report must contain all information 
that is necessary for the competent authority to consider the application and reach a decision’. 
296 R24(1)(b)(ii) and R34(2)(b) of the EIA Regulations, 2010. 
297 R24(1)(b)(ii) of the EIA Regulations, 2010. Also provide for rejection of the BAR in cases where the 
report has not taken into account guidelines applicable in respect of the basic assessment reports. This is 
not relevant in this case as it is not non-compliance with a guideline that is the issue but the need for 
further information. 
298 A list is provided of what must be contained within these two reports in R22(2) and R31(2) of the EIA 
Regulations, 2010. 
299 R22(2)(i)(vii) and R22(2)(j) and R31(2)(k) of the EIA Regulations, 2010. 
54 
 
provided for is not efficient. The Regulations do not stipulate when a biodiversity offset 
should be initiated, and do not require that such can only be formalised by the 
competent authority. Further, the only way in which the competent authority can 
currently initiate an offset investigation is by rejecting the BAR or EIR.  It is suggested 
that the amendment of the EIA Regulations, to better facilitate these points, in 
conjunction with a guideline, would allow for a more streamlined process. 
 
4.4 MECHANISMS TO ENFORCE THE IMPLEMENTATION AND 
MANAGEMENT OF THE BIODIVERSITY OFFSET  
The reports submitted may indicate that a biodiversity offset is a feasible option and 
may also provide details of what would need to be undertaken to ensure that this offset 
would fulfil the requirements of no net loss and on the ground conservation gains, as 
well as the long term management requirements. Does the legislation, however, allow 
the competent authority to enforce these requirements of securing, rehabilitating, 
managing, monitoring and reporting, through conditions of the environmental 
authorisation (EA)? 
 
R37(1)(d) of the EIA Regulations, 2010 sets out that the EA must specify conditions 
subject to which the activity may be undertaken. This provision then goes on to list 
what must be included. This list is not, however, exhaustive300 and therefore does not 
preclude the competent authority from imposing other conditions. This is further 
supported by R37(2)(f), which provides that the competent authority may include any 
other condition that is considered necessary for the protection of the environment. 
 
The decision to grant an EA with associated conditions is an administrative action.301 
The action of the competent authority must thus be lawful, reasonable and fair; the 
competent authority must not exercise powers or perform a function beyond that 
conferred upon it by law;302 any decision taken must be rationally related to the purpose 
for which the power was given and to the information in front of the competent 
                                                 
300 Wording states ‘ including conditions determining’ (my emphasis). 
301 See op cit note 292. 
302 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 
374 (CC) at para [58]; Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) 
SA 247 (CC) at para [49]. 
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authority;303 any decision taken must have been preceded by a fair procedure; and the 
decision must be consistent with NEMA and the principles of NEMA. 
 
The EIA process, through the submission of an amended report, would provide the 
applicant with a reasonable opportunity to make representations concerning whether the 
applicant is prepared to consider biodiversity offsets, and to present the offsets options 
which the applicant considers to be feasible and achievable. The information in the 
amended report, which should contain the report on the biodiversity offset investigation 
and proposals as well as the financial implications of the offset’s implementation and 
management, 304  should, on the face of it, provide the competent authority with 
sufficient information to determine if the activity could be considered to be sustainable. 
In addition, the report should provide sufficient information for the competent authority 
to determine the best practicable environmental option, which provides the most benefit 
or causes the least damage to the environment as a whole, at a cost acceptable to 
society.305 Thus, it could be argued that a decision under these circumstances could be 
considered reasonable and fair.306 
 
Would such a biodiversity offset condition(s) be within the empowering provision of 
R37 and considered rationally related to such powers? As noted above, R37 provides 
that the competent authority may impose any condition necessary for the protection of 
the environment. A biodiversity offset could be argued as being a means to protect the 
environment, and thus conditions relating to its enforcement could be considered to be 
within the empowering provision of R37. 
 
                                                 
303  SLC Property Group (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Economic 
Development (Western Cape) and Another 2008 1 All SA 627 (C) at para [41-42] – Longlands case. 
304  In the Longlands case, the judgment clearly stated that conditions of authorisation must avoid 
unquantified financial burdens -  Supra note 303 at para [52]. 
305 As required by NEMA principles and broadly by S24(4) of NEMA. 
306 This could potentially be challenged if the biodiversity offset, which is intended to mitigate the 
residual negative impacts arising from the activity, commences or is finalised only after the impacts 
have already been effected on the ecosystem.  Land requiring many years of rehabilitation in order to 
get the environment to a state that would be in accordance to a required biodiversity offset, could be 
said to have a high risk of failure  and that such risk is all owned by biodiversity and not the project. 
The Fuel Retailer cases have clearly set out the requirement that a decision must be based on 
sustainability of the project, and it could be argued, that in these cases, that the biodiversity risk 
associated with the decision means that there could not be certainty of the sustainability of the project. 
It is put forward that in these cases, it could be argued that the decision to grant authorisation based on a 
biodiversity offset, which may take years to come to fruition and /or which may not rehabilitate to the 
required level, could be deemed unreasonable. 
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Further to this, with regards to R37, the conditions imposed must be rationally 
connected to the listed activity being authorised. 307  Broadly, the concept of a 
biodiversity offset could be said to be rationally connected to the activity as the offset 
would be managing/mitigating the residual negative impacts arising from the activity. 
 
This direct connection to the activity could, however, vary and may not be considered 
reasonable where offsets types are not directly linked to mitigating the impact (such as 
out of kind offsets,308 where the offset is not directly mitigating the activity’s impacts; 
or where the location of the offset is so far removed from the activity site that it may not 
be reasonable to assert a link). The Smith Ndlovu and Summers Report additionally 
highlights that there may not be a rational link where the offset exceeds the lifecycle of 
the project and its impacts.309 This is related to S24E of NEMA,310 which requires that 
‘adequate provision is made for the on-going management and monitoring of impacts of 
the activity on the environment throughout the lifecycle of the activity’ (own emphasis). 
However, in light of the South Africa situation, where restoration of habitat/ecosystems 
is generally not possible, is financially unfeasible, or can only occur over a period of 
several decades, 311  it is likely that the majority of projects would have long term 
impacts even beyond the closure of the project. The Smith Ndlovu and Summers report 
thus argues that, in these cases, the ‘imposition of an offset in perpetuity may be both 
reasonable and legally defensible’.312 
 
Further to the above, on the ability of EA conditions to enforce biodiversity offsets, it 
must also be noted that the holder of the EA is responsible for the implementation of 
conditions. The EA can thus impose duties upon the applicant/EA holder to implement 
and manage a biodiversity offsets, but cannot impose such conditions on a third party. 
Financial donations or land donations to a third party by the applicant as a means to 
                                                 
307 The purpose of S24 of NEMA is to determine the consequences of a listed activity(ies) and how best 
to optimise the resulting positive environmental impacts and how best to avoid the resulting detrimental 
impacts on the environment, or where these can’t be avoided, ensure mitigation and management of 
impacts to acceptable levels. The purpose of the EIA Regulations, 2010, is to regulate the procedures 
required to implement S24 of NEMA. The purpose of R37 of the EIA Regulations, 2010, is thus to 
ensure that the activity is undertaken and managed in such a way that detrimentally impact on the 
environment are mitigated to an acceptable level.  
308 Out of kind offsets are those which do not provide for the same habitat/ecosystem/species that is 
damaged by the activity, but provide for another type habitat/ecosystem/species of a potentially higher 
conservation value, or that is under greater threat of extinction; See also Section 2.4(e). 
309 Smith Ndlovu Summers, op cit note 236, at 9. 
310 S24E sets out the minimum conditions for an environmental authorisation.  
311 See note 135; and Section 2.5. 
312 Smith Ndlovu Summers, op cit note 236, at 36. 
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implement the biodiversity offset, if imposed as conditions, thus only control the 
donation and not the implementation and management of the offset. Currently, it thus 
appears that the applicant must be held responsible for all phases of the offset to allow 
for enforceability through the EA conditions.  
 
4.5 MECHANISMS TO SECURE THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE 
OFFSET FOR THE REQUIRED DURATION 
Conditions of an EA can set out controls for implementation and management of an 
offset, and this would allow for enforcement of a biodiversity offset. This does, 
however, place a burden on the competent authority in terms of compliance monitoring 
and further does not protect the land from other legally authorised processes, such as 
mining, whereby the minerals are owned by the state and not by the land owner. The 
following discussion examines alternative mechanisms to secure biodiversity offsets, 
and ensure the viability of the biodiversity offset, under other legislation. 
 
4.5.1 The National Environmental Management Protected Areas Act 
The National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003 (NEMPAA) 
provides for several types of protected areas as well as mechanisms to manage these 
protected areas. 
 
An area may be declared as a nature reserve (NR),313 and although this is subject to the 
area complying with the nature reserve criteria, these criteria are wide enough to 
accommodate biodiversity offsets.314 The declaration of private land as a nature reserve 
may be initiated by the landowner, 315 allowing the competent authority to place the 
onus on the applicant to initiate the nature reserve declaration. The terms of the written 
agreement entered into with the landowner are binding on the successors in title and 
must be recorded in a notarial deed and registered against the title deeds of the 
property,316 thus ensuring that the land is maintained and managed as a nature reserve. 
The management of the nature reserve may be assigned to the landowner, an organ of 
state or suitable organisation, 317  thus allowing for the option of a landowner, 
conservation body or third party to manage the nature reserve. Such management must 
                                                 
313 S23(1)(a)(i) of NEMPAA.  
314 S23(2) of NEMPAA lists the criteria as, inter alia: ‘(b) To protect the area if the area has significant 
natural features or biodiversity, or  is in need of long-term protection for the maintenance of its 
biodiversity or for the provision of environmental goods and services; (c)  To provide for a sustainable 
flow of natural products and services to meet the needs of a local community’. 
315 S35(1) of  NEMPAA. 
316 S35(3)(a) and (b) of NEMPAA. 
317 S38(1)(a) of NEMPAA. 
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be undertaken in terms of a management plan318 and performance indicators,319 and the 
performance monitored by the MEC or Minister.320 
 
Protection provided by the declaration includes the prohibition of prospecting or mining 
within a nature reserve, 321 and there being limited circumstances in which a declared 
nature reserve may be withdrawn. 322  In terms of management of the reserve, the 
protection is, however, limited to the removal of the management authority in instances 
of non-performance.323  A trust fund with sufficient money to ensure the staffing and 
management of the reserve would ensure that the State does not have to take on the 
financial burden of the offset and would provide the option for another party to be 
designated as the management authority.324  
 
A protected environment (PE) may be declared325 subject to the area complying with 
the PE criterion, and, as with the NR, these criteria are wide enough to accommodate 
biodiversity offsets.326 Again, as with the NR, the landowner may initiate the process,327 
the management of the PE may be assigned to the landowner, an organ of state or 
suitable organisation, 328 and management is required to be undertaken in terms of a 
management plan329 and performance indicators,330 and the performance monitored by 
the MEC or Minister.331 
 
Protection provided through the declaration of a PE is more limited than in the case of 
the NR, as the PE is not registered against the title deeds, is not transferable to a 
successor in title,332 and is only established for a limited period. 333 Withdrawal from a 
                                                 
318 S39(2) of NEMPAA. 
319 S43(3) of NEMPAA. 
320 S43(3) of NEMPAA. 
321 S48(1)(a) of NEMPAA. 
322  S24(1) of NEMPAA - A nature reserve may only be withdrawn by resolution of the National 
Assembly or by resolution of the Legislature depending on whether the nature reserve was declared 
by the Minister or the MEC respectively. 
323 S44(2) of NEMPAA. 
324 See Section 4.6 below for more details on financial obligations around offsets. 
325 S28(1)(a) of NEMPAA. 
326  S28(2) of NEMPAA lists the criteria as, inter alia: ‘(b)To enable owners of land to conserve 
biodiversity on their land and to seek legal recognition therefor; (c) to protect the area if the area is 
sensitive to development due to its-  (i)biological diversity and/or … (v)provision of environmental 
goods and services; …(e) to ensure that the use of natural resources in the area is sustainable’. 
327 S35(1) of NEMPAA. 
328 S38(1)(b) of NEMPAA. 
329 S39(2) of NEMPAA. 
330 S43(3) of NEMPAA. 
331 S43(3) of NEMPAA. 
332 S28(3) of NEMPAA. 
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PE can be undertaken by a notice in the Gazette334 and mining or prospecting may be 
undertaken if authorised by the Minister of Environmental Affairs and the Cabinet 
member responsible for minerals.335 Further to this, as with the NR, the protection 
around good management is limited to the removal of the management authority in 
instances of non-performance. 
 
4.5.2 National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act  
The National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 provides for the 
utilisation of biodiversity management agreements. In this regard, the Minister is 
empowered to enter into an agreement with any suitable person, organisation or organ 
of state regarding the implementation of a biodiversity management plan336 (whereby a 
biodiversity management plan is a plan that is drawn up to ensure the long-term 
survival in nature of a species or ecosystem). 337  Such plans and agreements have 
recently been opened to utilisation by the biodiversity stewardship programme,338 and 
could potentially be utilised for biodiversity offsets in a similar manner. However, they 
are based on a voluntary system339 and may not be an appropriate tool to enforce 
compliance with a condition of an environmental authorisation. 
 
4.5.3 Conservation servitude 
A conservation servitude could be imposed upon a landowner in favour of a third party, 
requiring the landowner to restrict activities and land uses to those consistent with the 
desired conservation aims. Such a servitude agreement would be recorded in a notarial 
deed and registered against the title deeds of the property as a personal servitude.340 In 
the case of biodiversity offsets, the third party would likely be a juristic person such as 
a conservation authority, as personal servitudes do not extend beyond the lifetime of the 
                                                                                                                                               
333 The South African Stewardship programme is currently implementing a period of 3 to 4 years with the 
Protected Environment declarations. 
334 S29(a) of NEMPAA. 
335 S48(1)(b) of NEMPAA. 
336 S44 of NEMBA. 
337 S43(1) of NEMBA. 
338 Department of Environmental Affairs ‘Norms and Standards for Biodiversity Management Plans for 
Ecosystems’ in Government Notice 83 in Government Gazette 37302 of 17 February 2014, 9. 
339 DEA 2014, op cit note 338, at 13, and S43(2) of NEMBA ‘Before approving a draft biodiversity 
management plan, the Minister must identify a suitable person, organisation or organ of state which is 
willing to be responsible for the implementation of the plan’ (my emphasis). 
340 S65 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937, as amended. Praedial servitudes, S75 of the Deeds 
Registries Act, although allowing for the servitude to be in perpetuity were not investigated as such 
are related to two land parcels, dominant and servient tenements, where the servient land grants rights 
to the dominant land such as a right of way or for service pipelines. As such, praedial servitudes 
would not be usable for biodiversity offsets. 
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person in whose favour the servitude is created and cannot be transferred, and thus to 
ensure the land is secured the third party would need to be a juristic person. The 
personal servitude would be binding on successors in title and thus could provide for 
long term protection from non-compatible land activities. However, this would not 
provide control over how the land was managed, such as in terms of alien clearing, fire 
management etc, and would also not provide for protection against mining rights.  
 
4.5.4 Contracts 
The applicant can enter into a legal agreement with the landowner, or the applicant (if 
the landowner) with the competent authority or conservation authority, requiring that 
the land is managed in a manner that gives effect to the biodiversity offset 
requirements. 341  Such an agreement would only bind the landowner and not any 
successors in title, and would generally only operate for a fixed period. Further, the 
contract would not provide for protection against mining rights. 
 
4.5.5 Land use zonings 
Property can be zoned for conservation use by the municipality under the relevant 
provincial planning acts or ordinances.342 This provides a very low level of protection, 
as an application can always be made to have the land rezoned. The zoning also does 
not enforce conservation management of the land and the land would not be protected 
against mining rights. 
 
4.5.6 Trusts 
Another mechanism could be a trust, set up by the applicant, in terms of the Trust 
Property Control Act, 1988.343 Ownership of the land would be vested in the trust and 
the trustees would manage and control the land in accordance with the biodiversity 
offset management plan and the trust deeds, which would specify the purpose of the 
trust, the nature of the trust property, the trustees’ duties and when and how the trust 
may be terminated.344 This would provide good protection in terms of implementation 
of the plan, but land would not be protected against mining rights. 
 
                                                 
341 Such contracts are part of the stewardship programme, where biodiversity agreements are based on 
contracts between land owner and the conservation authority. 
342 For example in the KZN province this would be the KZN Planning and Development Act 6 of 2008. 
343 Act 57 of 1988. 
344 Smith Ndlovu Summers, op cit note 236, at 48. 
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4.5.7 Conclusion  
In terms of the best protection provided for the long term management of biodiversity, 
the nature reserve appears to be the best option in terms of providing for management 
of the offset, and protection from non-compatible land uses such as mining. This is the 
option put forward in the draft National Biodiversity Offset proposal and that proposed 
by the provincial guidelines. However, as noted in Chapter 3, it would not be practical 
to secure the smaller area offsets, in particular wetlands which may be located in 
several areas to make up one offset, through a nature reserve. In these cases, a mix of 
conservation servitudes and contracts may have to be utilised. It is suggested that the 
amendment of the EIA Regulations to allow for the establishment of conservation 
servitudes and the placement of such against the property’s title deeds, as set out in 
NEMPAA, would provide for more security for these smaller areas that would not fall 
within the NR criteria. 
 
Further to this, both conservation servitudes and NR have to follow a legal procedure to 
be initiated and implemented. This process would take time and thus the securing of 
land would have to be considered as a condition which needed to be met before the 
authorised activity, or parts thereof, could commence.345 
 
4.6 FINANCIAL MECHANISMS FOR SECURING THE LONG TERM 
MANAGEMENT OF BIODIVERSITY OFFSETS 
In order for a biodiversity offset to achieve its objectives, it is necessary to ensure that 
the land is managed in accordance with the aims of the biodiversity offset in the long 
term and, in some cases, in perpetuity. Such management would include any ongoing 
rehabilitation work and maintenance management, such as fire breaks, block burning, 
fencing, alien clearing, and control of poaching. Long term monitoring and auditing of 
the site would also be required to provide feedback on compliance. This would require 
financial mechanisms beyond that of securing the land. 
 
The requirement for such long term financial input for the maintenance of the 
biodiversity offset could be a condition of the environmental authorisation. 346  A 
condition requiring the applicant to fund the long term management of the biodiversity 
                                                 
345 R37(1)(d) of the EIA Regulations, 2010. 
346 In the Longlands case, supra note 303, it was noted that the financial burden on the applicant must be 
clearly quantified prior to a decision being undertaken. Financial requirements would thus have to be 
set out in the report prior to a decision being undertaken on the offset. 
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offset may however not protect against insolvency, death of the applicant, or the closure 
of the company. All of which could result in the biodiversity offset not being managed 
in the long term or falling to the State to manage, resulting in financial implications for 
the State. 
 
S24P of NEMA provides for financial provisions for remediation of environmental 
damage. This section is intended to allow for the financial provisions,347  similarly 
required by the MPRDA, for the rehabilitation, management and closure of 
environmental impacts related to mining projects. The provision allows for the Minister 
to utilise the funds if the applicant fails to undertake the required activities348 and allows 
the funds to be re-assessed to ensure that the amount is sufficient to undertake the 
required work,349 and such money is protected from insolvency of the holder.350 This 
provision is intended for mining and prospecting applications351 and is intended to only 
last until the closure of the mine. Provision is, however, made for this to be extended to 
other applications within NEMA.352 It could be argued that this provision could be 
made applicable to biodiversity offsets which are required in environmental 
authorisations, where such would allow for securing of funding for long term 
maintenance for the lifetime of the activity. This would, however, require that the 
Minister or MEC extended this provision to environmental authorisations, with relevant 
changes to make such applicable to the lifetime of the biodiversity offset, which is not 
the case at the moment.  
 
Another mechanism would be donation of the land and/or the financial transfer to a 
third party, such as a conservation organisation or the State. These options were 
assessed by the Smith Ndlovu and Summers Report353 which determined that no organ 
of state is mandated to implement biodiversity offsets, thus money transferred to a 
Department could not be withdrawn as a direct charge against the Revenue Fund.354 All 
                                                 
347 Where financial provisions is the setting aside of funding, in a manner that secures such funding i.e. a 
bond, before a project commences. 
348 24P(2) of NEMA. 
349 24P(3) & (4) of NEMA. 
350 24P(6) of NEMA provides that ‘the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 24 of 1936), does not apply to any 
form of financial provision contemplated in subsection (1) and all amounts arising from that provision’. 
351 24P(1) of NEMA. 
352 24P(7) of NEMA provides that the Minister or MEC ‘may in writing make subsections (1) to (6) with 
the changes required by the context applicable to any other application in terms of this Act’ (my 
emphasis). 
353 Smith Ndlovu Summers, op cit note 236, at 28-31 and 53 and 55. 
354 S15(1)(a)(ii) & 24(1)(a)(ii) of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA). 
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money received by an organ of state must be paid into the Revenue Fund,355 with the 
exception of money received in trust for a specific purpose.356 Money received in trust 
for a specific purpose must be held in a separate trust for each portion of the money 
received. 357  Thus, money paid to, for example, the Department of Environmental 
Affairs would be required to be set up as individual trusts and must be appropriately 
managed by the Department,358 placing a burden on the state to manage the biodiversity 
offset. 
 
Money transferred to a public entity,359 such as a conservation authority, is exempt from 
entering the Revenue Fund. 360  The founding statutes of the conservation authority 
would however, have to provide the mandate to implement a biodiversity offset and 
empower the establishment of a trust to manage the biodiversity offsets. The 
conservation authority would be liable for the administrative burden of managing the 
trust and ensuring that sufficient funding is available to manage the various biodiversity 
offsets. With conservation authorities experiencing similar resource constraints as are 
experienced by government, this may not be possible for conservation authorities to 
take on. 
 
Money transferred to a public benefit organisation (PBO) or trust is also a possibility.361 
There is further potential for a PBO to be specifically set up to manage biodiversity 
offset trusts, with such trusts been managed in terms of the Property Control Act, 1988.  
 
With regards to the fund mechanism the Smith Ndlovu Summers report concluded that  
 
a trust fund is a legally independent institution and is an important mechanism because it is a 
dedicated legal mechanism to cater for public interest objectives. As such it is better placed to 
                                                 
355 S11 & S26 of PFMA. 
356 S13(1)(f)(ii) & S22(1)(d)(ii) of PFMA. 
357 R14.3 of Treasury Regulations for departments, trading entities, constitutional institutions and public 
entities in Government Notice R255 in Government Gazette 27388 dated 15 March 2005, as amended. 
358 R14.2.2 of the Treasury Regulations. 
359  Defined in S1 of PFMA as a ‘board commission, company, corporation, fund or other entity 
established in terms of the national or provincial legislation’; Schedules 2 and 3 provide a list of such 
entities, which includes provincial Conservation bodies, such as Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife. 
360 S13(i)(b) & S22(1)(b) of PFMA. 
361 In cases where existing PBO’s or trusts as used, and not ones specifically set up for biodiversity 
offsets, the ability of such PBOs or trusts to accept a biodiversity offset responsibility would be based 
on the flexibility of its founding documents. 
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offer perpetual succession and avoid being influenced by partisan (either private or public 
sector) interests. 362  
 
Purchasing of credits from a conservation bank would preclude the need for financial 
mechanisms to manage the biodiversity offset. The conservation bank would, however, 
have to be set up and managed through legal mechanisms to ensure that the 
management of the land meets the required standard and continues in perpetuity. 
Currently, the legal mechanisms to establish these conservation banks are not in place, 
and thus credits are not a current biodiversity offset option. 
 
Based on the above, it thus appears that trusts363 are the best mechanism currently 
available to be utilised by environmental authorisations. In this regard, conditions could 
be written into authorisations, such as environmental authorisations, to control the 
setting up of the type of trust, the duties of the trustees (including management of the 
offset, monitoring and reporting), as well as the mechanisms for dismantling the trust. 
 
4.7 MECHANISMS PROVIDING FOR THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE 
SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES IN THE OFFSET PROCESS 
In South Africa the requirement for public participation during the EIA process is set 
out in common law through the audi alteram partem rule;364 the Constitution through 
the right to just administrative action365  and the right to access information;366 the two 
acts that give effect to these constitutional requirements, the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 (PAJA); Chapter 5 of NEMA367 and the NEMA principles;368 as well as Chapter 6 
of the EIA Regulations, 2010. 
                                                 
362 Smith Ndlovu Summers op cit note 236 at 61. 
363 See Section 4.5.6 for further details on trusts. 
364 The right to be heard is clearly linked to the environmental right and the assessing of environmental 
impacts through the landmark case Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region and Sasol 
Mining(pty) Ltd v Save the Vaal Environment and Others 1999 (2) SA 709 (SCA), at para 20. 
365 Section 33 of the Constitution. 
366 Section 32 of the Constitution. 
367  Section 23(2)(d) and Section 24(4)(v) of NEMA which respectively state ‘ensure adequate and 
appropriate opportunity for public participation in decisions that may affect the environment’ and 
‘public information and participation procedures which provide all interested and affected parties, 
including all organs of state in all spheres of government that may have jurisdiction over any aspect of 
the activity, with a reasonable opportunity to participate in those information and participation 
procedures’. 
368  NEMA principles particularly related to the Environmental Impact Assessment process include 
Section 2(4)(f) ‘the participation of all interested and affected parties in environmental governance 
must be promoted …’ and Section 2(4)(k) ‘decisions must be taken in an open and transparent 




The EIA Regulations, 2010, provide for the public to be involved in the compilation of 
and, to provide comments on, the basic assessment reports (BAR) and environmental 
impact reports (EIR) as well as specialist reports, and for comments to be submitted on 
the draft, final and amended reports.369 This requirement would provide opportunity for 
interested and affected parties (I&APs) to comment on the need for a biodiversity offset 
investigation, the biodiversity offset proposals and its implications. 
 
R54(6) further requires that amended reports, which contain new information, must go 
through a public participation process, 370  which requires notices to all potential 
interested and affected parties (I&APs) through site notices, written notifications and 
newspaper adverts. This requirement, that notice is given to all potential interested and 
affect parties would allow for the scope of I&APs to be extended to areas that could be 
affected by any proposed offset sites. 
 
The above, in general, provides for the public to be involved in the offset investigation 
and design. Involvement with the implementation of the biodiversity offset or the 
implementation of the activity is not explicitly provided for in the EIA Regulations, 
2010. It is possible, however, that conditions of authorisation could require a 
management forum to be established, allowing for community representatives to be 
involved in the implementation phase and the operation of the biodiversity offset. 
Further, amendments to the EIA Regulations to expressly provide for biodiversity 
offsets may facilitate this involvement beyond the Environmental Authorisation.  
 
4.8 SUMMARY  
Based on the above, it is concluded that, although no legislation explicitly mentions 
biodiversity offsets, it is possible, within the constraints of administrative law, to utilise 
the EIA Regulation process to manage and implement such biodiversity offsets. 
 
However, further to this, it is noted that there are constraints to the efficient long term 
management of biodiversity offsets, in most part due to lack of mechanisms to legally 
secure offsets that do not fulfill the criteria for a nature reserve, and the questionable 
                                                 
369 R56(1), R56(2), R56(3) of the EIA Regulations, 2010. 
370 As contemplated in R21 and R31 
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CHAPTER 5                                                                         
FAIRBREEZE MINE ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORISATION 
 
In this chapter, the environmental authorisation issued for the Fairbreeze Mining project 
in July 2012371 is utilised as a case study to assess how biodiversity offsets are being 
implemented through the EA process, and whether this implementation highlights any 
gaps or weaknesses in South Africa’s laws.372  
 
The structure for undertaking the review of the EA, is based on the requisite 
components for a functional biodiversity offset, as identified in Chapter 2, 373  the 
legislative controls and tools provided for in South African law, as discussed in Chapter 
4, and the NEMA Chapter 5 IEM objectives,  which includes, amongst others, 
sustainability of the project, protection of biodiversity, the public trust and 
intergeneration equity, participation of the public in the process, and administrative 
justice. 
 
A brief introduction into the Fairbreeze Mining case, including the roleplayers, the 
background to the project and the biodiversity offset, and the conditions of 
authorisation as related to the biodiversity offset, is first set out below to provide 
context for the case study review.  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE FAIRBREEZE MINING PROJECT 
5.1.1 Background  
Tronox KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd (Tronox) previously known as Exxaro Sands (Pty) Ltd 
was granted environmental authorisation374 in 2012 for a number of listed activities that 
allowed for the mining of the mineralised sand dunes375 at a location along the northern 
coast of KwaZulu-Natal, immediately south of the Mtunzini Town. 
                                                 
371 KZN DAEA Fairbreeze, op cit note 25. 
372 Several environmental authorisations have been issued in South Africa which include biodiversity 
offsets, although at this stage none of these offsets have been finalised, including the Fairbreeze 
Mining project.  
373 In this review of the EA it is noted that the veracity of this functionality has not been fully tested, as 
broad principles, however, these components have been accepted both internationally and by the 
environment sector. The determination of what a functional biodiversity offsets is, is previously 
discussed in Section 2.4 and Section 3.5, but will include issues such as implementation of the 
mitigation hierarchy, no net loss of biodiversity and limits to offsetting, additionally, transparency of 
process, duration of and security for the offset, as well as the enforcement of the offsets. 
374 KZN DAEA Fairbreeze, op cit note 25. 




Figure 1: Fairbreeze mining area and associated infrastructure 
 
The EA was issued for the mining376 of three ore bodies (FBA, FBB & FBC),377 the 
establishment of two residue storage facility,378 a return water dam, a Primary Wet 
Plant (PWP) and associated infrastructure including offices, roads, powerlines, 
pipelines, pumping stations and storage dams. 379  Refer to Figure 1 for the spatial 
location of these various features.380 
 
The mining site was largely located on Eucalypt plantations and sugarcane, but did also 
contain riparian and wetland areas. It was determined that the mining operation would 
result in the loss of wetland, Mimusops Albizia Riparian Forest,381  and Syzygium/ 
                                                 
376 The mineralised sand dunes are to be mined by hydraulic mining which involves the use of high-
pressure water hoses to turn the in-situ sand into slurry. The slurry then flows to a pump station from 
where it is pumped to the Primary Wet Plant (PWP). At the PWP the heavy mineral is separated from 
the sand, silt and clay fraction. The heavy mineral concentrate is removed off the site to be processed, 
and the fine discard material is pumped to one of the residue storage facility (slimes dam) and the 
coarse discard is pumped back to the mining area to backfill the mining void. - Exigent Engineering 
Consultants on behalf of Exxaro Sands (Pty) Ltd Amended final Basic Assessment Report for the 
Construction of the Fairbreeze Mine and related activities, February 2012 (2012), 3. 
377 The mining of orebody Extension C (FBCX) had already been authorised on 19 July 2006 (EIA 4187), 
and the orebody FBD was excluded from the authorisation. 
378 Storage facilities for the fine discard material (in effect a slimes dam), which are 166ha and 373ha 
respectively in extent.– KZN DAEA Fairbreeze, op cit note 25, at 5.  
379 KZN DAEA Fairbreeze, op cit note 25, at 5. 
380 Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 4. 
381 A threatened vegetation type which had high species diversity, high ecological function and contained 
protected tree species - Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 80. 
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Cassipourea Swamp Forest,382  through the development of the two residue storage 
facilities, a return water dam and pipelines.383, 384 Such a loss was determined to be a 
residual impact of the project that would require a biodiversity offset, and conditions to 
this effect were contained in the EA.  
 
5.1.2 Roleplayers in the EIA application process 
In addition to the competent authority (namely, KZN Department of Agriculture and 
Environmental Affairs (KZN DAEA), hereafter referred to as the competent authority 
or CA)385 and the applicant (Exxaro Sands (Pty) Ltd, which was bought out by Tronox 
KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd in June 2012), the role players in the EIA application included the 
following: 
 
(i) Several organs of state which administered legislation related to the activities that 
required environmental authorisation, particularly the KZN Regional Department 
of Mineral Resources (DMR),386 the Department of Water Affairs (DWA),387 the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) 388  and the KZN 
Conservation Authority, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (Ezemvelo).389 
(ii) Interested and affected parties (I&APs) to the EIA application, including the 
Wildlife and Environmental Society of South Africa (WESSA),390 the Mtunzini 
Conservancy, Wildlands Trust, the Mtunzini Residence Association, traditional 
authorities within the area and surrounding community members. 
                                                 
382 A threatened vegetation type which had a moderate species diversity and high ecological function - 
Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 80.  
383 The storage dams would be permanent structures and would remain after the closure of the mine, 
while the return water dam and pipelines would remain for the life of the mine, which was noted in the 
EIA as being between 11-14 years, Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 51. 
384 KZN DAEA Fairbreeze, op cit note 25, at 19; Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 419. 
385 At the time of the application the competent authority was called the KZN Department of Agriculture 
and Environmental Affairs (KZN DAEA), this CA is now referred to as the KZN Department of 
Economic, Development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs (KZN DEDTEA). 
386A mining license was granted in 1988 for the Fairbreeze site, and updated in 2009 and 2010. An 
amended to the Environmental Management Programme was been applied for at the time of the EIA 
application. 
387 A water use license was granted in 2007 for the Fairbreeze mining site, changes to the mining project 
required a new water use license which had been applied for at the time of the EIA application and 
which was issued on 9 September 2013. 
388 The mining and associated infrastructure required the destruction of natural forest and the destruction 
of protected tree species, for which a permit had to be applied for from DAFF. 
389 Under S23(e) of the KZN Conservation Management Act 9 of 1997, Ezemvelo is required to comment 
on all land use change applications outside of protected areas, where such changes could detrimentally 
affect ecological processes and biodiversity within KZN. Further to this, was the fact that the uMlalazi 
Nature Reserve, which is a designated protected area managed by Ezemvelo, was located immediately 
to the east of the mine site. 
390 WESSA as both a NGO and the operator of Twinstreams Environmental Education Centre which is 
located in close proximity to the mining site. 
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(iii) The Mkhwanazi Traditional Authority, under Inkosi Mkhwanazi, and the 
Mkhwanazi Community were both I&APs and the holders of the land, under the 
Ngonyama Trust, for the offset site referred to as ‘Portion 2 of Farm Kraal Hill 
No. 15871’ in the EA.  Certain community members were also involved in a land 
claim submitted to the Land Claims Commission for the mine area, the offset area 
referred to as ‘Fairbreeze C ext’ in the EA and other surrounding areas. Although 
at the time of the EIA decision the submitted land claim had only been mapped 
and not as yet published in in the Gazette.391 
  
5.1.3 Basic Assessment Report documentation 
The draft BAR, dated March 2011392 which was submitted to the public for comment, 
included a biodiversity offset proposal. This biodiversity offset was developed on the 
initiative of the EAP and the applicant, prior to CA input in this regard. The CA in 
October 2011 rejected the report 393  and required several amendments to the BAR, 
including the requirement for the provision of an acceptable biodiversity offset proposal 
and associated report.  Several versions of the biodiversity offset proposal were 
subsequently compiled, with the CA utilising the February 2012 Amended Final BAR 
version 394  for decision making. This version included details on what biodiversity 
would be lost (set out as hectares of vegetation types), the size of the required 
biodiversity offset (again set out as hectares of vegetation types), and a partial offset 
proposal. The offset proposal as provided did not cover the full required extent of 
wetland offset and did not provide details on the extent of, and timeframes for, 
rehabilitation of the proposed two offset sites.  
 
                                                 
391 The status of the land claim was set out in a 7 June 2011 letter from the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform under the Land Claims Commission. S11 of the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act 22 of 1994 requires that a land claim is Gazetted only once the Commission has determined 
that the claim has been lodged correctly, that the claimants are entitled to restitution (as set in S2 of this 
Act), and that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious.   
392 Exigent Engineering Consultants on behalf of Exxaro Sands (Pty) Ltd Draft Basic Assessment Report 
for the Construction of the Fairbreeze Mine and related activities, March 2011 (2011). 
393 KZN DAEA, Rejection of the final basic assessmen report for the proposed construction of the 
Fairbreeze Mine and related activities within Umlalazi Local Municipality under Uthungulu District 
Municipality, KZN, issued on 5 October 2011, 3. 
394 Exigent (February), op cit note 376. 
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5.1.4 Environmental authorisation 
Five conditions were included in the 2012 EA which were directly related to the 




The following biodiversity offsets must be set in place as part of the mitigation 
required for the establishment of the Fairbreeze mine and related infrastructure 
within 12 months from the date of authorisation and prior to commencement of 
mining 
(a) Portion 2 of Farm Kraal Hill No. 15871 or equivalent as negotiated with 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife and such land must be secured in favour of 
biodiversity conservation. 
(b) Area referred to as Fairbreeze C ext consisting of portion 3 of Umlalazi Lot 91 
and Remainder of Umlalazi Lot 91 or equivalent and such land must be secured 
in favour of biodiversity conservation. 
(c) Financial offset as proposed in the application to be held in trust to be formed 
for the use to secure additional offset areas as approved by an offset committee 
(as contemplated herein below) to be formed to secure the balance of offset 
required for Wetlands areas. 
(d) Financial offset as proposed in the application inflated by CPIX to be 
contributed on an annual basis to the offset trust to be formed for the specific 
use for rehabilitation and management of the parcels of land contemplated in 
sub-conditions (a), (b) and any further land secured as contemplated in sub-
condition (c) hereinabove. The contribution should be reviewed annually and 
adjusted to assure sufficient funds are available to support the implementation 
of the approved Offset Management Plan. The review of contributions will be 
approved by the offset committee (as contemplated herein below). 
(e) Financial offset will be contributed annually to the trust to be formed for the 
specific use of rehabilitation and management. These funds will be contributed 
in order to provide for management for a period of 33 years post mine 
operation. The funds contribution will be made annually such as to make 
available at the end of mine operation required funds as proposed in the 
application which will be inflated by CPIX annually. The offset committee will 
annually recalculate the required funds for the 33 year maintenance period post 
mine operation and the contributions will be adjusted accordingly. 
                                                 




An offset steering committee must be set in place consisting of a minimum of 
representatives of the Department of Water Affairs, Department of Agricultural 
Forestry and Fisheries, KZN Agriculture and Environmental Affairs and Ezemvelo 
KZN Wildlife, and a representative of Exxaro KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd. The 
responsibility of this offset steering committee shall be to direct the use of the 
financial offset contemplated in condition 3.20 hereinabove. 
 
Condition 3.22 
The terms of reference, operation and duration of the offset steering committee must 
be determined by the committee and such terms of reference must be directed to the 
efficient and effective fulfilment of the biodiversity management plan. 
 
Condition 3.23 
Exxaro KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd shall ensure the steering committee is established and 
remains operation and will be responsible for any reasonable costs thereto. Such 




An Offset Management Plan must be drawn up by Exxaro KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd for 
areas contemplated in 3.20 within six months from the date of authorisation and such 
plans, which must include all relevant aspects relating to the environment and the 
impacts thereon, must be adopted by the offset steering committee and be used to 
guide rehabilitation and maintenance areas. 
 
Condition 3.25 
The offset management plan must be reviewed and updated if required. The updated 
plans need to be approved by the offset steering committee. 
 
5.1.5 Appeals and appeal decision 
Four appeals were submitted to the MEC of the KZN Department of Agriculture and 
Environmental Affairs, in accordance with Section 43 of the National Environmental 
Management Act, 1998, which, included appeal arguments around the viability of the 
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biodiversity offsets and the associated conditions in the EA.396 In all four appeals, the 
decision to grant authorisation for the project was upheld by the MEC,397 although in 
two of the appeal decisions the MEC required the amendment of the Offset Steering 
Committee conditions.  
 
The amendment required the replacement of the Offset Steering Committee by an 
Offset Advisory Committee which is to advise the Department; that the Department is 
to take over the responsibilities set out for the previous Offset Steering Committee; and 
that the applicant may only be an observer on this Offset Advisory Committee and not a 
member.398 
 
5.2 REVIEW OF THE FAIRBREEZE MINE ENVIRONMENTAL 
AUTHORISATION 
5.2.1 Mitigation hierarchy  
The mitigation hierarchy is an important component of both the functionality of a 
biodiversity offsets as well as the NEMA principles and implementation of sustainable 
development.399 As discussed previously, the mitigation hierarchy requires that impacts 
are, in order of preference: avoided, minimised and/or remediated, with the last option 
being a biodiversity offset. 
 
The Fairbreeze Mine project was determined to have the potential to impact on 
biodiversity through impacts on: water quality and quantity;400  the uMlalazi Nature 
Reserve; riparian vegetation and associated species,401 wetlands and associated species, 
and the Siyaya estuary.402 The EIA process403  included the investigation of how to 
mitigate these impacts and the resultant significance of the impacts after mitigation. 404 
                                                 
396 Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa, KwaZulu-Natal Branch (WESSA KZN) dated 28 
August 2012; Mtunzini Conservancy dated 31 August 2012; as well as the Twinsteams Blue People 
Advocacy Group and the Wildlands Conservation Trust. 
397 Appeal decisions for appellant Twinstreams Blue People Advocacy Group, Wildlands Conservation 
Trust, WESSA, and Mtunzini Conservancy – op cit note 26. 
398 Twinstreams Blue People Advocacy Group Appeal Decision, op cit note 26, at 21 -22; Mtunzini 
Conservancy Appeal Decision, op cit note 26, at 21 -22. 
399 See previous discussion in this regard in Sections 2.4, 3.1 and 4.1.3. 
400 Water quantity impacted through the alteration of catchments, loss of wetland functionality, and actual 
mining of sand dunes. Water quality impacted through the pollution and sedimentation of wetlands, 
riparian areas and estuary - Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 260-262 and 265-266. 
401 Through degradation, loss or fragmentation of riparian habitat - Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 
260-262. 
402 Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 260-262 and 265-266. 
403 As required through the EIA Regulations, 2010 and S24 of NEMA. 




Interested and affected parties (I&APs) questioned the completeness and acceptability 
of this mitigation hierarchy process during the EIA and appeal phase. 405 An example 
being the residue storage facilities, which if not in place or reduced in size would avoid 
significant habitat loss. The EIA report stated that there were no other technically 
feasible options available for this project406  and that alternatives were not investigated 
in the EIA due to limited potential of their application.407 In this regard, it is noted that 
the EIA report contained no specialist reports to support this assertion. Subsequent 
investigations for the offset have also determined that further avoidance can be put in 
place with regards to the return water dam, and that the required realignment of the 
ESKOM powerlines will not result in the loss of riparian habitat.408 It thus could be 
questioned whether the competent authority had all the available facts before it when it 
made the determination that no further avoidance, minimisation or remediation could be 
implemented and that the offset was the only option available. The full determination of 
this question, however, falls outside the scope of this analysis.  
 
5.2.1.1  Assessment of the Onsite Mitigation Measures 
The mitigation measures for biodiversity, dealing with avoidance, minimisation or 
remediation (i.e. not biodiversity offsets), are essentially provided for through four 
conditions in the EA, namely: the approval of the Environmental Management 
Programme (EMPr) included in the final EIA report, 409  the implementation of 
cumulative 410  and decommissioning411  mitigation measures, and the 60m buffer on 
riparian vegetation.412  Whether these measures are adequate to provide for the ongoing 
management of impacts is briefly examined below. 
                                                 
405 For example the Mtunzini Conservancy Appeal - Mtunzini Conservancy, op cit note, 396 at 18 
406 Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 162-163. 
407 Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 161. 
408 Macfarlane, D Strategic Offset Management Plan: Fairbreeze Mine and associated activities, draft 
version 0.2, dated 29 January 2013, 13. 
409 Which reads: ‘The Environmental Management Programme (EMPr) dated February 2012 for the 
construction and operational phases of this project as submitted for the environment authorisation of 
this project complies with Section 24N of NEMA and Regulation 33 of the EIA regulations. 2010. This 
EMPr is hereby approved and must be implemented’ (my emphasis) - Condition 3.5 in KZN DAEA 
Fairbreeze, op cit note 25, at 10.  
410 Which reads: ‘The cumulative impacts mitigation measures as specified on page 337 -341 of the 
AFBAR (see appendix C of this environmental authorisation) must be strictly implemented’ - Condition 
3.17  in KZN DAEA Fairbreeze, op cit note 25, at 12. 
411  Which reads: ‘The decommissioning impacts mitigation measures as specified on page 334 -335 of 
the AFBAR (see appendix D of this environmental authorisation) must be strictly adhered to’ - 
Condition 3.18  in KZN DAEA Fairbreeze, op cit note 25, at 12. 
412 Which reads: ‘A 60m buffer must be physically delineated and enforced as set out in the EMPr’ - 
Condition 3.31 in KZN DAEA Fairbreeze, op cit note 25, at 14. 
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An EMPr is intended as the means to guide the implementation of the mitigation 
measures identified in the environmental impact assessments.413 To facilitate this, the 
EMPr needs to be a stand-alone site document capable of operating and being utilised 
independently of the numerous documents submitted during the application process. 
The EMPr approved in Condition 3.5, however, refers back to sections in the BAR for 
mitigation actions, thus requiring that site managers and workers must have access to 
numerous documents to allow them to implement and follow the requirements of the 
EMPr, and making it difficult to use for monitoring and implementation. The approval 
of this EMPR is likely to result in contractors and managers misunderstanding or even 
disregarding the constraints of the EMPr, which could place biodiversity and other 
components related to the mining operation at unnecessary risk. 
 
It also has to be questioned whether the approved EMPr contains all the mitigation 
measures to be implemented on site, as Condition 3.17 414  refers to cumulative 
mitigation measures that must be implemented, which would appear to imply that such 
were not adequately dealt with in the EMPr. 
 
Further to this, the EMPr approval appears, contrary to the requirements of S24N of 
NEMA and R33 of the EIA Regulations 2010, to only require the implementation of the 
construction and operation sections of the EMPr and not the decommissioning and 
closure phase. This assertion is based on the wording in Condition 3.5, which explicitly 
refers to the construction and operation phases as providing the required compliance 
with NEMA and the EIA Regulations, 2010.415 The closure phase thus appears to have 
been omitted, as the EMPr is only to be implemented for the construction and operation 
phases. This is further supported by Condition 3.18, 416  which separately requires 
compliance with the decommission mitigation measures. 
 
The approval of the limited EMPr and the two additional cumulative and 
decommissioning conditions could again result in confusion around implementation. 
The reliance on the additional two conditions also does not facilitate the effective 
implementation of the mitigation measures, as this does not provide for clearly set out 
                                                 
413 S24N(2) of NEMA. 
414 See note 410. 
415 See note 409. 
416 See note 411. 
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actions to achieve the required mitigation measures, as would have been provided for in 
the EMPr. 
 
The Condition 3.31417 with regards to the 60m buffer could be seen as an emphasis of 
an important biodiversity mitigation measure, as the intention of the 60m buffer was to 
protect the wetlands and watercourse from sedimentation and any water pollution 
arising from the mining activities, as well as to protect the integrity of the habitat and 
provide movement corridors.418 It could however also be read that the condition was 
intended to require that all buffers must be 60m, including those referred to in the EIA 
and EMPr as requiring only a 30m buffer.419  This could lead to confusion regarding the 
intention of the condition and how it should be implemented. 
 
In light of the issues noted above, it is questioned whether the conditions with regards 
to implementation of mitigation measures are adequately addressed in the EA and 
whether such can be considered as making adequate provision for the ongoing 
management of the impacts as required by S24E of NEMA.  
 
5.2.2 No net loss of biodiversity 
The no net loss of biodiversity is fundamental to the functionality of a biodiversity 
offset, but also to the determination of the sustainability of a project and whether the 
requirements for intergeneration equity and the public trust have been upheld. 
 
The no net loss being referred to here is that as set out by the environment sector, which 
requires that there is no net loss to the biodiversity targets and the biodiversity 
network.420 For such no net loss to have been achieved there must have been a clear 
determination of what was going to be lost, what was required to offset this loss, how 
the offset is to be achieved and whether the offsets proposed were feasible and 
implementable. 
                                                 
417 See note 412. 
418 See note 402. 
419 The EMPr refers to two sets of buffers 30m and 60m which was determined based on the sensitivity of 
the feature - Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 370-372. 
420 Refer to the discussion in Section 3.1 in this regard.  
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5.2.2.1 KZN draft offsets document 
The approach described in the KZN draft offsets document (which was used as the 
guideline for this project)421 was that the information, required to determine no net loss, 
had to be set out in a biodiversity offset report and that such information had to be 
finalised prior to a decision being undertaken. 422  Subsequent discussions for the 
national biodiversity offset framework have suggested that, at a minimum, before a 
decision is undertaken an offset report must clearly identify feasible and viable site(s) 
for the offset, but that the report need not identify the exact offset site that is to be 
purchased. 423  
 
The decision in the EA was, however, that the project would be authorised without the 
offset investigations being finalised, as at the time of the issuing of the EA, 
investigations on whether a significant portion of the required wetland offset could 
actually be offset and the extent and timeframes for rehabilitation of the two proposed 
sites, were outstanding.  The decision to issue the EA at that stage was thus not in line 
with the KZN draft guideline. Whether there should have been compliance to the KZN 
Guideline was broached in the MEC’s appeal decisions, where the MEC stated that it 
was inappropriate to utilise a draft document as a guideline on how the offset should be 
undertaken, 424  and that, in the absence of a formalised policy, the NEMA principles 
should instead be utilised.425 Although there is a legal requirement to utilise available 
guidelines to support decision making,426  this would not apply to a draft guideline 
document. It is however put forward that the use of the KZN draft guideline had been 
established during the EIA process, and the KZN draft guideline as well as the Western 
Cape draft guideline had been in the public domain for several years. On the basis of 
this, it could have been expected that the MEC would, at a minimum, have unpacked 
the requirements of the draft guideline and given reasons why such would not be 
considered applicable in this case. The exclusion of the guideline document was 
                                                 
421 During the offset investigations the draft national framework had not been initiated and the draft KZN 
and Western Cape offset guidelines were the only available South African guidelines. 
422 Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 95-96. 
423 This was put forward as developers had noted that information in the public domain could result in 
unreasonable increases in land prices. 
424 Mtunzini Conservancy Appeal Response, op cit note 26, at 19; Twinstreams Blue People Advocacy 
Group, op cit note 26, at 19. 
425 WESSA Appeal Response op cit note 26,397 at 10. 
426 BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs 
supra note 273, at [155 B]; MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs, 
Gauteng v Sasol Oil and Another, supra note 237, at para [19].  
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however a judgement call by the MEC and the decision to revert to the NEMA 
principles in the absence of a formalised policy, cannot be faulted. 
 
5.2.2.2 Level of information for informed decision making 
Further to the draft guideline was, however, the fact that at the stage of the decision it 
was unknown whether the loss of the wetlands could be offset in such a way that would 
provide a no net loss of function and biodiversity within the same catchment.427 The 
question of whether the offset should be ‘like for like’ or ‘trading up’, or in fact even if 
this lack would trigger the requirement for limits of biodiversity offsetting, was 
therefore still to be determined. The decision to authorise the project was thus 
undertaken without sufficient information and without a clear understanding of whether 
the offset could be implemented and whether the project would result in irretrievable 
loss of sensitive wetland habitat. In this regard, the EA decision could thus be said to 
have inadequately taken into account the NEMA principles of sustainability, protection 
of sensitive environments, and the consideration of the required public trust.428 Further, 
the decision could not adequately have determined the ability of the applicant to 
implement mitigation measures and conditions associated with the biodiversity 
offsets.429 The accuracy of the assertion in the EA that the objectives of Chapter 5 of 
NEMA will be met in the issuing of the EA is thus questionable. Further to this is the 
question of whether such a decision, in the absence of vital information, would fulfill 
the requirements for just administrative action.430 
 
5.2.2.3 Enforceability of the conditions 
In looking at the enforceability of the conditions set out in terms of establishing the 
biodiversity offsets, a number of observations can be made. Firstly, Condition 3.20431 
does not describe what needs to be offset or refer to a document which sets this out. On 
the face of it, the offset metrics determined during the EIA process are thus not 
enforceable through the EA. The competent authority could potentially argue that the 
EA was based on the EIA documents, which contained this information, and that the 
intention of the EA was to instruct the implementation of this information and proposal. 
                                                 
427 The project site was located in the coastal zone, and there were therefore limited areas to offset within 
the catchment in such a way that would still provide this functionality.  
428 S2(4)(a), S2(4)(o) and S2(4)(r) of NEMA. 
429 S24O(b)(ii) of NEMA. 
430 Just administrative action is discussed in Section 5.2.6 below. 
431 See Section 5.1.3 for details on this condition.  
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This lack could however potentially lead to the condition being unenforceable and the 
CA having to re-negotiate with the applicant when finalising the offsets.  
 
To achieve no net loss of habitat and ecosystem functioning would require that the 
offset is secured and, where required, rehabilitation undertaken to re-establish habitat in 
the offset site(s) prior to any destruction of the habitats within the mine site. A further 
observation regarding the conditions of the EA is that, whilst Condition 3.20 recognises 
that the destruction of natural habitat may not occur prior to the commencement of 
mining activities, the EA is silent on the issue of the installation of associated 
infrastructure. Such associated infrastructure would include the installation of pipelines 
and roads and construction of residue storage facilities (slimes dams) and return water 
dams, which due to their proposed location could have a significant impact on large 
areas of highly sensitive wetland and swamp forest. Allowing the installation of such 
associated infrastructure prior to the securing of the offset could impose a significant 
and unwarranted risk to the environment.  This is regarded as a risk due to several 
factors, namely: 
 
(i) The foreseeable probability that such an offset would require time to be 
finalised, 432  thereby lengthening the potential period between installation of 
infrastructure and securing of the offsets. In this regard, it is noted that no offset 
site had been as yet determined for a significant portion of the wetlands to be 
offset. Further, the offset site specified in Condition 3.20(a) was located on areas 
identified as communal land and at the time of the EA there was no finalised 
written agreement with the Tribal Authority or the Ingonyama Trust Board.  
(ii) The financial burden experienced by the applicant for the installation and 
maintenance of the infrastructure could be prohibitive in the circumstances 
where the applicant is prevented from commencement of the mining due to 
lengthy negotiations for the biodiversity offset. In these circumstances it is 
possible that the applicant will apply for an amendment to this EA, to proceed 
with the mining operation without all or part of the offsets being set in place. 
(iii) The EA places no obligation on the applicant to set in place the biodiversity 
offsets should the mining operation not commence once the infrastructure has 
been constructed.  The establishment of the infrastructure (residue sediment 
                                                 
432 To be noted that there is in fact a delay in securing the offsets, and that 12 months after the appeal 
decisions no offsets have been finalised or secured. 
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facility, return water dam and pipelines) is one of the key reasons why the 
offsets are required and as such is a failing. It is thus argued that the competent 
authority erred in not conferring the obligation on the applicant to ensure that 
mitigation, in terms of the offsets, is effected irrespective of mining. 
 
Further to the risk resulting from the installation of infrastructure, is the fact that 
rehabilitation work required on these offsets sites for wetlands and swamp forest would 
require additional authorisations under both the EIA Regulations and the National 
Water Act. These authorisations will take time to obtain and thus, even after securing 
the sites, it could not be said that no net loss will occur. Further to this, the 
rehabilitation could take several years to adequately replace wetlands and many more 
years for the rehabilitation suggested for the FBCX swamp forest to meet the purpose of 
the offset. The need for the offset to be finalised and able to provide for an adequate on 
the ground replacement of habitat, species and ecosystem services is not explicitly set 
out in the conditions, with Condition 3.20433  requiring simply that ‘biodiversity offsets 
must be set in place’. This wording is vague, and doesn’t provide for a clear argument 
that obliges the applicant to have the required rehabilitation in place prior to 
commencement of mining. 
 
Conditions 3.20(a) and (b)434 both allow for an equivalent offset area (viz. an alternative 
to that contemplated in the EA) to be put forward by the applicant. In the first condition, 
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife is the organ of state that is required to consider and authorise 
any such alternative,435 whilst the second condition is silent on the organ of state. It 
could be argued that the lack of stated authority in Condition 3.20(b), gives the 
applicant the sole discretion on the ‘equivalent offset. This wording places the 
implementation of the offset at risk as an applicant does not have the public trust 
mandate and has own priorities which may conflict with the no net loss requirement of 
the offset. 
 
                                                 
433 See Section 5.1.3. 
434 See Section 5.1.3. 
435 In light of Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife’s mandate to conserve biodiversity within KZN, it is accepted that 
the organisation should be involved in the decision. However, KZN DAEA was the delegated 
competent authority and responsibility to approve the offset should thus lie with this competent 




The intention of Condition 3.20 (c)436 was to provide for the outstanding offset which 
had not been identified prior to the EA being issued. The wording of the condition does 
not provide for when the outstanding offset must be provided, just for when the 
financial offset must be put in place. Thus, there is no obligation on the applicant to 
secure the physical offset prior to the establishment of the mine and associated 
infrastructure. Further, the condition is silent on what is to happen if no suitable offset 
is found. The issue of the responsibility of the competent authority to approve the 
offset, with regards to this condition, was resolved through the appeal decision, which 
transferred all the powers of the offset committee to the CA.  
 
Based on the discussion above, it is put forward that there is insufficient security for the 
biodiversity offsets and that the conditions of the EA do not sufficiently deliver on the 
no net loss of biodiversity required for a functional biodiversity offset. 
 
5.2.3 Securing the biodiversity offset sites 
As noted in Chapter 4,437 the EA conditions do not in themselves provide for protection 
of the offset from other legislative process such as mining applications or land 
restitution cases.  The EA conditions are also not legally required to be placed on the 
title deeds of the land. The long-term securing of the offset site(s), which in the case of 
this project should be in perpetuity, as the residue sediment facilities will remain after 
the mine has closed, thus requires further legal mechanisms to secure the land for 
biodiversity.  There are a number of mechanisms that can be utilised which provide 
varying degrees of protection.438 However, as argued above, the designation of the 
offset site as a nature reserve would provide the most effective long term protection. 
 
In the case of the Fairbreeze Mine EA, the conditions required that the offsets set out in 
Condition 3.20 (a) and (b) must be ‘secured in favour of biodiversity conservation’, and 
was silent on the manner in which the outstanding wetland offset (c) should be secured.  
The dictionary definition of the term ‘secure’ is to protect against threats and to make 
safe.439  The conditions do thus provide an obligation for the applicant to protect the 
biodiversity on the site. There is however no guidance on the manner of this protection 
                                                 
436 See Section 5.1.3. 
437 See Section 4.5 on the securing of biodiversity offsets. 
438 See Section 4.5 on the securing of biodiversity offsets. 




or level/extent thereof, and the EA appears to leave this to the discretion of the 
applicant. If this condition is taken on face value, the applicant could arguably be 
considered as being compliant by just providing for the management of the offset site 
through the financial contributions and the offset management plan. The long term 
security of these offsets is thus not guaranteed through the EA conditions, which in turn 
places biodiversity (which is held in trust for the public) at risk. 
 
5.2.4 Management of the biodiversity offset sites 
To ensure the continued level of biodiversity for which the site was selected as an 
offset, it is required that the land is actively managed.440 Such management requires a 
work plan, resources (including financial resources, labour and specialists), internal 
monitoring to allow for management and updating of the plan, and external compliance 
monitoring to ensure that the site is being managed effectively. In terms of the 
biodiversity offset process, such resources are to be provided by the applicant on the 
basis of required internalisation of all externalities and the polluter pays principle.441 
 
For the EA conditions to effectively implement the above, such conditions should 
require the development and updating of a plan, resources, and compliance monitoring. 
In the Fairbreeze Mine EA, the requirements for such are provided for in Conditions 
3.20 (d) and (e),442 which provides for financial inputs, and Conditions 3.24 and 3.25,443 
which provide for management planning and updating of the plan. The requirement for 
compliance monitoring is not as explicitly set out and this will be discussed below after 
the finance requirements.  
  
5.2.4.1 Financial  
The financial requirement is that an annual contribution is paid into a trust fund for the 
management of the offsets sites, as set out in the management plan. The trust fund is 
required to provide the financial resources to manage the offsets for 33 years post mine 
operations.444  
 
                                                 
440 Such management could include clearing of alien plants; bush encroachment control; annual fire 
breaks; a burn program for grasslands and wetlands; control of poaching; management of utilisation of 
the land, which could include resource harvesting, access to the site, unauthorised uses such as sand 
mining or quad bikes/dirt bikes; and maintenance of fencing, where required. 
441 See note 267. 
442 See Section 5.1.3 for these conditions. 
443 See Section 5.1.3 for these conditions. 
444 Conditions 3.20 (d) and (e), see Section 5.1.3 for details of these conditions. 
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The financial obligation of the applicant is thus stated as being 33 years post mine 
operation.  There are several concerns related to this. Firstly, there is no definition of 
what is considered ‘post mine operation’, which is problematic as this term could apply 
to when the physical mining operations cease or when mine closure has been obtained 
in terms of S43 of the MPRDA. These two definitions provide for a significantly 
different commencement date of the 33 years. The completion of mine physical 
operations is planned to occur within 14 years, but could also occur whenever the 
applicant decides to cease operating, based on financial or other reasons.445 Closure of 
the mine, however, is generally accepted to be when a closure certificate is issued by 
the Department of Mineral Resources, with concurrence of the Department of Water 
Affairs446 and the landowner. This closure can take a number of years post the cessation 
of the operation phase, as the process requires that rehabilitation is finalised, structures 
are removed or are made safe, and water management must be at such a level where 
there is limited environmental risk. 
 
Perhaps the assumption could be made that ‘post mine operation’ was meant to refer to 
mine closure. This assumption is made based on the norms set out by the MPRDA 
(which requires that the applicant is responsible for any environmental liability447 prior 
to the closure of the mine), as well as the EMPr provisions448 (in terms of which the 
applicant is responsible for implementing the offset management plan during planning, 
construction, operation and decommissioning phases449). However, this argument on the 
EMPr is weakened by the fact that the EMPr appears to only be approved for the 
construction and operation phase.450 Thus, there is uncertainty on the intention of the 
EA and this could result in government having to inherit this financial burden of 
managing the offset significantly sooner than perhaps was planned for. 
 
This condition further provides for the applicant to make annual instalments, which 
obviously would not be sufficient to manage these areas should the applicant not fulfil 
its intention to mine for the full period. Under this scenario, the payments during the 
                                                 
445 Based on financial cost and benefits of continuation of mining and worth of extracted heavy minerals. 
446 S43 of the MPRDA. 
447 Section43(1) of the MPRDA. 
448 Which must be complied with as per Condition 3.6, which states that the EMPr provisions are an 
extension of the EA - KZN DAEA Fairbreeze, op cit note 25, at 10. 
449 Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 352 -355. 
450 Condition 3.5, KZN DAEA Fairbreeze, op cit note 25, at 10; as see Section 5.2.1. 
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closure period would also forfeit. Thus, this condition inadvertently places the State at 
an additional financial risk. 
 
Secondly, the condition is silent on how the management and rehabilitation of the offset 
sites are to occur prior to the trust being initiated. Again, an assumption could be made 
that this is the applicant’s separate responsibility (based on the EMPr provisions). The 
explicit setting out of this requirement, however, would have removed any uncertainty 
in this regard in the enforcement of this EA. 
 
Further to this, is that the offset conditions do not set out who will take on the financial 
burden of managing the offset sites after the 33 years. A conjecture could be made that 
this would revert to government, which is what is assumed above. However, equally it 
could be assumed that after 33 years no further management is required. Government 
could decline to take on this burden, particularly if the site is not designated as a 
protected area with an appointed management authority. Again, the lack of explicit 
conditions  places the continued long-term security of the biodiversity offset at risk. 
 
5.2.4.2 Compliance monitoring 
The Fairbreeze Mine EA includes no explicit requirement for the ongoing compliance 
monitoring of the offset sites. Requirements for monitoring are set out in the EMPr, 
which in one section indicates that the success of the offsets will be measured as per the 
conditions and monitoring requirements of the offset management plan.451 However, the 
condition for the offset management plan specifies that such must be used to guide 
rehabilitation and maintenance,452 and no mention is made of monitoring reports. 
 
Thus, there appears to be no requirement that compliance monitoring be undertaken. It 
is possible that the Department could argue that such was implicit and should be part of 
the management plan. Indeed, the draft KZN Offset guideline document clearly sets out 
that the management plan must include auditing and reporting requirements.453 This 
argument is however significantly weakened by the MEC appeal response, which 
                                                 
451 Exigent (February), op cit note 376, at 353. 
452 Condition 3.24, KZN DAEA Fairbreeze, op cit note 25, at 13; See Section 5.1.3. 
453 Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, op cit note 20, at 97. 
85 
 
indicated that the guideline (being a draft) should not be relied on in making decisions 
around the EA.454  
 
Further to this, Condition 3.13 requires that monitoring reports must be submitted to the 
Department only for the construction and operational phases,455 thus leaving out the 
requirement for reporting on the offsets post operations.  
 
In view of these observations, there appear to be significant gaps in the EA conditions, 
which could result in the offset being inadequately implemented and managed, thus 
putting at risk both the viability of the offset and biodiversity. 
 
It is however further noted that even if long term compliance monitoring had been an 
explicit requirement of the EA, it is possible that over time, once government officials 
working on the project have moved on and once the mine has closed and compliance 
monitoring of the mine has ceased, that the land could by attrition revert to being 
utilised for other land uses.  This attrition is possible as the EA controls, through the 
construction phase or operational phase of a mine, is acknowledged and is the norm.456 
Without accepted norms with regard to long-term management of offsets there is no 
continuity in place for EA compliance to occur years after closure of the operation. 
 
5.2.5 Transparency of the biodiversity offset process 
The requirement for transparency and the involvement of the public in the biodiversity 
offset process is a clear requirement of the BBOP process. In South Africa, this 
requirement for public participation during the EIA process is set out in common law, 
the Constitution, PAJA, NEMA and its principles,457 as well as Chapter 6 of the EIA 
Regulations, 2010. 
 
                                                 
454 Mtunzini Conservancy Appeal Response, op cit note 26, at 19; Twinstreams Blue People Advocacy 
Group, op cit note 26, at 19. 
455 KZN DAEA Fairbreeze, op cit note 25, at 11. 
456 This is supported by a common condition which is also contained within this EA, Condition 3.9, 
which requires that an Environmental Control Officer is appointed to ensure that the mitigation 
measures, EA and EMPr requirements are implemented for the construction, operation and 
decommissioning phases (my emphasis). 
457 Refer to Section 4.7 above, as well as note 364 to 368 for details on these requirements. 
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With regards to NEMA and the EIA Regulations, it must be noted that the public 
participation process contemplated ends with the issuing of a decision.458 This in itself 
is not problematic in terms of the public’s rights to administrative justice and access to 
information, as it would be expected that the EIA decision would be undertaken based 
on a detailed report which provides the public and the competent authority with a clear 
picture of the impacts, the mitigation measures and how such mitigation could be 
implemented. The public is further provided with an opportunity to give input on any 
reports submitted, right up to the final report that the competent authority utilises in the 
decision. 
 
In the case of the Fairbreeze Mine EA the decision was undertaken prior to the offset 
being finalised in terms of offset types, potential sites and management of said sites. 
These issues, according to the EA, are to be resolved post environmental authorisation, 
and involve the submission of new information on the biodiversity offsets. Case law is 
clear that the public must be allowed to participate in all stages of environment 
decisions,459 as is the requirement for a fair administrative process.460 The question is 
thus: Did the EA and its conditions exclude the public from rightfully making 
representations on decisions regarding the biodiversity offset process, their finalisation 
and whether the offset achieves what it ought to achieve? 
 
It is argued that decisions around the biodiversity offset would affect the public’s right 
to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations and 
the requirement that development which meets present needs will take place without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 461 The public 
thus could be expected to have a legitimate interest in providing representation on the 
proposed design and means for implementation of the entire biodiversity offset462. 
 
 It is argued that the design and implementation measures of the biodiversity offset 
would be a significant determiner of whether the project could be considered 
                                                 
458 Murombo T, ‘Beyond public participation: the disjuncture between South Africa's Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) law and sustainable development’(2008) 3 Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal 1-31, 11. 
459 Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
and Another 2005 (3) SA 156 (C), para 113; Petro Props (Pty) Ltd v Barlow and Another 2006 (5) SA 
160 (W), paras 73.2 and 73.3; Save the Vaal, op cit note 364, at para 19. 
460 S3 of PAJA. 
461 S24 of the Constitution. 
462 S23(2)(d) of NEMA requires that the public is given adequate and appropriate opportunity for public 
participation in decisions that may affect the environment. 
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sustainable, and whether the CA decision would uphold the public trust and the public’s 
right to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future 
generations.463 The biodiversity offset design and implementation measures thus must 
be considered as part of the application documentation, and that decision on this 
information as administrative decisions for the environmental authorisation process. In 
this regard the EIA Regulations clearly set out that the public must be given an 
opportunity to comment and to bring to the attention of the competent authority any 
issues which that party believes may be of significance to the consideration of the 
application.464 
 
On the basis of above it is thus argued that the CA decision to require the submission of 
new biodiversity offset information, post authorisation, on the outstanding wetland 
offset, excluded the public from rightfully making representations on administrative 
decisions around the biodiversity offset process. 
 
It is also noted that the EA in providing for alternative offsets, for the other offset 
components, through the use of the term or ‘equivalent’ offset in Condition 3.20(a) and 
(b) opens the argument on whether the public would have also been excluded from 
making representation on these equivalent offset reports. Such argument could 
potentially be made as equivalent has not been defined in terms of whether this is size, 
location, or type of offset and thus potentially an equivalent site could significantly 
differ from the current proposals.  
 
With regards to the submission of new information post authorisation, it is noted that 
Justice Griesel in the Earthlife Africa judgment states that the introduction of new 
matters without allowing the public the right to respond is to be considered 
administratively unfair; and further, that procedural unfairness affecting a decision 
renders such a decision susceptible to review.465  
 
                                                 
463 These issues are part of what the CA has to consider when determining whether an environmental 
authorisation should be granted, as set out in S24(4)(a)(ii) of NEMA.  
464 R56(1) of the EIA Regulations, 2010. 
465 Earthlife Africa v Director-General: DEAT, supra note 459, at Para 57, 91, 95 and 101. 
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5.2.6 Administrative justice  
As noted in the discussion on South Africa law in Chapter 4, just administrative action 
requires that administrative decisions are fair, lawful and reasonable.466 In this regard, 
the discussion in Section 5.2.5 appears to indicate that there is a case to be made that 
the decision undertaken to issue the EA prior to conclusion of the biodiversity offset 
was procedurally unfair. 
 
The competent authority, in undertaking a decision on whether to authorise activities, is 
required to ensure that such is an informed decision, based on the clear setting out of 
the environmental consequences of an activity, which integrates the NEMA principles 
in the decision process.  
 
At the time that the decision was taken to authorise the project, the competent authority 
did not, however, have all the facts at hand and, it could thus be argued, could not 
wholly ascertain that the biodiversity offsets would adequately ensure the protection of 
biodiversity. Following this argument, it could be further argued that, at the time of the 
decision the competent authority could not have been able to make a judgement on 
whether the mining proposal could be considered as sustainable. As the application 
documentation had not, as yet, provided evidence that the activities would not exceed 
beyond the level which the integrity of the ecosystems would be jeopardised, or that the 
degradation and disturbance of ecosystems and loss of biodiversity could be remedied, 
and thus that these negative impacts on the environment and people’s environmental 
rights could be adequately remedied.467,468 
 
It is thus put forward, that the CA erred in accepting the EIA report,469 as the content of 
the report could not support an informed decision. It is further submitted that the CA 
erred in putting conditions in the EA that provided for the submission of new 
information, without providing for a public participation process. Further, that the 
competent authority erred in that the conditions in the EA did not adequately provide 
                                                 
466 See discussion in Section 4.3 and note 293. 
467 S2(4)(a)(i), (ii), (vi) and (viii) of NEMA. 
468 It could on this basis, be further argued that the CA, in undertaking this decision failed to uphold its 
duty to adequately protect the environment which is held in trust for the people of South Africa 
469 Accepted in terms of R34 of the EIA Regulations, 2010. 
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for the implementation, monitoring and required long-term duration of the biodiversity 
offsets, as required in S24E of NEMA.470  
 
Based on the above it is put forward that the decision to issue the EA, on the face of it, 
could be argued as being unlawful as it did not fully consider all relevant issues and did 
not comply with a mandatory condition prescribed by an empowering provision,471 and 
could be argued as being procedurally unfair.472 
 
5.2.7 Conclusion  
It is concluded that the Fairbreeze Mine EA as it stands does not provide for a 
functional biodiversity offset, and that the implementation and ongoing management of 
the biodiversity offsets would be reliant on the applicant’s goodwill and not the 
enforceability of the EA conditions.  
 
It is, however, further concluded that many of the problems identified are due to the 
offset report not being finalised prior to a decision, and the fact that the EA conditions 
did not provide sufficient detail and enforceability regarding the required 
implementation, the required protection levels for the offset, and long term management 
and monitoring. These issues could thus potentially be avoided in other EAs requiring 
biodiversity offsets. 
 
The application commenced in October 2010 and a decision was issued in July 2012.473 
It is put forward that the pressure on the competent authority to finish processing the 
application is likely to have caused many of the errors found in the EA. This is not as 
easy to solve, as the EIA process as set up can only determine that an offset should be 
investigated after a full BAR/EIA process is undertaken.  Further, any project which 
                                                 
470  The minimum conditions for an EA require that adequate provision is made for the ongoing 
management and monitoring of the impacts of the activity on the environment throughout the lifecycle 
of the activity. 
471 S6(2)(b) of PAJA. It is noted that the NEMA provision refers to the lifecycle of the project and that 
post mine closure it could be argued that the lifecycle would be complete. In the case of this application 
it is however argued that the impacts of the mine would last beyond the mine closure and that the long 
term management of the biodiversity offset would be part of this lifecycle. See note 312 and Section 4.4 
for further discussion around the concept of the lifecycle of a project and how this relates to 
biodiversity offsets. 
472 S6(2)(c) and S6(2)(e)(iii) of PAJA. 
473 The following occurred in between these dates: The submission of the BAR to the CA in July 2011; 
Amendments and further investigation on the biodiversity offset was request by the CA in October 
2011 (the EAP had, prior to a decision by the CA, investigated biodiversity offsets as an option); The 




required an offset would be on a site which had high biodiversity value, and thus would 
likely have required a number of specialist studies to investigate the impacts, which 
would also have taken time. An offset process significantly lengthens this time and it is 
likely that the applicant would, as a matter of course, apply pressure for the competent 
authority to provide shortcuts. 
 
There is currently no alternative process provided which would facilitate a quicker 
decision when an offset must be investigated. However, the time spent on investigating 
and determining offsets would be reduced by a clear guideline, which would allow all 
the roleplayers to understand how the process should be undertaken, the time periods 
involved, and where their input would be required. Further, such a guideline would 
allow the CA to review and make a decision on the project within a shorter timeframe. 
 
Further to these issues is the lack of current mechanisms to provide for the central 
registration of biodiversity offsets and for the long-term compliance monitoring 
required for a biodiversity offset. Thus, unless the offset is designated as a nature 
reserve or protected environment, there is a high possibility that the EA, under the 
current EIA Regulation process, would be filed away post construction or operation and 





CHAPTER 6                                                                                       
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
South Africa, in striving to achieve sustainable development, has prioritised five 
national strategic priorities, including the protection of ecosystems and the efficient use 
of natural resources. 474  In line with this strategic priority, and international trends, 
South Africa has started investigating and utilising biodiversity offsets as a tool to 
implement sustainable development by providing for the protection of ecosystems 
whilst facilitating economic development. Biodiversity offsets have, in particular, been 
considered and utilised through NEMA and the EIA Regulations. 
 
The biodiversity offset process is relatively new in South Africa and at this time there is 
little literature available on South Africa’s regulatory and enabling legislation for 
biodiversity offsets. South Africa’s legislation, in particular the legislation governing 
the EIA process, was therefore assessed in this dissertation to answer the question of 
whether such laws currently provide an adequate framework for the implementation of 
biodiversity offsets. 
 
From this assessment, it could be concluded that it is possible, within the constraints of 
administrative law, to utilise the process provided for by the EIA Regulations to 
manage and implement biodiversity offsets. However, there are several aspects which 
are not provided for, which, it is put forward, hinders the effectiveness of biodiversity 
offsets in South Africa. These aspects are, broadly, the lack of: approved guidelines; a 
system to register and keep track of offsets; mechanisms to ensure that the land-use 
remains conservation for the required duration of the offset; and mechanisms to ensure 
that the land is adequately management for the required duration of the offset. 
 
With regards to these aspects, it is noted that it appears to be the norm, in foreign 
countries, that biodiversity offsets, being a relatively new tool, are implemented using 
                                                 
474 The 2011-2014 National Strategy for Sustainable Development and Action Plan (NSSD1) sets out 
five national strategic priorities, of which Priority 2 is ‘sustaining our ecosystems and using natural 
resources efficiently’- Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism ‘National Strategy for 
Sustainable Development and Action Plan (NSSD 1) 2011–2014’, (23 November 2011), 19. 
The NSSD is the implementation document for the 2008 National Framework for Sustainable 
Development, which was developed to provide a coherent and overarching national strategy for 
sustainable development - Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism ‘A National Framework 




existing EIA or similar legislation in conjunction with biodiversity offset policies and 
guidelines, and not with legislation specifically written for biodiversity offsets.475 South 
Africa’s current approach of utilising EIA legislation and guidelines to implement 
offsets is thus in line with this thinking. However, it is put forward that although using 
EIA legislation is a feasible option, South Africa’s current EIA laws are not adequately 
tailored to effectively secure and manage biodiversity offsets, and that amendments to 
legislation are required to facilitate the implementation of biodiversity offsets. 
 
6.1 GUIDELINES 
South Africa’s current draft guidelines follow the approach and thinking of the BBOP’s 
standards and guidelines on what constitutes a biodiversity offset and how such an 
offset should be implemented.  Although it is noted that offsets are a relatively new 
process and that the BBOP approach requires further rigorous testing and further 
scientific input, this approach has however had input from a range of professionals and 
is currently the best international guidance available. South Africa aligning with the 
BBOP’s guidelines has thus followed current best practice. 
 
Currently, despite the legislation providing for guidelines for the EIA Regulations and 
for wider application, South Africa has no overarching framework for biodiversity 
offsets. It also appears that the delay in the completion of this national framework has 
had a subsequent effect of delaying the finalisation of the provincial guidelines. 
Biodiversity offsets are therefore currently being implemented without any 
standardisation, no certainty for developers and no guidance to EAPs, I&APs and the 
competent authorities. In stating this, it is noted that the draft provincial guidelines are 
being utilised, however, being in draft format such is open to challenge from all 
participants. 
 
It is put forward that this lack of framework and guidelines significantly impacts on the 
efficiency of the biodiversity offset process and could lead to poorly thought out 
decisions and unviable biodiversity offsets. 
 
                                                 
475 For example this can be seen in the Canadian, Australian and US approach, where Canada utilised the 
Canadian Fisheries Act and the habitat policy; Australia the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act and the associated biodiversity offset policy; and US the Clean Water Act and the 
Endangered Species Act and associated guidelines – see Section 2.1 for more details in this regard. 
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6.2 CENTRAL REGISTER OF BIODIVERSITY OFFSETS 
The provision for a central registration of biodiversity offsets would allow for details to 
be recorded on how the offset is to be implemented and the responsible parties for its 
implementation. An associated maintenance of a GIS layer would also allow for the 
location of the offsets to be spatially available. A register and spatial layer would allow 
other organs of state and sectors (national, provincial and local) to have this information 
when undertaking spatial planning or making application decisions, and would thus 
facilitate the protection of such sites. It would further ensure that existing offset areas 
are not used for other offsets (i.e. that there is no ‘double’ use of areas). A central 
register would also facilitate the required long term management of offsets, as the sites 
would not rely on the EA as the sole record of the biodiversity offset.  
 
As with NEMPA,476 it is argued, that this requirement should be written into legislation 
to ensure that such is undertaken and that there is a responsible party for its 
maintenance and distribution to other organs of state and sectors. 
 
6.3 LEGALLY SECURING THE LAND USE OF BIODIVERSITY OFFSETS 
Legally securing biodiversity offsets should preferably be undertaken through the 
nature reserve category in NEMPA, as such provides the greatest protection for the 
biodiversity. However, not all biodiversity sites would fit this NR criterion, especially 
wetlands which could be a number of small areas to make up the complete offset. In 
these cases, conservation servitudes are generally the next viable option. The legislation 
that provides for such servitudes is, however, not effective for long term management 
of biodiversity offsets, as protection only stays in place for the lifetime of the person to 
whom the servitude is in favour. Although this problem can be mitigated to a certain 
extent through the use of a juristic person, it is put forward that it would be more user 
friendly if it was legally required that all biodiversity offset agreements be recorded in a 
notarial deed and registered against the property’s title deeds, through the Deeds 
Registries Act. This would require the amendment of NEMA or the EIA Regulations or 
the development of separate biodiversity offset legislation.  
 
This does not however prevent other legislation, such as MPRDA, from impacting on 
the biodiversity offset. There is still therefore a need for a mechanism to secure the site 
solely for the implementation of the biodiversity offset, as provided for the NR option. 
                                                 
476 S10 of NEMPA. 
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For the biodiversity offset to be agreed to, there must be certainty that the offset will 
remain available for the required timeframe and in the required condition. It is therefore 
argued that such security is required, as mining on these sites would mean a gap where 
the site does not function as a biodiversity offset. Mining on these sites would also 
generally negate its biodiversity value as restoration after mining, to its required 
biodiversity level, is unlikely to be financial possible and/ or successful within 
acceptable ecological timeframes.  
 
To facilitate such, there is the option that biodiversity offsets could be written into the 
NEMPA, as a type of protected area under Section 9 of NEMPA. This is put forward as 
the objectives of this Act include, inter alia: 
 
to effect a national system of protected areas in South Africa as part of a strategy to 
manage and conserve its biodiversity; 
to provide for a representative network of protected areas on state land, private land 
and communal land.477 
 
Although biodiversity offsets are not initiated for these reasons, it could be argued that 
such would be the end result of biodiversity offsets sites. The advantage of this would 
be that NEMPA already has provisions for a register and for the management of 
protected areas. Further, if the NEMPA’s mining exclusion was extended to these offset 
sites, such would provide security on par with a NR.  
 
6.4 LONG TERM MANAGEMENT OF BIODIVERSITY OFFSETS 
For biodiversity offset sites to be viable for the long term, expert management of the 
site is required and compliance monitoring must be in place for the entire duration of 
the biodiversity offset. 
 
With regards to management, the polluter pays principle478 places the responsibility on 
the developers for any degradation resulting from their activities. Developers’ expertise 
is, however, not in conservation. Thus it could be questioned whether the physical 
management of the land by developers would be practical. In general, provincial and 
national conservation departments are already overstretched, both personnel wise and 
                                                 
477 S2(c) and (d) of NEMPAA. 
478 See note 267. 
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financially, and thus the additional unfunded burden of biodiversity offsets would also 
appear to not be desirable, and would not be in line with the polluter pays principle.479 
  
It is put forward that a solution could be that developers have financial and physical 
responsibility for the setting up of the site and financial responsibility for the long term 
management of the site, with the conservation departments or another appropriate third 
party having access to the management fund to provide for staff and equipment. For 
government to ensure that developers contribute to the long term management of the 
biodiversity offset sites thus relies significantly on a method of ensuring the long term 
management of a fund which can cover the expenses of managing such sites. 
 
Such a fund could be centrally located and an organ of state mandated to implement 
biodiversity offsets, thus allowing for a direct charge against the national Revenue 
Fund.  However, such would require the mandated organ of state to be listed in 
Schedule 5 of the PFMA, and legislation that provides for such a withdrawal to be 
approved by Parliament. Currently, Schedule 5 includes remuneration for the president, 
ministers and parliament, judges and magistrates, and thus it is questioned whether 
remuneration for offset management falls within these boundaries. 
 
 It appears that the use of trust funds managed individually or jointly by a non-profit 
organisation is the most appropriate option available, and could make funding available 
to provinces that have conservation entities, or (in other provinces that do not have 
conservation entities) to approved third parties, for the physical management of the site. 
The route to undertake needs to be clearly set out for the various competent authorities, 
as, as noted above, long term management requires that this funding be secured. 
 
Further to the financial provisions is the risk to long term management of the land as a 
result of difficulties with compliance and enforcement through the EA. EAs are 
currently viewed as a tool to manage impacts from construction through to 
decommissioning, as can be seen with regards to the EMPr requirements which control 
the implementation of mitigation measures.480 Due to this, and the existing capacity 
                                                 
479 See note 267. 
480 As noted in Section 5.2.4.2, EA controls, through the construction phase or operational phase of a 
mine, is acknowledged and is the norm. This is supported by (i) the EMPr required phases of planning, 
construction, operation and decommissioning and (ii) a standard EA condition which requires that an 
Environmental Control Officer is appointed to ensure that the mitigation measures, EA and EMPr 
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constraint experienced by compliance units, there is a high possibility that biodiversity 
offsets would falter after the normal EA compliance route has been finalised. As noted 
above, the registration of biodiversity offsets could abate this risk, as would the 
inclusion of biodiversity offsets in NEMPA, which would allow the biodiversity offset 
site, once fully operational, to be managed and audited under NEMPA.  This option 
would reduce the burden on the Department of Environment’s EIA unit, which is 
already experiencing capacity constraints handling compliance on discrete projects. 
 
If this risk is, however, to be managed through the EIA Regulations, it is put forward 
that there must be specific provision for the offset stage in the regulations. In this 
regard, clarification must be provided that the lifecycle of a project includes 
biodiversity offsets (where these are undertaken), and that the EMPr should include the 
implementation, management and monitoring of this mitigation measure. 
 
6.5 AMENDMENT OF THE EIA REGULATIONS 
It is put forward that the inclusion of biodiversity offsets in the EIA Regulations, 
supported by the guidelines and national framework, would provide for an approach 
that is legally defensible and which can provide the guidance required to all role 
players.  
 
Despite the above, it is noted that conservation areas are already managed through 
NEMPA, and thus it was not the intention for EIA Regulations to duplicate this 
function. In this regard it is put forward that, as a minimum, biodiversity offsets should 
be incorporated into NEMPA. However, provision for the decision making around 
biodiversity offsets 481  and the implementation of the offset sites should be made 
through amendments to the EIA Regulations. Amended provisions should ideally 
describe at what stage the decision to consider offsets can be undertaken and on what 
basis the CA can consider an offset and should also set out the minimum information 
requirements of an offset report.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
requirements are implemented for the construction, operation and decommissioning phases. Without 
accepted norms with regard to long-term management of offsets there is no continuity in place for EA 
compliance to occur years after closure of the operation or, in the case of construction impacts, years 
after the construction activity has been finalised. 
481 Which would need to include, at a minimum, (i) the extension of the lifecycle of the project to include 
biodiversity offsets; (ii) that biodiversity offsets were part of the mitigation hierarchy; (iii) that 
biodiversity offsets are legitimate tools that can provide mitigation for listed activities, even out of kind 
and those located away from the development sites.  
97 
 
Biodiversity offsets are a new process and South Africa is still determining how this 
should be undertaken. Although the process could continue under national and 
provincial guidelines, it is submitted that the process of implementing offsets and the 
long term management of offset sites would be significantly improved by the 
amendments to the legislation and process suggested above. 
 
6.6 VIABILITY OF BIODIVERSITY OFFSETS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONTEXT 
Despite international and foreign countries, thinking and input into biodiversity offset 
approaches, there is still a significant question of whether the ability to accurately 
assess and offset the impact on the full scale of biodiversity is currently available.482  
South Africa notwithstanding its advances in systematic conservation assessments and 
spatial planning also faces this challenge. 
 
Although the above indicates that biodiversity offsets could be secured and managed 
there is still thus the fundamental issue of whether offsets are an approach South Africa 
should be taking. South Africa has no working example of an implemented and 
successful long term biodiversity offset, and neither does BBOP, thus perhaps at this 
stage judgement should be suspended. It is however put forward that South Africa must 
be ready in the next ten years to undertake this assessment and judgement of whether 
biodiversity offsets sufficiently uphold the environmental public trust, and is a tool that 
South Africa should be using to ensure that the development, which meets present 
needs, takes place without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.483   
 
  
                                                 
482 See discussion in Section 2.5. 
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